Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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The Mortuary Science Act (MSA) (Article 18 of the Occupational Code); Engaging in the practice of mortuary science at unlicensed locations; MCL 339.1806(3); MCL 339.604(h); MI Admin Code, R 339.18941(2) (Rule 41); MCL 339.1801(f); “Funeral directing” (MCL 339.1801(e)); “Funeral establishment” (MCL 339.1801(b)); The Prepaid Funeral & Cemetery Sales Act (the Prepaid Act); Applicability of Ansell v Department of Commerce, Bd of Exam’rs of Mortuary Sci; Exclusion of evidence; Hearsay within hearsay; MRE 408; Administrative law judge (ALJ); Generations Funeral & Cremations Services, Inc. (GFCS)
The court held that the ALJ “properly determined that respondents engaged in the practice of mortuary science at the unlicensed locations, and the circuit court properly concluded that the record supported” that decision. Respondent-GFCS had four funeral establishment locations but only one was licensed under the MSA. Respondents contended “their activities at the unlicensed locations did not constitute ‘funeral directing’ or ‘engaging in the practice of mortuary science’ in violation of the MSA and Rule 41 because the activities did not involve the handling of dead bodies.” The court disagreed, concluding that reading the relevant statutory “provisions as applying to embalming only would nullify the references to funeral directing[.]” The MSA additionally “provides that a license is required at the location where a person engages in mortuary science, and the location must be fixed[.]” GFCS had an establishment license issued for just one of its locations. “Because the MSA requires that each location be licensed, the unlicensed locations could not rely on the license for the” one licensed location. Respondents admitted “that GFCS employed five mortuary-science practitioners who utilized the title of ‘funeral director,’ three who worked in the unlicensed locations and two who worked at the” licensed one. They also acknowledged “that GFCS conducted business at the unlicensed locations, and the business included both prepaid and at-need contract sales and arrangements of funeral services and merchandise. In light of those admissions,” the ALJ’s ruling was proper. The court found respondents’ reliance on the Prepaid Act unavailing. That Act “expressly prohibits a seller or provider from offering or performing services where a mortuary-science license is required[.]” The court further determined that because “the statutory definition of ‘the practice of mortuary science’ includes funeral directing, and the MSA clearly includes nonscientific acts, Ansell is inapposite, and respondents’ reliance on” it was misplaced. In addition, the ALJ’s ruling as to their “signage and advertising was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” Finally, the court upheld the ALJ’s evidentiary rulings. Affirmed.
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Whether a police officer violated clearly established law when he used deadly force to stop gunfire at midnight on New Year’s Day; Reasonableness of the force used; Tennessee v Garner; Municipal liability under Monell v Department of Soc Servs
The court held that defendant-police officer (Huber) was properly denied qualified immunity in this § 1983 case arising from his fatal shooting of plaintiff’s decedent (Williams), who was firing celebratory gun shots into the air at midnight on New Year’s Day. It concluded that (1) “Huber violated the Fourth Amendment under the facts that a reasonable jury could find” and that (2) “all ‘reasonable’ officers would have recognized that they should not attempt to kill a nonthreatening (if reckless) New Year’s reveler.” Huber drove to the scene to investigate the gunfire and fatally shot Williams six times through a patio fence. Plaintiff brought an excessive-force claim against Huber under the Fourth Amendment. Huber moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, ruling that fact questions remained, including whether “Williams had moved the rifle in Huber’s direction when Huber shot into the fence.” On appeal, the court, interpreting the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, found that “a man’s reckless (but unfortunately common) decision to fire a rifle into the air just after midnight on New Year’s Day does not—without more—give officers the required probable cause to ‘shoot[] him dead.’” And Huber did not identify anything more when the court interpreted the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff. It agreed with the district court that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to “whether Williams moved the rifle in a way that could have led Huber to perceive it turning toward him.” Thus, at this stage, the court had to interpret the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff. “So Huber may not now rely on this factual justification—the one that he gave in testimony and in his interview with investigators—as the basis for shooting Williams. Rather, he must save this self-defense justification for the jury.” As to the “threat that Williams’s gunfire posed to others,” the court noted the city has treated Williams’ s purported “crime as a misdemeanor. And we know of no case that has given the police the right to shoot a suspect—without warning—to stop an ongoing misdemeanor without probable cause that the suspect’s conduct posed a threat to the officers or others.” As to the clearly established law qualified immunity prong, while “there are no cases like this one, this fact pattern is one of the rare ‘obvious’ ones in which Garner’s general test clearly establishes the violation.” Affirmed.
Six-month period of limitations in an employment agreement; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC; “Adhesion contract”; Reasonableness of the shortened limitations period; Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA); Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc
On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford, the court vacated the trial court’s order granting defendant-former employer’s summary disposition motion and remanded for application of Rayford. On 4/27/17, “plaintiff alleged that he suffered injury in the course of his employment and made a claim for worker’s compensation benefits that same day. Defendant terminated” his employment on 5/8/17. On 5/4/20, “plaintiff filed a complaint alleging wrongful termination from his employment in retaliation for requesting benefits under the Michigan” WDCA. Although he filed suit 2 “years and 361 days after his termination, plaintiff had signed a supplemental agreement to limit the statute of limitations to six months. Defendant moved for summary disposition premised on the six-month period of limitations. Plaintiff opposed the dispositive motion, claiming he did not understand the employment application and supplement because of his English language limitations, the lack of consideration, and the lack of a valid waiver. The trial court granted defendant’s dispositive motion.” The court previously “affirmed, concluding that a 180-day limitations period was enforceable because the terms of employment became part of the contract in light of” Timko. The court now noted that Timko was overruled in Rayford, and that in “the trial court, no determination of the reasonableness of the shortened limitations period or unconscionability occurred. Rather, the trial court’s analysis predominantly consisted of the application of contract law and the enforcement of unambiguous agreement language.” Under Rayford, when “the record lacks development ‘to determine the reasonableness of the shortened limitations period and whether the provision was unconscionable,’ a remand to the trial court is appropriate.”
Motion to suppress evidence of drugs in the blood; Scope of the warrant; The particularity requirement; Good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule; Operating under the influence of drugs (OUID); Operating under the influence of an intoxicating substance (OWI); Operating a motor vehicle while visibly impaired (OWVI)
The court held “that the equities here strongly favor concluding that Deputy [S] believed that he had filled out the correct form for lawfully obtaining authorization to get a blood sample from defendant in order to test it for THC.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. He “was pulled over after [S] witnessed him driving erratically. [S] obtained a warrant to test defendant’s blood, which revealed the presence of THC. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of drugs in his blood, arguing that the scope of the warrant was limited to testing for the presence of alcohol only.” On appeal, he argued “that the search warrant expressly authorized alcohol testing only and that the second test of his blood for controlled substances exceeded the scope of the warrant in violation of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Thus, he asserted “the results of the test indicating the presence of THC in his blood must be suppressed.” The court held that while “the search warrant includes the pre-printed limitation to test for alcohol only, . . . when considering the circumstances of this case, the chemical testing of defendant’s blood sample for evidence of THC did not exceed the scope of the warrant as it was written. The warrant stated that there was ‘probable cause to believe an OUID . . . has occurred.’ The face of the search warrant thus established that it was reasonably directed at obtaining evidence relevant to the investigation of an OWI and OWVI involving marijuana.” The court concluded that “the warrant included the affidavit, given its proximity and incorporation into the warrant application itself.” Thus, it held that “the testing of the second blood sample for evidence of drugs did not exceed the scope of the warrant.” The court added that even if it “interpreted the warrant more stringently, such that it plainly limited the search to test only for alcohol, . . . the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to save the fruits of the drug test in this case.” It was evident that S “intended to obtain a search warrant authorizing a blood draw to test for THC in defendant’s blood—not to test for alcohol. Unfortunately, the Sheriff’s Department used a preprinted search warrant form that was preset to order a blood draw to test for alcohol.” Although S “presumably could have physically printed the request and then altered it by hand to fit the facts of his case, he did not do so. The district court characterized this as a ‘clerical mistake,’ and the circuit court agreed that it was an ‘oversight.’” The court also agreed. It noted that “defendant conceded that probable cause existed to support testing for drugs, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that [S] did anything but act in objective good faith by relying on the warrant to request both alcohol and drug testing of defendant’s blood to further the criminal investigation.”
Ineffective assistance; Failure to call witnesses; People v Jurewicz; Voluntary manslaughter instruction; People v Mendoza; Sentencing proportionality; People v Steanhouse
The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that his within-guidelines sentence for second-degree murder was proportionate. Defendant and a codefendant fought two brothers outside a bar, the victim fell backward after being punched and later died, and defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and AWIGBH. The trial court denied counsel’s withdrawal motion shortly before trial, directed that two attorneys proceed as cocounsel, refused requested self-defense and defense-of-others instructions as unsupported by the evidence, and imposed a 30-year minimum for murder within the 270-to-450-months-or-life guidelines range. On appeal, the court held counsel’s decision not to call defendant’s wife and the younger women from the group was reasonable strategy because their testimony “would not have aided” the defense and did not show any woman was in “immediate danger of harm” when the assaults occurred, a prerequisite to defense of others. The court also credited counsel’s assessment that calling the wife risked impeachment because she admitted lying to police and could open the door to testimony about defendant’s alleged steroid use and “roid rage,” and the Ginther record showed counsel had “investigated” those witnesses and made a “reasonable decision” not to present them. The court next held counsel was not ineffective for declining to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction because a rational view of the evidence did not establish “adequate provocation” that would cause a reasonable person to lose control, and an “all or nothing” approach can be “legitimate trial strategy” where the defendant believed second-degree murder was not proven. Finally, the court upheld the 30-year minimum as proportionate, noting there is no requirement to justify a within-guidelines sentence and emphasizing the trial court’s finding that defendant’s conduct was “particularly violent,” including punching the victim and then “kick[ing] and stomp[ing] him” while he was down and unable to defend himself. Affirmed.
Personal protection order continuation; MCL 600.2950(1)(j) & (4); Stalking definition; MCL 750.411h(1)(e); Burden on termination motion; Hayford v Hayford; Credibility findings; SP v BEK
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the stalking PPO because petitioner met her burden to show continuation was warranted and respondent’s appellate challenges were largely attacks on credibility that the trial court was entitled to resolve. Petitioner, respondent’s aunt, obtained an ex parte PPO on 11/4/24 after alleging respondent assaulted her three times, including an incident where respondent “took off her shoes and threw them,” and tried to damage petitioner’s car; an incident on 6/20/24 where respondent “ran up behind” her and hit her in the back of the head; and a later incident where respondent “ran up to jump” her but a third party intervened. Respondent denied the allegations and argued the dispute was driven by family conflict and financial motives. After a hearing, the trial court continued the PPO and tailored relief by prohibiting respondent from being at the mother’s home when petitioner was present, reasoning petitioner held power of attorney and “had to have access to her.” On appeal, the court explained a PPO may issue to restrain conduct prohibited by the stalking statute, defined as “a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment” that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized or harassed and that actually causes that reaction. The court reiterated the petitioner bears the burden on a termination motion and the trial court must consider the evidence and any history of similar acts. The panel rejected respondent’s credibility arguments, stressing credibility determinations belong to the trial court and petitioner was not required to pinpoint exact dates for every incident, nor was corroboration or a criminal charge required because the statute allows a PPO “whether or not” the respondent has been charged or convicted. The court also held the trial court permissibly considered petitioner’s need to safely enter the mother’s home to perform power-of-attorney duties as part of the practical context for the continued restrictions. Finally, it rejected the claim that petitioner had a pattern of baseless PPO filings because respondent produced no evidence that a separate PPO against another relative was dismissed for lack of credibility. Affirmed.
Child’s best interests; In re Atchley
Concluding that there was sufficient record evidence for the trial court to find that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in his child’s (KMG) best interests, the court held that the trial court did not clearly err in doing so. It noted that the referee’s reasoning as to KMG’s best interests “was sparse. The only considerations that the referee highlighted were respondent’s lengthy prison sentence, his lack of support for KMG, and the absence of a strong bond between respondent and KMG. However, given the situation, there were necessarily few facts to consider when addressing” the best-interests issue “because respondent had been in prison KMG’s entire life. Additionally, the considerations highlighted by the referee were supported by the record[,]” which showed “that KMG had never been in respondent’s care or custody because respondent was incarcerated when KMG was born. Further, during the events of the case, [he] did not have any formal visitation or interaction with KMG. Nor was there any testimony that [he] financially provided for KMG or made arrangements for his care during the time he was incarcerated.” As a result, “his total lack of history caring for KMG suggested that even if he were to be released during KMG’s childhood, he” failed to show “the ability to do so. The [trial] court was also permitted to consider the fact that [his] earliest release date is after KMG reaches legal adulthood.” While evidence was presented that they had a bond, a factor weighing against termination, “the other factors that the [trial] court considered, such as respondent’s limited ability to care for KMG and the advantages of KMG’s foster-care placement, weighed in favor of termination. At this point, KMG’s need for permanency, stability, and finality with his foster placement is paramount.” The court noted that at “the time of the best-interest hearing, KMG had been waiting eight months for his father to provide for his custody and care. Any placement with respondent’s mother was still theoretical as of the date of the best-interest hearing. KMG was entitled to stability, permanency, and finality, and he was receiving that stability with his foster family.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Children’s best interests; Parent-agency treatment plan (PATP)
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § (c)(i) was established, that reasonable reunification efforts were made, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. DHHS foster-care worker D “explained that from the beginning of the proceedings, DHHS was aware of respondent’s cognitive limitations and made appropriate accommodations for [her] capabilities. [D] also confirmed that in each referral, she specified that respondent was a minor at the time and ‘has some limitations regarding what she can and cannot do due to her age,’ and that she also had cognitive limitations. Contrary to respondent’s” appellate argument, the record showed that she “was not cooperative in participating in most of the services” DHHS offered. While her mother may have hindered respondent’s success, “when made aware of her behavior, DHHS took steps to mitigate her involvement. Faced with the overarching issue that respondent’s cognitive delays hindered her ability to comply with her court-ordered services, DHHS continued to make necessary modifications.” The court noted that while she was more compliant with her plan for a brief period “and her parenting was improving, [her] progress did not endure. She did not take initiative to comply with services and was not visiting [the children] because she felt ‘tired.’ DHHS also coordinated services for” her between three agencies but she failed to contact them “or otherwise follow through, explaining that she had simply forgot, and thus did not complete the initial intake.” As to § (c)(i), one child (JMG) was removed from her care and jurisdiction was “acquired over him because respondent was homeless, did not have the means or ability to care for JMG, had expressed that she did not want to care for JMG, and had been found with JMG riding unsecured in her scooter,” subjecting him to potential harm. Her second child (JTG) was removed from her care because JMG had already been removed. At the time of the 4/23 statutory-grounds stage of the termination hearing, “and later at the best-interest portion of the hearing in [12/23], the conditions that led to the adjudication of both” children continued to exist. The record was also “replete with evidence that respondent continued to struggle with obtaining full compliance with her PATP as to both children.”