Sentencing; Resentencing of juvenile defendants who were sentenced to life without parole; Miller v Alabama; Montgomery v Louisiana; People v Skinner

The court held that the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion by resentencing defendant to life without parole. When he was 15, he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of AWIM, and one count of felony-firearm for a shooting rampage he undertook with two others. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for the first-degree murder convictions, life for the AWIM convictions, and two years for the felony-firearm conviction. After Miller and Montgomery were decided, the resentencing court again imposed sentences of life without parole for his first-degree murder convictions. On appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err in its application of the Miller factors. “Defendant’s actions and predispositions prior to the offense supported the resentencing court’s conclusion that, although young, defendant appreciated the nature of his violent actions, and that the attributes of youth, i.e., impetuosity and immaturity, were not mitigating factors.” In addition, the record contained “no evidence of physical or sexual abuse, or that defendant’s household had been filled with criminality.” Further, “[a]mple record evidence supported the resentencing court’s conclusion that defendant had not been subjected to pressure to commit the murders.” The court was also “unpersuaded that defendant might have been charged with a lesser offense but for his youth and inexperience.” And although defendant “had significantly improved his behavior and character in prison, this factor, one among many, in light of the totality of the circumstances did not outweigh all other factors.” The resentencing court did not err by concluding that, “although a juvenile rarely may be sentenced to life without parole, this case presented the rare instance necessitating such resentencing because defendant ‘was the only shooter and directly responsible for the death of both victims.’” Finally, the court “declined to interfere with the fact-finder’s role of assessing the weight and credibility” of evidence, and found that the prosecution did not “bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is irreparably corrupt.” Affirmed.