Tenant trip & fall; Failure to maintain the sidewalk in a condition that rendered it fit for its intended use; MCL 554.139(1)(a); Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP; Common-law negligence; Height discontinuity; Reliance on statutes addressing municipal liability; MCL 691.1402a(3)(a); Effect of failing to respond to a summary disposition motion; MCR 2.116(G)(4)

The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that the sidewalk at issue was not unfit for the use the parties intended, but that it erred in granting defendants summary disposition on plaintiff-Williams’s common-law negligence claims. He filed the action after he tripped and “fell on three occasions while walking from his vehicle to his manufactured home located on a lot he leased from” defendant-Creekside Huron Shores (Huron Shores). Defendant-Creekside Communities (Creekside) maintained the property. As to Williams’s claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a), the “parties ostensibly intended the sidewalk at issue to be used for walking and providing access to the walkway located on Williams’s lot. The fact that the sidewalk had sunk to a degree, creating a height differential between the sidewalk and walkway, did not render it unfit for this use. As the trial court recognized, Williams had used the sidewalk without incident for more than one year before he fell.” As to his common-law negligence claims, the court concluded that a factual dispute existed as to “the height discontinuity, rendering summary disposition inappropriate.” Further, the trial court erred in “determining that defendants were entitled to summary disposition if the height differential was less than two inches.” While Williams failed to respond to defendants’ motion, the trial court (and the court) still had to “‘review the legal arguments and the evidence properly submitted in support to determine if they are sufficient in themselves to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’” The court held that MCL 691.1402a(3)(a)’s “rebuttable presumption of reasonable repair for municipal vertical discontinuities less than two inches . . . did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, it cannot be said that there exists no genuine issue of material fact that a private landowner should not be held to a higher standard than a municipality.” In addition, the statute relates to premises liability. “Williams did not allege a premises-liability claim against Creekside and could not have done so given that [it] did not have possession and control over the property. Defendants’ motion” did not assert an applicable defense to the claim against Creekside. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.