Personal protection order (PPO) based on stalking; MCL 600.2950a(1); Whether adequate facts were alleged; MCL 750.411h(1)(d) & (e); “Stalking”; MCL 750.411h, i, & s; “Harassment”; MCL 750.411h(1)(c) & (d); “Unconsented contact”; MCL 750.411h(1)(e)(i)-(ii); MCL 750.411i(1)(d)(i)-(ii); Credibility; McGonegal v. McGonegal; Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, NC; In re Loyd; People v. Lemmon; Scott v. Harris; Freedom of speech; TM v. MZ; New Prods. Corp. v. Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev.; “Fighting words”; Virginia v. Black; “Insults, epithets, & personal abuse”; Chaplinski v. State of NH; “Abusive, vicious, hostile, or otherwise colorful invective speech”; RAV v. City of St. Paul, MN; Pure harassment; Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist. (3rd Cir.)

The court held that the trial court did not err by ordering that the PPOs against respondent would remain in effect. The trial court initially granted petitioners’ requested PPOs ex parte on the basis of allegations of vehicular assault. After a subsequent hearing, it ordered that they would remain in effect. On appeal, the court first noted that the initial order was appropriate as the petitions “unambiguously allege[d] a pattern of respondent following and confronting petitioners in manners that would cause any reasonable person to feel fearful or distressed.” On their face, the petitions did not appear implausible. It next rejected respondent’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to terminate the PPOs because she and her mother were more credible than petitioners, noting she provided “no basis for undermining the trial court’s credibility assessment here, and in fact, the objective evidence amply support[ed] it.” The evidence showed that the trial court “had ample basis for concluding that not only did respondent assault petitioners with her vehicle, but she waged a stalking campaign against them and other neighbors.” And it “appears to have exercised exemplary patience with all parties.” The court next found that respondent failed to establish any error or misconduct by the trial court, or any reason why it should “interfere with the trial court’s clearly well-supported credibility assessment.” Finally, it rejected her claim that the PPOs violate her constitutional rights. It noted that although she “would not be entitled to expand the record on appeal, she does not even make the effort to provide any evidence showing that the prohibition is in any way practically damaging to her.” Moreover, she “clearly cannot be trusted not to use access to her property as a pretext, and she does not seek any kind of compromise, such as conditioning the use of her property on not possessing or using any photo, video, or audio equipment while within range of petitioners’ property.” Affirmed.