Criminal-contempt convictions for violating a domestic personal protection order (PPO); Freedom of speech; Posting messages through any medium of communication in violation of MCL 750.411s; Sentencing; Good-time credit under MCL 51.282(2); ARM v JKL; De facto “consecutive” sentencing; Due process & equal protection; Distinguishing In re Contempt of Tanksley; MCR 3.708(F); MCL 764.15b; MCR 8.107(A); Jail credit for time served under MCL 769.11b

In these consolidated appeals, the court remanded for correction of both sentencing orders to omit the provisions precluding statutory good-time credit but affirmed in all other respects. Respondent was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a domestic PPO. He “posted petitioner’s PPO petition and the PPO itself on Facebook, along with the caption, ‘Should have left the cell numbers off of the petition, dummies.’” The next day, he “made a second Facebook post that shared text messages between the parties, and some of the screen shots again included petitioner’s name and phone number.” Shortly after the “posts, petitioner began receiving hateful, threatening, and cryptic text messages from strangers.” On appeal, respondent first argued that his “conviction and related sentence must be vacated because the PPO is a public record and posting it to Facebook was protected free speech that could not serve as the basis for a PPO violation” The court held that considering “the totality of the circumstances, respondent’s posts did not involve a matter of public concern, but rather, ‘a thinly veiled attempt to immunize a private harassment campaign as a matter of public concern.’” Because the post was integral to his “violation of MCL 750.411s and did not involve speech relating to a public figure on a matter of public concern, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding respondent guilty of criminal contempt. Noble as [his] general issue advocacy may be, the trial court was not precluded from enforcing its PPO merely because the manner in which respondent purportedly violated its provisions involved speech.” He further argued “the trial court erred by ordering that he was not entitled to good-time credit under MCL 51.282(2).” The court agreed. Despite the unambiguous language of MCL 51.282(2) and the court’s interpretation in his “previous appeal, the trial court’s sentencing orders both stated that respondent was not entitled to good-time credit. Although ARM was decided after the last sentencing order at issue in these consolidated appeals, its reasoning is equally applicable, and we are bound to conclude that the trial court again erred by ordering that respondent was not entitled to earn good-time credit under MCL 51.282(2).” But the court rejected his claim “the trial court engaged in unlawful de facto consecutive sentencing by strategically delaying resolution of the various PPO violation allegations.”