Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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42 USC § 1983; Fourth Amendment false arrest, false imprisonment, & malicious prosecution claims; Claim that defendant-police officer falsified information used to obtain the search warrant; “Probable cause”; Qualified immunity; Effect of the fact that the searched premises belonged to plaintiff’s mother; “Clearly established” law; Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for failure to comply with Brady v Maryland; Michigan state law claims for gross negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, & malicious prosecution; Governmental immunity
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that, taking the case as framed by the parties, plaintiff-Chancellor could not show that defendant-police officer (Geelhood) lied in the search warrant affidavit and thus, could not overcome Geelhood’s qualified immunity defense. And given that he sought “to hold Geelhood liable for his arrest and prosecution” resulting from the alleged violation of “his mother’s privacy rights[,]” the court added that it was “certainly not clearly established that an officer could be liable in such circumstances.” It also rejected his due process and Michigan state law claims. Geelhood obtained a warrant to search Chancellor’s mother’s home based on tips and surveillance, and found drugs and firearms. Chancellor “was arrested, prosecuted, and eventually sentenced . . . for possession of illegal narcotics. Seven years” into his sentence, “the local prosecutor’s office vacated his conviction via a stipulated order. Chancellor then sued” Geelhood, bringing both federal and state claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, as well as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for failure to follow Brady and a state law gross negligence claim. The district court granted Geelhood summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the federal claims and governmental immunity on three of the state claims, in addition to finding that Chancellor failed to state a gross negligence claim. On appeal, the court rejected his claim that there was no probable cause to search based on Geelhood’s allegedly false search warrant affidavit information. It agreed with the district court that Chancellor did not supply “evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on” this claim, and thus could not overcome the qualified immunity defense. Geelhood based the affidavit on “a confidential informant and independent surveillance. Taken together, these sources provided probable cause to search the house.” The court further noted that even if he “had put forth a triable issue on whether the search warrant lacked probable cause, it is not clear to us how that would show a direct violation of Chancellor’s constitutional rights.” The search warrant was for his mother’s home. His defense in the criminal case was that he “did not live at that house and was not there the night of Geelhood’s surveillance. Chancellor has maintained that position in this § 1983 suit. That poses a problem for [his] ability to show that he is the ‘a direct victim’ of a constitutional tort.” The court also held that his due process claim failed where he did not “show that Geelhood suppressed any Brady information in this case.” Affirmed.
Newly discovered evidence; People v Cress; Credibility assessment; People v Johnson; Successive motion based on new evidence; MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b); Abuse of discretion review; People v Owens
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment because, even if the newly offered eyewitness account was not patently incredible, it did not make a different result reasonably probable when weighed against the evidence that would be presented on retrial. Defendant was convicted in 1985 of first-degree murder for a 1984 shooting during a vehicle chase. Decades later he sought relief from judgment based on an affidavit and evidentiary-hearing testimony from a witness who claimed he was in the victim’s car and identified a different shooter. The trial court found the first three Cress factors satisfied but denied relief on the fourth factor, concluding the new testimony would not probably produce a different result at retrial given the overall trial evidence and the circumstances surrounding the witness’s late disclosure. On appeal, the court held that under Cress and Johnson, the trial court could consider credibility and then evaluate the new testimony “‘in conjunction with the evidence that would be presented on retrial[.]’” It concluded the record supported the trial court’s finding that the prosecution’s case was not “‘shaky’” enough for the new account to likely change the outcome. The court emphasized that the key trial witness had a substantial basis to identify defendant and his car, including years of familiarity, contemporaneous statements to police that led officers to defendant’s street and vehicle, corroboration from another witness who observed a chase involving a car matching defendant’s, evidence of defendant’s prior dispute with the victim and prior attempts to harm him, and defendant’s flight when police tried to apprehend him shortly after the shooting. The court also noted the new witness’s account conflicted with trial evidence on the chase vehicle and who fled the crash scene, further diminishing its force at retrial. Affirmed.
Search warrant affidavit false statements; Franks hearing; Franks v Delaware; Informant reliability; MCL 780.653(b); People v Kalchik; Probable cause; People v Mullen; OV 19 interference; MCL 777.49(c); People v Hershey; Possession of child sexually abusive material (CSAM); Child sexually abusive activity (CSAA)
The court held that, after severing false statements from the search-warrant affidavit, the remaining allegations still provided probable cause to search defendant’s apartment, and that the trial court properly scored OV 19 at 10 points for attempting to interfere with the administration of justice. Defendant, the biological mother of the victim whose rights had been terminated, was accused of repeated sexual contact with the teenage victim after he moved into her apartment, and police obtained evidence from a phone and bedding, including explicit photographs, messages, and DNA results. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress after conducting a Franks hearing and later sentenced her following jury convictions of CSC offenses and related child-abuse and CSAM/CSAA counts, including scoring OV 19 at 10 points. On appeal, the court held the magistrate could credit information relayed through the DHHS because the affidavit identified the source as DHHS reporting suspected abuse in the course of its duties, and the affidavit also described corroborating circumstances, including the victim becoming emotional when asked about inappropriate touching, the refusal of a sexual-assault exam, and the victim’s statement that defendant told him to wash up to remove evidence. The court also held that three inaccuracies established at the Franks hearing had to be excised, but that even without them the affidavit still created a “fair probability” evidence of criminal sexual conduct would be found in the apartment, so suppression was unwarranted. The court next held OV 19 was supported by a preponderance of the evidence because defendant did not respond to police knocking while voices and movement were heard inside, and the victim testified defendant told him the police were there and instructed him to get in the bath and shut the bathroom door, which supported a finding she tried to hinder the investigation. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” (USSG § 3E1.1(a)); Restitution for victims’ mental health treatment; 18 USC § 3663(b)(2)(A); “Bodily injury”; A mental harm that produces physical symptoms; Procedural & substantive reasonableness; Aggravating role enhancement (§ 3B1.1(c)); Obstruction of justice enhancement (§ 3C1.1)
The court held that “bodily injury” in the restitution statute (§ 3663) “does not encompass purely mental or psychological harms.” However, when “a victim suffers a mental harm that produces physical symptoms, the victim experiences ‘bodily injury’” under § 3663. It also found that the district court did not err in denying defendant-Green an acceptance of responsibility reduction. And it rejected defendant-Hovanec’s procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges to her sentences, as well as her arguments related to the §§ 3B1.1(c) and 3C1.1 enhancements. Hovanec killed her husband by injecting him with an animal tranquilizer. Her mother, Green, drove the car to bury the body. Hovanec pled guilty to conspiracy to import a controlled substance, importation of a controlled substance, conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and distribution of a controlled substance. She was sentenced to 480 months. Green pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact. She was sentenced to 121 months and ordered to pay for her grandchildren’s psychological care as restitution. On appeal, the court first upheld the denial of a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility because evidence showed Green “was dishonest during the change-of-plea hearing[,]” and there was no indication the district court had “misinterpreted” her statements regarding prior knowledge of the murder plan. Her guilty plea and proffer did “not entitle her to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility given that she falsely denied relevant conduct.” Green also challenged the restitution order, arguing that there was no “bodily injury” to her grandchildren. The district court ruled that “bodily injury” includes mental harm. The statute does not define the term, so the court considered dictionary definitions. These definitions showed “that ‘bodily injury’ is defined as a physical or corporeal injury and contrasted with mental or spiritual injuries.” And they were “in accord with the conclusions of all of our sibling circuits that have addressed the question de novo.” Thus, it “concluded that ‘bodily injury’ does not include purely mental harms[.]” But it also held that the term “encompasses physical manifestations of mental harms.” Because it was not clear from the record whether the children’s mental harm resulted in physical symptoms, the court remanded for the district court to make a “factual determination of whether the children’s mental harm from Green’s crime manifested physically[.]” All of Hovanec’s sentencing challenges failed. The court affirmed defendants’ sentences, reversed Green’s restitution order, and remanded as to the restitution issue.
JNOV; Waived issue; Motion for a new trial; Great weight of the evidence; Jury instruction; M Civ JI 12.01
The court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the motion for a new trial should be denied. And although the trial court erred in denying the requested jury instruction, reversal was not required. Thus, it affirmed “the judgment entered on a jury verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant.” The case arose from a collision between KB (a minor who was riding a motorbike on a sidewalk) and defendant. Plaintiff (next friend of her son, KB) claimed “that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a new trial.” She maintained “that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” Plaintiff cited “defendant’s testimony regarding her eyesight, her awareness of children in the area, and her speed at the time of the incident, as well as testimony that KB was pinned between the vehicle and a brick wall. Although some of defendant’s testimony was inconsistent, defendant’s account of the collision was largely unrefuted. KB’s own testimony also contained inconsistencies regarding how he was freed from under the vehicle and how he returned home.” The court noted that defendant “testified that she was traveling approximately 20 [MPH], was attentive to the presence of children, used her turn signal, and attempted to stop. Conversely, KB acknowledged that he was not paying attention to traffic and had not received training in operating a motorbike.” Given the “record, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding of negligence.” The trial court reasonably held “that the jury’s verdict should not be disturbed, and [thus] did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.”
Quiet title; Standing; Claim for value of improvements; MCR 3.411(F)(1) & (3); Privity; MCR 3.411(D)(1)
In this quiet title case, the court held that defendants-Detroit International Holdings and Koperfield Investments “have a legal cause of action under MCR 3.411(F)(1) for the value of improvements to the property.” It was undisputed that plaintiff-Toure “sought to quiet title to real property by bringing an action in circuit court, that he sufficiently described the land and the claimed interests of all parties, and that the trial court concluded that Toure held title to the property after considering the evidence.” Detroit International and Koperfield then “sought to bring a claim under MCR 3.411(F) for the value of improvements that they made to the property.” The trial court denied this “request, reasoning that it could not be maintained because they lacked privity of contract with Toure.” The court noted that “MCR 3.411(F)(1) has no language limiting a claim for improvements to individuals who are in privity of contract with the person who a court has found to have title to the premises. Instead, it requires that the person filing a claim for improvements be ‘a party.’” Detroit International and Koperfield were “parties to Toure’s quiet-title action. The court rule requires that their claim for improvements be brought against ‘the party found to have title to the premises.’ Toure is the party that the [trial] court found to have title. Given the plain language of MCR 3.411(F),” the court concluded the trial court erred in “denying Detroit International and Koperfield the opportunity to file their claim for improvements against Toure.” It noted the trial court suggested they could sue defendant-Davis. But “the court rule does not permit, nor does it require the claim for improvements to be brought against a party’s immediate predecessor in interest. Thus, the [trial] court’s contention that the claim could and should be maintained against Davis is also contrary to the plain language of the court rule. Likewise, [its] suggestion that a claim could only be maintained if Detroit International and Koperfield had any title or interest in the property is also erroneous inasmuch as the court rule expressly contemplates that someone without title may claim the value of improvements made to the property.” Toure contended that their claim was “nevertheless barred under MCR 3.411(F)(3)[.]” The court held that whether they “made the improvements to the property in bad faith . . . is irrelevant to a determination of whether they may bring a claim under MCR 3.411(F)(1). Here, it was determined that Davis forged the deed with the aid of a notary.” Nothing in the record suggested “that Detroit International and Koperfield were aware that Davis’s claim to the property was based upon a forged deed. Nor is there any evidence that they were aware, at the time that they made the improvements, that there was a cloud upon their title to the property. In the absence of any evidence of bad faith, it is premature to preclude their claim” based on MCR 3.411(F)(3). Reversed and remanded.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) & (j); Children’s best interests; MCR 3.977(I)(1); Reasonable reunification efforts; Failure to participate in services; In re White; Case-service plan (CSP)
The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that reasonable reunification efforts were made and that §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) supported terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. As to the children’s best interests, it found that “the trial court satisfied MCR 3.977(I)(1).” Thus, it affirmed the termination order. As to the children’s best interests, her “argument that the stipulated order cannot satisfy MCR 3.977(I)(1)’s requirement that the trial court ‘state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law’ fails, because the parties manifestly agree, by virtue of the signed, stipulated order itself, that the [trial] court did ‘state on the record’ [its] findings of fact and conclusions of law. Moreover, the stipulated findings adequately addressed the children’s best interests, including adoptability, developmental needs, medical complexity, placement stability, and mother’s failure to benefit from services.” As to reasonable efforts, the trial court ordered the mother “to participate in a CSP. DHHS referred [her] for therapy, parenting classes, parent partner services, housing assistance, visitation, and medical education. Over nearly two years, [she] was terminated from services due to nonparticipation, declined re-referrals, failed to attend visits and appointments, and did not meaningfully engage in the services ordered. DHHS additionally accommodated transportation barriers, facilitated virtual medical attendance, provided educational resources, and transported [her] and the children for supervised parenting time visits. Despite these efforts, [she] attended only two of over one hundred medical appointments and completed only nine parenting time visits in 32 months. [Her] failure to participate supported statutory grounds for termination under” §§ (g) and (j). The court added that, apart from “her noncompliance with the CSP, the original neglect was severe. MH went a year without medical care, failed to gain weight, and had a dislodged feeding tube. AH was profoundly malnourished. As the trial court found, without intervention,” they would have died. While the “mother claimed recent improvements in housing and transportation, those late and unverified efforts do not outweigh her persistent inability to meet the children’s medical needs.”
Whether the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof; Children’s best interests; Request for an adjournment to subpoena witnesses; MCR 3.923(G); MCR 2.503(C)(2); Good cause; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to subpoena witnesses
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent-mother’s request for an adjournment to subpoena witnesses, and her related ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed. The trial court also did not improperly shift the burden to her to prove her sobriety, or clearly err in finding that terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the termination order. As to the denial of an adjournment, the court concluded respondent “failed to establish good cause. She provided no affidavits, witness lists, or proffer demonstrating that the proposed testimony was material or outcome-determinative. Nor did she show diligent efforts to secure the witnesses. [She] did not identify when she allegedly provided witness information to prior counsel, whether she followed up on those efforts, or why no witness list was filed.” And without an offer of proof about “the substance of the proposed witnesses’ testimony or how it would have affected the outcome[,]” she could not “overcome the presumption of effective assistance. Even assuming deficient performance, respondent failed to establish prejudice given the extensive evidence of unresolved substance abuse, lack of progress despite prolonged services, and ongoing concerns regarding parenting ability.” The court also determined that, viewed as a whole, the record showed “the trial court did not place the burden of proof on respondent.” In reaching its decision, “the trial court relied on evidence presented by [DHHS], including testimony from a foster-care worker and a foster-care case manager regarding respondent’s continued substance-abuse concerns, lack of progress, and unresolved barriers to reunification. [It] also detailed the numerous services offered to [her] and explained why [they] had not resulted in meaningful improvement. Nothing in [its] findings suggests that termination was ordered because respondent failed to prove her fitness.” Finally, as to the children’s best interests, the trial court found that she did not have a meaningful bond with them “and that given their young ages, they required permanency and stability. [It] further noted a high likelihood that [they] would be adopted by their fictive-kin placement, which would allow them to remain together as siblings.”