Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Whether plaintiffs’ Title IX claim was time-barred; Claim accrual; Application of the discovery rule to Title IX claims; Snyder-Hill v Ohio State Univ; Title IX retaliation claim; Jackson v Birmingham Bd of Educ; Judicial impartiality; Recusal under 28 USC § 455(a); Hughes v United States; Financial interest under § 455(d)(4); Whether recusal is required because a judge serves as an adjunct professor at the law school of a party-university; Sessoms v Trustees of Univ of PA (Unpub 3d Cir); Considering the cumulative effect of a judge’s individual actions; Easley v University of MI Bd of Regents
Holding that Snyder-Hill applied equally to plaintiffs-abuse survivors’ claims, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the claims as untimely, and remanded. But because it found the district court properly denied plaintiffs’ Title IX retaliation claim and did not abuse its discretion by denying their motions seeking the judge’s recusal, the court affirmed as to those claims. It joined other “circuits in concluding that recusal is not required just because a judge serves as an adjunct professor at the law school of a party-university.” In 2018, former Ohio State student-athletes came forward alleging that an Ohio State employee (Dr. Richard Strauss) had abused them and that Ohio State had covered it up. Hundreds of survivors, including plaintiffs, sued Ohio State under Title IX. The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. Prior to this appeal, another panel reversed the district court’s order as it pertained to two other groups of plaintiffs in Snyder-Hill. The court found that Snyder-Hill applied equally here. “That panel held that the discovery rule applies to Title IX claims, meaning that a plaintiff’s claim accrues when he ‘knows or has reason to know’ not only that he was injured but also that ‘the defendant caused’ his injury. For a Title IX case like this one, a plaintiff’s claim does not accrue until he ‘knows or has reason to know that the defendant institution,’ here Ohio State, injured him. So ‘the clock starts only once the plaintiff knows or should have known that Ohio State administrators “with authority to take corrective action” knew of Strauss’s conduct and failed to respond appropriately.’” Applying Snyder-Hill, the court noted that “[j]ust when the plaintiffs knew or should have known that Strauss’s conduct was abuse, and when they knew or should have known about Ohio State’s role in causing their injuries are questions of fact that we cannot resolve on a motion to dismiss.” But as to the Title IX retaliation claim, the court found plaintiffs failed to “adequately allege a claim against Ohio State as an institution.” Finally, as to the motions to recuse the district judge and transfer the case to a judge in a different division, the court could not say that the judge “abused his discretion in determining that § 455 did not require his recusal.” In addition to recusal not being required due to a judge serving as an adjunct professor at a party-university’s law school, it was not required here based on a financial interest or the cumulative effect of the judge’s individual actions.
Breach of contract claim asserting breach of a settlement agreement; Condition precedent; Effect of a merger clause; Alleged “substantial” breach by the other party; Absence of language providing that time is of the essence; McCarty v Mercury Metalcraft Co; Rescission; Mutual mistake; Lenawee Cnty Bd of Health v Messerly; Conversion; Reliance on MCL 440.3420; MCL 440.3102(1); A tort action based on nonperformance of a contractual duty; Heating, ventilation, & air conditioning (HVAC)
The court held that defendant did not materially breach the parties’ settlement agreement when it failed to deliver HVAC units within three days after plaintiff requested delivery. As a result, plaintiff was not entitled to be excused from performing its duties under the agreement. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for rescission based on an alleged mutual mistake. Finally, plaintiff failed to establish the elements of a conversion claim. Thus, the trial court did not err in ordering performance under the settlement agreement. As an initial matter, the court rejected defendant’s assertion the appeal was moot because plaintiff had accepted delivery of the HVAC units in compliance with the trial court’s order, finding that it was possible to fashion a remedy if plaintiff’s arguments were credited. It also did not interpret the settlement agreement as containing a condition precedent to defendant’s performance, as defendant contended. But it additionally found “no merit to plaintiff’s argument that it was excused from performing its contractual duties, or entitled to” rescind the agreement on the basis “defendant substantially breached” it first. The court noted that nothing in the agreement’s language indicated “the parties considered time to be of the essence, or that defendant’s failure to deliver within any specified timeframe would be such a substantial breach as to relieve plaintiff of its duties under the agreement.” Further, there was no indication “the ‘late’ delivery of the units otherwise imposed any hardship on plaintiff or amounted to a complete failure of consideration on defendant’s part.” The court additionally noted that defendant had partly performed under the “agreement by removing its construction lien.” The court concluded the circumstances supported a finding “that the parties did not intend for the time of performance to affect plaintiff’s rights such that time would be of the essence” and that the alleged “timeframe for delivery was not a material term of the” agreement. The court also determined that plaintiff failed to show a mutual mistake of fact sufficient to warrant rescission, and that plaintiff could not base its tort claim of conversion “on defendant’s alleged nonperformance of a contractual duty.” Affirmed.
Motion to withdraw a plea of guilty but mentally ill to second-degree murder; Coerced plea; Compliance with plea court rules (MCR 6.302(B)(4) & (5)); Effect of shackling during a motion hearing
The court concluded “defendant was not entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel, and the trial court properly determined that defendant’s plea was not the product of coercion.” Also, the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of MCR 6.302(B)(4) and (5). Finally, there was nothing to suggest “the trial court was actually or potentially swayed by defendant’s appearing in shackles,” and the court was unable to find his due-process rights were violated. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty but mentally ill to second-degree murder. Defendant contended defense counsel violated the principle of deferring to the client’s ultimate objectives. He claimed that he was directly coerced into accepting the plea by defense counsel. The court held that given “the trial court’s ability to observe the demeanor of defense counsel and defendant, especially in light of the expert psychological evaluations of defendant and defendant’s history of outbursts, there is no evidence suggesting that the trial court clearly erred in determining that defense counsel did not directly coerce.” Defendant also claimed that “he was more indirectly and insidiously coerced by being forced to accept counsel with whom his relationship had broken down.” The court held that contrary to his “argument, filings in the trial court reflect that defense counsel nevertheless continued to pursue an insanity defense at trial on the basis of lay witnesses even after receipt of the adverse independent examination.” There was no evidence on the record “counsel was unprepared to take the case to trial, doomed though doing so would likely have been.” In other words, the record plainly showed “there would have been no adequate cause for defendant to be appointed different counsel, and, in any event, it would have been highly improbable for defendant to have obtained a more favorable outcome by” going to trial. Furthermore, his “subjective discomfort with counsel is not grounds for appointment of a new attorney.” Defendant further argued that “because he sought to withdraw his plea before sentencing, his request should have been granted.” But he relied on inapposite case law in his argument.
Search & seizure; Whether a warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe a crime was committed; Uncorroborated information; United States v Frazier; Obtaining a warrant to investigate the cause of a fire; Michigan v Tyler; The exclusionary rule; Applicability of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to evidence derived from the threatened use of an unlawful warrant; The “attenuation” & “inevitable discovery” exceptions to the doctrine; United States v Pearce; United States v Cooper; The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule; United States v Leon; Comparing United States v Hython
The court held that the affidavit in support of the first search warrant in this case (the DVR warrant) did not establish probable cause to believe a crime was committed. It also held that the fruits of an unlawful search warrant, even if it was not actually executed, should be suppressed if the warrant was otherwise exploited. That was the case here. The attenuation and inevitable discovery exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply, nor did the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to suppress the evidence at issue. After defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence were denied, he entered a conditional guilty plea for possessing cocaine and heroin with the intent to distribute and a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The court noted the only information in the affidavit in support of the DVR warrant that was “proffered to support a finding of probable cause is the statement of an unidentified person made to the unidentified property owner, and then communicated second-hand to” the officer who provided the affidavit, about “an unknown person entering the property and removing items from the shed around the unspecified time of the fire.” The affidavit lacked “any additional information that might support either source’s credibility[.]” Thus, the court determined the uncorroborated information was insufficiently reliable to support a probable cause finding. Further, the fact a fire occurred in the shed was “not itself evidence of a crime” and the existence of surveillance cameras attached to the duplex where defendant lived did not “add to a finding of probable cause.” Likewise irrelevant was his refusal to give the police access to the DVR equipment connected to the cameras. The government argued the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine only apply when there is “‘an actual unlawful search, not simply the act of obtaining of a signed warrant that goes unexecuted.’” The court disagreed, holding that the “doctrine may be used to suppress evidence derived from the threatened use of an unlawful warrant.” As to the attenuation exception, all the events here occurred in one afternoon and there were no “intervening circumstances between the threatened execution of the unlawful DVR warrant and the discovery of the challenged evidence.” The court noted that defendant “confessed only because of the officials’ threat to execute the unlawful DVR warrant.”
Termination under the Adoption Code; Credibility of witnesses; MCR 2.613(C); Woodington v Shokoohi; Paternity; MCL 710.37(1)(a); Qualification as a “do something” father; MCL 710.39(2); Effect of a custodial relationship
Holding that the trial court was in a superior position to resolve this credibility contest and declining to interfere with the trial court’s factual findings, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissals of petitioners’ petitions under MCL 710.39(2) of the Michigan Adoption Code. Respondent-mother placed her three-year-old twins in a prospective adoptive home and petitioned along with the prospective adoptive parents (petitioners) to terminate the rights of the children’s biological father. Respondent-father fought the petitions and the parties provided widely divergent evidence of his level of involvement with his children. The trial court assessed the evidence and weighed the credibility of the witnesses before determining that the father had a custodial relationship with the children and had provided substantial and regular support and care for them. On appeal, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that the trial court erred by dismissing their adoption petitions. “Ultimately, the question in this case is not father’s quality as a person or whether he could have done more as a father. The question is whether father had a sufficient relationship such that his parental rights were entitled to the same constitutional protection as any other parent. Evidence of record supports the trial court’s finding that he did.” The court found that the trial court “followed its duties in this regard. [It] also advised the parties that they could seek termination of father’s parental rights under the Juvenile Code. The Juvenile Code is much broader than the Adoption Code. Mother and petitioners will have much more leeway to establish that father is an unfit parent whose parental rights should be terminated if they take this legal pathway.”
Claims arising from a college’s Title IX investigation; Sua sponte dismissal of a 42 USC § 1983 due process claim on the merits; Tingler v Marshall; Sufficiency of notice & opportunity to respond; State actor; Brentwood Acad v Tennessee Secondary Sch Athletic Ass’n; “Close nexus”; Ripeness of Title IX violation claims; Theory of “erroneous outcome”; Selective enforcement claim
The court held that while the district court did not follow the appropriate process for an on-the-merits, sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff-Doe’s federal due process claim, defendants (collectively, Oberlin) “is not a state actor subject to federal due process requirements.” Thus, dismissal on the merits was proper, and affirmed. As to his remaining claims, including Title IX claims, “the district court was correct to dismiss them for lack of ripeness, but subsequent factual developments” had ripened them on appeal. Thus, the court remanded as to those claims. Doe sued Oberlin, a private college, in “state court during the Title IX office’s ongoing investigation into a fellow student’s sexual misconduct accusation against him.” He alleged, among other things, “that the investigation violated federal due process and Title IX. After removal to federal court, the district court sua sponte dismissed the federal due process claim with prejudice and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice.” The court found that two issues arose with the sua sponte dismissal of his § 1983 due process claim. The first was whether the district court gave him “adequate notice that it was planning to dismiss the federal due process claim on the merits.” The court noted that “the district court stated a plan to dismiss the entire case without prejudice belies Oberlin’s argument that Doe had notice of [its] intention to sua sponte dismiss the federal due process claim on the merits and with prejudice.” Second, the district court failed to “give Doe a sufficient opportunity either to respond to the notice of dismissal or to amend his complaint.” Because the court requires “the district court to give a plaintiff notice of the specific grounds for a planned sua sponte dismissal on the merits, this record indicates that Doe’s opportunity to amend or respond after the initial notice was insufficient.” Further, the court concluded “the limited time between the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss the case sua sponte and the actual dismissal supports Doe’s assertion that he was denied the proper procedural safeguards.” The court held that without “an explicit opportunity to respond or to amend the complaint based on the known intention of the district court, Tingler was not satisfied.” However, the fact that the “sua sponte dismissal amounted to a Tingler error” did not necessitate a remand here. The court held that Doe’s allegations neither satisfied “any of the state-actor tests nor overcome the persuasive case law from our sister circuits.” Thus, allowing him “to make additional amendments to his complaint to respond further to Oberlin’s state-actor argument would be futile.”