Right to a speedy trial; People v. Williams; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20; MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A); People v. Waclawski; 27-month delay; People v. Rivera; Reasons for the delay; People v. Walker; People v. Cain; Assertion of the right to a speedy trial; Barker v. Wingo; Prejudice; People v. Chism; Due process right to a fair trial; Evidentiary issues; People v. Chelmicki; Claim that the shotgun recovered from the home of defendant’s sister was irrelevant because it did not have any connection to the charged crimes; People v. Castillo; Relevance; MRE 401; People v. Bass; MRE 403; People v. Crawford; People v. Kramer; People v. Wilson; Harmless error; People v. Lukity; Admission of testimony the handgun recovered from defendant was reported as stolen; The doctrine of invited error; People v. Jones; People v. Beckley; Assault with intent to do great bodily harm (AWIGBH); Carrying a concealed weapon (CCW)

The court held that defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Also, the admission of the shotgun recovered from his sister’s home did not impact the outcome of the trial such that reversal was necessary. The doctrine of invited error barred him from challenging the testimony that a handgun found on his person was reported stolen, and the court found that even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, reversal was unwarranted. He was convicted of AWIGBH, armed robbery, CCW, and felony-firearm. Defendant contended that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, given the 27-month delay between his arrest and trial. As to the first of the relevant factors, the lengthy delay of 27 months was “presumptively prejudicial,” and it was the prosecution’s burden to show that “defendant suffered no injury as a result.” The second factor of the speedy trial analysis weighed in favor of neither party. Viewing the reasons for the delays, the court found that “the prosecution and defendant share roughly equivalent responsibility for the delays.” While he was responsible for nearly four months of delays, the prosecution was “technically responsible for five months,” four of which were to be given only minimal weight. “Responsibility for an additional year of delays cannot be attributed exclusively to either party.” As to factor three, the court held that this factor weighed against defendant’s claim. “A defendant’s lack of diligence in failing to assert the right to a speedy trial until the eve of trial weighs heavily against the defendant.” Finally, as to factor four, there was no basis for finding that the delay “gave rise to any prejudice to defendant’s defense.” He conceded that he could not “show with specificity that witnesses were unavailable to him due to the delay, or that any necessary documentation was lost in the intervening time period.” Affirmed.