Right to speedy trial; Barker v Wingo factors; Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27a; MRE 403; People v Watkins; Authentication of Snapchat messages; MRE 901; Cumulative error; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); MCL 750.520b(2)(c); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Parks; People v Taylor; Prior-conviction exception to the general Apprendi v New Jersey rule; Almendarez-Torres v United States

The court held that defendant’s approximately 26-month pretrial detention did not violate his speedy-trial rights, that the trial court properly admitted his prior CSC II conviction and Snapchat messages, and that his mandatory LWOP sentences did not violate the state or federal constitutions. He was convicted of six counts of CSC I and accosting a child for an immoral purpose based on sexual conduct with a child under 13. On appeal, the court applied the Barker factors to his speedy-trial claim. The length of the delay favored defendant and created a presumption of prejudice. But the reasons for delay and his assertion of the right weighed against him, while the prejudice factor weighed slightly against him because he did not show impairment of his defense. The court concluded that “several delays were outside of the prosecution’s control, defendant complained about delays but did not file a motion, and he then requested new counsel on the eve of trial.” Thus, the prosecution overcame the presumption of prejudice. As to defendant’s 2002 CSC II conviction involving another child under 13, the court held that it was admissible under MCL 768.27a. Although approximately 20 years separated the offenses, defendant spent 12 of those years incarcerated, and the prior and current offenses shared relevant similarities. The prior conviction “may have been prejudicial, but it was not unfairly so,” particularly because the jury did not hear inflammatory details of the earlier offense. The Snapchat messages were also sufficiently authenticated under MRE 901 through the victim’s testimony and their content. The “prosecution ‘made a prima facie showing that a reasonable juror might conclude that the proffered evidence is what the proponent claims it to be,’” while disputes about whether defendant actually sent the messages went to weight rather than admissibility. Because defendant established no errors, his cumulative-error claim failed. Finally, the court declined to extend Parks and Taylor to invalidate his mandatory LWOP sentences. Although the qualifying prior CSC offense occurred when defendant was approximately 18, the six sentencing offenses occurred when he was about 37 or 38. “The concerns for adolescent brain development expressed in Parks and Taylor simply do not apply here when defendant was in his late 30s when he committed the sentencing offense.” The statute enhanced punishment for his adult conduct rather than imposing LWOP for the adolescent offense itself. His federal challenge also failed under the prior-conviction exception to Apprendi, and the prior conviction itself necessarily established that its victim was under 13. Affirmed.