Appointed counsel fees reimbursement; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv); The Michigan Indigent Defense Commission (MIDC) financed portion of defendant’s legal expenses; The Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act; Double recovery claim; Right to counsel of choice; Denial of adjournment to change counsel; People v Wilson; Whether substitute counsel should have been appointed; People v Mack; Good cause; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 19; MCL 777.49(c); People v Deweerd; Crosby remand; Appellate jurisdiction as to a postjudgment order issue; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court rejected defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s assessment of attorney fees for her appointed counsel, concluding that the statutory scheme in the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act “prevents the trial court’s funding unit from realizing a double recovery.” It also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request for an adjournment to change counsel, and she “was neither denied her Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel of choice nor entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel.” But it remanded for further proceedings as to the scoring of OV 19. Defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion and larceny in a building. Applying the Wilson factors to her claim that the trial court should have adjourned trial to allow her to retain substitute counsel, the court concluded that the trial court’s ruling was “a reasoned refusal to postpone a long-delayed trial mere hours before it was scheduled to begin based on nonspecific complaints about counsel and an indefinite plan to hire a replacement.” It also found that she failed to show good cause for the appointment of a different attorney. As to attorney fees, the trial court imposed the entire cost of her representation, $1,400. She argued “that she should be required to reimburse only the portion of that cost paid from the trial court’s funding unit’s local funds, excluding the portion financed by state grants from the MIDC. In her view, requiring reimbursement of the full amount would allow the funding unit to recover twice for the same expense.” The court disagreed, finding that this “argument misapprehends the statutory funding scheme.” It noted that pursuant to MCL 780.983(i), “recovered attorney fees ‘must not alter the calculation of the local share.’ And the local share excludes ‘money reimbursed to the system by individuals determined to be partially indigent.’” As to OV 19, while “the trial court’s rationale for scoring 10 points” was inadequate, it did not follow that the record could not support this score. The court concluded that a Crosby remand was the proper remedy. Finally, it found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the restitution imposed in the amended JOS given that this appeal was from the original JOS. Affirmed but remanded.