Criminal contempt for violating a personal protection order (PPO); Due process; Failure to conduct a hearing on respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO within 14 days; MCR 3.707(A)(2); Conducting the criminal-contempt hearing before addressing the motion to terminate the PPO

Concluding that “respondent would have been properly subjected to a criminal-contempt proceeding even if the trial court had expeditiously dealt with her motion to terminate the PPO” as required by MCR 3.707(A)(2), the court held that the delay in addressing her motion did not affect her substantial rights. Thus, it affirmed her bench-trial conviction for criminal contempt for violating the PPO. While she framed her challenge to the delay in hearing her motion to terminate the PPO as a constitutional issue, she relied only on “MCR 3.707(A)(2) as the basis for her argument that she was entitled to a hearing on that motion within 14 days of the date of filing.” She filed the motion on 9/16/21 but the trial court initially set a hearing on it for 10/11/21 and did not conduct the hearing until 11/1/21. Although the delay was largely due to “respondent’s request for appointed counsel to address the contempt matter, . . . the trial court plainly failed to schedule or conduct the hearing on respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO until long after the 14-day period prescribed by MCR 3.707(A)(2) expired. Given the expiration of the 14-day period,” the court had to determine whether the delay affected her substantial rights. This required that she show prejudice – that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. The court found that she could not do so. A party must obey a court order even if it is clearly incorrect. The trial court had “jurisdiction to issue the PPO against respondent, who was obligated to obey that order as long as remained in effect.” The court noted that she “committed her act of criminal contempt on a date when she knew the PPO was in effect and the 14-day deadline had not expired.” As a result, the outcome of the proceedings in this case, “i.e., termination of the PPO and a finding of criminal contempt with modest sanctions, would not have changed at all if the trial court had held a hearing and terminated the PPO within the 14-day period.”