Petition for appointment as a child’s guardian; MCL 700.5204(2)(b); Deschane v St Germain; In re Versalle Guardianship; Due process; Service of the probate court’s order; MCR 2.107(A)(1) & (3); Motion to reopen construed as a motion for relief from judgment under MCR 2.612(C); Right to access the court; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)

The court held that the record supported the probate court’s decision to deny petitioner’s guardianship petition for the child in question (OLH) on the ground that MCL 700.5204(2)(b)’s requirements were not met. It also concluded petitioner’s due process rights were not violated, and that the probate court did not err in denying her motion for reconsideration. Petitioner, who was not a relative, sought appointment as OLH’s guardian after caring for the child for several years. Respondents, OLH’s biological parents, opposed the petition. In denying the petition, the probate court “found that the evidence did not establish that respondents intended to permit OLH to permanently reside with petitioner as contemplated by MCL 700.5204(2)(b).” The critical question here was whether they “permitted OLH to reside with petitioner when the guardianship issue arose.” The court noted that, after “they moved from petitioner’s property, respondent-mother filed a police report seeking to have petitioner return OLH. That is powerful evidence that, at the time the petition was filed, permission for OLH to reside with petitioner was not ‘currently occurring.’ Indeed, the petition’s timing indicates that the guardianship issue arose because respondents no longer acquiesced in OLH’s living with petitioner. For these reasons, respondents’ ‘past permission’—that OLH lived with petitioner after respondents moved out of petitioner’s house and onto her property—'is irrelevant.’” In addition, the “probate court reasonably found the parties’ discussions about possible future adoption did not reflect an intent to permit OLH to permanently reside with petitioner.” The mother “repeatedly insisted that she viewed OLH’s living with petitioner as a temporary measure that would allow respondents to get on their feet financially; petitioner adopting OLH was a last resort that had proven to be unnecessary.” As to petitioner’s due process claims, the probate court served the signed order on her attorney by first-class mail, which “satisfied the service requirements in MCR 2.107(A)(1) and” (3), and “the probate court did not deny petitioner’s right to access the court.” Affirmed.