Admission of evidence; Hearsay exception for evidence of the declarant’s state of mind; MRE 803(3); Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Right of confrontation; Whether a verified addendum in support of a petition for a PPO was testimonial; Failure to preserve or disclose video surveillance evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to suppress the victim’s cell phone; Failure to adequately advise defendant as to testifying at trial; Failure to obtain a neighbor’s video surveillance footage; Cumulative effect of errors

Finding no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions of first-degree felony murder and felony-firearm. It found defendant’s first argument, that the trial court erred when it removed his appointed counsel, W, as his trial counsel and replaced W with new appointed counsel was moot. As defendant acknowledged in his appellate brief, W “is deceased, and if this Court were to grant defendant his requested remedy of a new trial, he would again be represented by an attorney other than [W], the attorney whom defendant now claims to have preferred.” Thus, it was impossible for the court “to grant defendant a suitable remedy.” The court added that even if the issue were not moot, his argument lacked merit. It “was proper for the trial court to remove and replace [W] because he was unable to represent defendant while suspended from the practice of law.” Defendant next argued “that the trial court committed evidentiary and constitutional errors by admitting into evidence certain statements made by” victim-R. The court concluded R’s “statements were admissible under MRE 803(3). The central focus of [R’s] statements consisted of expressions that he was afraid of defendant and felt threatened by him.” The court found that the “statements also indicated a possible ground to find that defendant premeditated the murder.” Thus, it concluded “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the statements under MRE 803(3).” Defendant further suggested that R’s “statements should have been excluded because they were substantially more prejudicial than probative.” The court held that R’s “statements were probative of the family discord that existed between himself and defendant, which was relevant to motive and premeditation. Defendant’s behavior reflected in the statements was far less serious than his conduct underlying the charged offenses. There was no improper injection of considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. Even if there was unfair prejudice, it did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” Defendant further argued “that his state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation were violated by the admission into evidence of [R’s] verified addendum in support of the petition for PPO.” But the court determined that “because the statements contained in the verified addendum were not testimonial, defendant was not denied his constitutional rights of confrontation.”