Waiver of counsel; Validity; People v Anderson; Advice required by MCR 6.005(E); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Search warrant authorizing a forensic examination of defendant’s electronic devices; People v Carson; People v Hughes; Good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule; United States v Leon; People v Goldston; Admission of an unavailable witness’s preliminary exam testimony; MRE 804(a)(4) & (b)(1); Confrontation Clause

The court held that defendant validly waived his right to counsel, and rejected his claim that his prior counsel (S) rendered ineffective assistance. As to his challenge to the search warrant for his electronic devices, the court concluded that even if it was insufficiently particular, the resulting evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Finally, the admission of an unavailable witness’s preliminary exam “testimony did not violate MRE 804(b)(1) or the Confrontation Clause.” Thus, in these consolidated cases it affirmed his convictions of AWIGBH, felony-firearm, extortion, using a computer to commit a crime with a maximum penalty of 20 years, using a computer to commit a crime with a maximum penalty of 4 years, and unlawful posting of a message with aggravating circumstances. On appeal, he first asserted that his counsel waiver was not valid because a fee dispute with S “effectively forced him to represent himself.” He further asserted that the trial court did not provide the advice required by MCR 6.005(E) each day of trial. The court found that the record established “a valid initial waiver. After jury selection, defendant told the [trial] court that he had studied court procedures and believed that he could present a better defense than” S. The trial court advised him “that one charge carried a 20-year maximum sentence and warned that self-representation increased the likelihood of conviction. Defendant confirmed that he understood those risks and nevertheless wished to proceed. [S] remained present and available to advise him.” The court concluded that he did “not identify any deficiency in that colloquy under MCR 6.005(D) or Anderson.” In addition, the asserted fee dispute did not “render the waiver involuntary.” Based on the record, defendant did not show “that a fee demand compelled his decision or that the trial court plainly erred by accepting his unequivocal request.” As to MCR 6.005(E), any departure from the rule did “not require reversal. The renewed-waiver requirement is not itself constitutional, and noncompliance is reviewed under the plain-error rule.” The court noted that the rule “does not expressly treat every day of a continuous trial as a separate proceeding. More importantly, the record leaves no reasonable question that defendant remained aware of his right to counsel and continued to reject it.”