First Amendment claim under 42 USC § 1983; Prior restraint; Coercive government threat; National Rifle Ass’n of Am v Vullo; School Social Media Policy; Speech ban; School Communication Policy; Time, place & manner restriction; Fourteenth Amendment; Vagueness; Title IX standing; Supplemental jurisdiction
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendant-School District’s Social Media Policy violated the First Amendment as a prior restraint and speech ban, but the Communication Policy did not violate the First Amendment, and her Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims were properly dismissed. Plaintiff, whose children attended the District, frequently criticized its curriculum and employees on social media. After one post, a principal sent her a letter requesting that she “cease and desist” from referring to District employees on social media and warning that failure to comply could result in “all available legal remedies.” The letter separately directed her not to contact District staff without prior administrative permission. On appeal from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court concluded that the threatened legal consequences plausibly transformed the nominal request concerning social media into coercion. “The invocation of ‘legal remedies’ for using officials’ names in her posted complaints recontextualizes this nominal ‘request.’ What initially appeared as an attempt to convince now more closely resembles an intent to coerce.” Applying Vullo’s guidance, the policy’s legalistic tone, plaintiff’s allegation that she stopped speaking publicly in response, and the express reference to adverse consequences supported a plausible claim even though the District lacked direct regulatory authority over her social-media activity. Her criticism of public-school officials was protected speech, and at the pleading stage her allegations that the District used coercive threats to suppress it were sufficient. By contrast, the Communication Policy was “not a gag but a funnel.” It merely required plaintiff to direct communications through designated administrators and constituted a reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. The Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claims failed because the challenged policies were sufficiently clear, while the principal’s public comments were not themselves a policy and another claim was forfeited. Plaintiff also lacked standing to assert Title IX violations on her own behalf because she was neither a District student nor suing as next friend of one. Because the First Amendment claim survived, the district court may reconsider the state-law claims on remand. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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