Alleged violations of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Acts (PWDCRA) (MCL 37.1101 et seq.); MCL 37.1502(1)(b); MCL 37.1506a(1)(a); “Real estate transaction”; MCL 37.1501(d); Alleged violations of Michigan’s Condominium Act (MCL 559.101 et seq.); Improvements or modifications pertaining to persons with disabilities; MCL 559.147a(1); Personal representative (PR)

The court held that defendants’ (condo complex, association, and management company) denial of plaintiffs’ (condo owner and PR) request for installation of a railing as an accommodation to assist a disabled person did not constitute “discrimination in a ‘real estate transaction’ as that phrase in defined in the” PWDCRA. Further, because plaintiffs’ claimed violations of the protections “in the PWDCRA are limited to ‘the sale, exchange, rental, or lease of real property, or an interest therein,’” and their request did not arise from such a transaction, defendants were properly granted partial summary disposition. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the PWDCRA and Condominium Act after defendants denied their request to install a railing on the front porch of the condo. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred because: “(1) the definition of ‘real estate transaction’ includes the phrase ‘an interest therein’ and the condominium association’s governing documents constitute ‘an interest therein;’ (2) the trial court failed to interpret the statute as a whole; and (3) the trial court erred in determining that protections are inapplicable once a real estate purchase or exchange is complete.” The court disagreed, finding the alleged discrimination “did not have a relationship in fact with a real estate transaction because the alleged discrimination did not pertain to the (1) ‘sale . . . of real property, or an interest therein,’ (2) ‘exchange . . . of real property, or an interest therein,’ (3) ‘rental . . . of real property, or an interest therein,’ or (4) ‘lease of real property, or an interest therein.’” In addition, defendants “did not allegedly discriminate against the decedent ‘in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a,’ (1) ‘sale . . . of real property, or an interest therein,’ (2) ‘exchange . . . of real property, or an interest therein’ (3) ‘rental . . . of real property, or an interest therein,’ or (4) ‘lease of real property, or an interest therein.’” Plaintiffs also claimed that the statute had to “be examined as a whole and limiting its protections to instances of sales or leases negates the remedial ‘value’ of the PWDCRA” and rendered the statute meaningless or nugatory. But the court “noted that defendants did not seek summary disposition of count three, plaintiffs claimed violation of MCL 559.147a of the” Condominium Act. The Legislature’s limiting “of housing provisions in the PWDCRA to ‘real estate transactions’ does not preclude subsequent legal action after a disabled person completes the real estate transaction in light of MCL 557.147a,” and the court declined to “extend the application of the PWDCRA beyond real estate transactions because it would serve the rationale purpose of protecting a disabled person.” Affirmed.