Probate court order prohibiting a party’s contact with a legally protected person; The probate court’s inherent authority under MCL 700.1302(c); MCR 3.310; Constitutional rights to association & due process; Personal protection order (PPO)

The court held that the probate court had the authority to enter injunctive relief to protect Roberta Asplund, a legally protected person, where it entered the PPO “as equitable relief stemming from its inherent authority under MCL 700.1302(c).” Further, it did not abuse its discretion in ordering that appellant (Randall) no longer have contact with Roberta, his mother. Finally, the court found no merit to his claims that the probate court violated his constitutional rights. Thus, it affirmed the PPO. While Randall contended the probate court lacked the authority, or otherwise failed to follow the proper procedure, to issue the PPO, the court concluded “the probate court had the authority to enter injunctive relief consistent with MCR 3.310 to protect Roberta’s welfare and resolve the dispute over visitation.” As to Randall’s claim that the probate court did not explain its reasoning, it explained that he “had a long history of engaging in inappropriate behaviors directed at the professional caregivers who have been hired to help Roberta. His conduct had resulted in the need to move Roberta from her placement.” As to his assertion there was no evidentiary support for the probate court’s statements about his past conduct, the court noted that it had “already affirmed the probate court’s findings regarding Randall’s conduct in prior appeals.” The court next found that his “constitutionally guaranteed right to associate with others, namely Roberta, was not infringed upon when Roberta’s guardian asserted Roberta’s right not to associate with Randall. The controlling factor was whether it was in Roberta’s best interest to limit Randall’s visits.” The court found it was given that his visits were threatening her placement. And his “right to due process was not violated by the probate court’s refusal to provide Randall with more than notice of the proceedings and the meaningful opportunity to be heard or the refusal to hold another evidentiary hearing. Even though Randall’s interests were significant, they did not amount to a fundamental liberty interest and, thus, they did not require more than notice to Randall and his meaningful opportunity at the hearings. Randall was present at a majority of the hearings, and he was also represented by counsel.”