Medical malpractice; Administrative negligence; Wrongful Death Act (WDA); MCL 600.2922(6); Lost earning capacity; Loss of financial support; Daher v Prime Healthcare Servs-Garden City, LLC; Jury instructions; M Civ JI 12.01; Public Health Code (PHC); MCL 333.20201(1)(e); MCL 333.21513(a); Statutory violation as inference of negligence; Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Serv, Inc; Corporate-designee discovery; MCR 2.306(B)(3); Discovery sanctions; MCR 2.313(B)(2); Substitution of corporate designee

The court held that the challenged wrongful-death damages were recoverable as loss of financial support, the jury was properly instructed that violations of applicable PHC provisions could support an inference of negligence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery rulings or sanctions against defendant-hospital. Plaintiff’s decedent died after developing septic shock following abdominal surgery. The jury found both the surgeon and hospital negligent, with the hospital’s liability based on direct administrative negligence for failing to implement and enforce its chain-of-command policies. On appeal, the hospital first argued under Daher that the $4.3 million award labeled lost earning capacity was unavailable under the WDA. The court agreed that “lost-earning-capacity damages that are not for financial support are impermissible post-Daher,” but emphasized that “damages for loss of financial support remain recoverable.” The record showed plaintiff repeatedly sought compensation for the financial support the decedent would have provided her children. Thus, “there is . . . no basis upon which to vacate the damages award, which is supported by the record and not prohibited . . . as a matter of law.” The court next upheld M Civ JI 12.01. MCL 333.21513 and MCL 333.20201(1)(e) were intended to protect patients such as the decedent, she fell within the protected class, and expert testimony supported proximate causation. Thus, “all three requirements stated in Klanseck are applicable,” and instructing that statutory violations could permit an inference of negligence was proper. As to discovery, plaintiff’s notice seeking information about timely, safe patient care and supervision was sufficiently particular because the complaint specifically identified the hospital’s alleged failure to implement and enforce chain-of-command policies. The document request “clearly encompassed the chain-of-command policies” and the trial court properly sanctioned the hospital after more than a year of noncompliance, while rejecting the harsher sanction of default. Finally, it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to substitute a new corporate designee after the original designee professed ignorance of any chain-of-command policies. A corporate designee’s testimony represents the corporation’s knowledge, and allowing a new designee to provide new answers could permit impermissible “‘sandbagging.’” Affirmed.