Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i) & (k)(ix); Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Casto; Jurisdiction over the child; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re Pacyga; Child’s best interests

The court held that respondent-father failed to show that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in the trial court, and that sufficient evidence established statutory grounds for jurisdiction. Further, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ (b)(i) and (k)(ix) justified terminating his parental rights, or in relying on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect. Finally, it did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the child’s (J) best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the termination order. It first determined that the “trial court did not err by concluding that respondent did not establish that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The record showed “that trial counsel, after conducting a reasonable and thorough investigation of the case guided by her unique experience in forensic-interview protocols, chose to pursue a strategy of challenging the veracity of” the child’s half-brother’s (C) “statements by vigorously cross-examining” the forensic interviewer. The court also found no merit in respondent’s ineffective assistance claim related to redaction of the medical records. It was “clear that trial counsel did object to the admission of the documents” but the trial court denied the objection. And trial “counsel’s decisions regarding the redaction of the medical records stemmed from legitimate trial strategy.” As to jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), C “confirmed that [J] was made to watch pornography with” him and someone else. Further, J’s mother testified to finding bruising on J’s labia, and that when J returned to her after a 10-day visit with respondent, J “had a ‘huge bruise’ on the left side of her face” that looked like she had been punched and her lip was bleeding. A CPS supervisor’s testimony could have also allowed the jury to find “that respondent was neglectful and would not provide proper or necessary support” to J under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). As to the statutory grounds for termination, the “evidence established that respondent had physically abused [J] and sexually abused [C] and it was reasonably likely that [J] would be sexually abused in the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home.”