Sua sponte dismissal as a sanction; MCR 2.504(B)(1); Schell v Baker Furniture Co; Dismissal with prejudice; Relevant factors; Vicencio v Ramirez; Mistaken understanding of MCR 2.202(A)(1)(b); Personal representative (PR)

The court held that the trial court had authority to sua sponte dismiss the action as a sanction, but that it abused its discretion by doing so “with prejudice without adequately considering the relevant circumstances and available lesser sanctions.” Plaintiff alleged that she slipped and was injured while shopping at an Aldi store in 2020. There were discovery problems in the case, and discovery remained outstanding when she died on 1/2/25. Months later, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, relying “on counsel’s failure to file a notice of death or seek substitution within the applicable time frames, plaintiff’s refusal to engage in meaningful discovery, and counsel’s failure to appear when ordered to do so.” On appeal, the court considered the merits despite the absence of an order substituting the estate’s PR as plaintiff. It rejected the argument that “the trial court lacked authority to dismiss the action sua sponte.” While plaintiff relied on Schell, “MCR 2.504(B)(1) was amended after Schell and now expressly authorizes a trial court to act sua sponte.” The question was whether “dismissal with prejudice was a proper exercise of that authority[.]” The court concluded the record left “little doubt that substantial sanctions were warranted.” And it noted that the “record may ultimately support dismissal with prejudice[.]” But the trial court had to “evaluate the available alternatives on the record and explain why dismissal with prejudice is just and proper under the circumstances.” As the record did not show it “made that discretionary determination, remand” was required. The court vacated the dismissal order and remanded “for the trial court to reconsider the appropriate sanction. On remand, [it] may consider the entire history of the proceedings, including plaintiff’s discovery violations, counsel’s conduct following plaintiff’s death, [its] prior efforts to secure compliance, and the prejudice to defendants.” The court expressed no opinion on which sanction should be imposed, directing only that the trial court make a record showing “that the sanction selected is just and proper under the circumstances.”