Self-defense jury instructions; M Crim JI 7.16 (duty to retreat); Lack of evidence to support the instruction; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request M Crim JI 7.16; Futile requests; Admission of a to-do list found in defendant’s car; Whether the list constituted other acts evidence; Prior statement of defendant’s intent; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Moot issue as to a no-contact order; Failure to include the order in the judgment of sentence; MCR 6.427(9); Sentencing; Acquitted conduct; People v Beck; People v Brown; Unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle (UDAA)

The court held that the trial court did not plainly err in its jury instructions on self-defense and not giving M Crim JI 7.16 or 7.16a because they were not supported by the evidence. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the to-do-list found in defendant’s car, and it did not improperly rely on the acquitted armed robbery charge in sentencing him. Thus, the court affirmed his second-degree murder and UDAA convictions, and his sentences of 37 to 60 years for murder and 5 years for UDAA. As to the jury instructions, “providing M Crim JI 7.16 on the duty to retreat was not supported by defendant’s own testimony.” While self-defense and whether he “had a duty to retreat was arguably applicable when the victim” (C) approached the driver’s side of defendant’s girlfriend’s (G) “vehicle with a knife and defendant confronted him, [C] then dropped his weapon and retreated to his own vehicle after being stabbed by defendant. From that point forward, defendant had no reasonable belief that he or [G] was in danger of being killed or faced imminent great bodily harm. Based on defendant’s own testimony about what happened that evening, after [C] retreated, [G] pursued him, she entered [his] vehicle, and defendant then pulled [C] from his own vehicle. [G] then stabbed [C] to death. On these facts, an instruction on the duty to retreat was inappropriate and, even if given, very likely would not have benefited defendant at trial.” Further, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile request for the instruction. As to the admission of the to-do list, the court first concluded that it did not constitute other acts evidence and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude it under MRE 404(b). Next, while it did not name C, it “was relevant to defendant’s motive. The statements in the to-do list suggested that [he] had a motive to kill both [G] and individuals with whom she was ‘sliding,’ i.e., having sex.” The court concluded that a “reasonable jury could easily infer that if defendant was willing to kill a person and [G] for having consensual sex, then [he] would similarly be motivated to kill a person who allegedly raped” G. Thus, the list “was highly probative of defendant’s motive for murder, and” the court found “that it was not unfairly prejudicial.”