Motion for disqualification of the trial court; MCR 2.003(C); Presumption a trial judge is unbiased; Mitchell v. Mitchell; Judicial rulings as a basis for the motion; Armstrong v. Ypsilanti Charter Twp.; Remarks made during trial; In re MKK; Untimely motion; MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a); Attempting to force a judge’s disqualification by suing the judge; Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger; In re Disqualification of Saffold (OH); Olsen v. Wainwright (5th Cir.); MI Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4); Disclosure of alleged ex parte communications; Personal protection order (PPO) enjoining defamatory speech on social media; Whether the nondomestic PPO statute (MCL 600.2950a) bars or provides a remedy for defamation; MCL 750.411s; Buchanan v. Crisler; TM v. MZ (On Remand); McFadden v. Detroit Bar Ass’n; “Post a message”; MCL 750.411s(8)(i); Principle that MCL 750.411s “does not prohibit constitutionally protected speech or activity”; MCL 750.411s(6)

The court held that the trial court and chief judge did not commit reversible error as to respondent-KL’s motion for disclosure of alleged ex parte communications between the trial court and its counsel in KL’s federal lawsuit against it, or to disqualify the trial court. But while 600.2911 (providing money damages for defamation) does not preclude enjoining defamatory communications that meet the elements of MCL 750.411s, the language of the amended PPO was too broad and inconsistent with the law. Thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for modification of the amended PPO as set forth in the opinion. KL and his former girlfriend have a child, O. Petitioner-TT is O’s maternal great aunt. The amended PPO prohibited KL “from posting defamatory statements about [p]etitioner on social media and/or from publishing such statements elsewhere.” KL failed to address on appeal one of the reasons the trial court denied the motion for disqualification – that it was untimely. In addition, the court found “no indication that the trial court acted in a biased or less than impartial manner.” It did not prevent him from presenting his side. While it did refuse to allow him to withdraw his motion to terminate the PPO, a trial court “has the inherent authority to exercise its discretion in controlling its docket.” Considering that he couched his “notice of withdrawal in terms that reserved a right to refile the motion to terminate the PPO in the future, which was not a ‘right’ that” he could dictate to the trial court, that the hearing was already in progress, and there had been several adjournments, the trial court’s decision did not show actual bias against KL. As to the alleged violation of Canon 3(A)(4), the court concluded that accepting his argument “would effectively vitiate the principle that a person cannot force a judge’s disqualification merely by suing that judge.” It also noted that there was no evidence of any ex parte communications. As to the PPO, “the trial court did not err by concluding that respondent made defamatory statements concerning” TT on Facebook. Further, applying the “modern trend,” the court held that when a respondent argues a “PPO would prohibit constitutionally protected speech and the petitioner counters that the posted messages are defamatory, the petitioner need not show economic injury.” But also consistent with the modern trend, “the PPO needs to be specifically limited to the adjudicated speech.”