Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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42 USC § 1983; Disclosure obligations under Brady v Maryland; A forensic serologist’s failure to disclose his notes before trial; Whether the court had jurisdiction to review this appeal involving a “mixed” question of law & fact; Gregory v City of Louisville; Whether Brady’s applicability to scientists was “clearly established” for forensic scientists in 1995; Moldowan v City of Warren
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review defendant-forensic scientist’s (Thurman) argument “that his notes were neither exculpatory nor material under Brady[.]” It also concluded that “it was clearly established in 1990 that a scientist could violate Brady by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence.” Thus, that rule sufficed “to rebut Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense under our caselaw.” Plaintiffs-Hardin and Clark were tried for murder. During their trial, Thurman testified “that a hair found at the crime scene was ‘similar’ to a sample of Hardin’s hair.” They were convicted and each spent over 20 years in prison before DNA testing proved that this hair was not Hardin’s. The convictions were vacated, and they sued. Thurman’s working notes were obtained in discovery and revealed that there were doubts about the hair’s identification. Plaintiffs alleged that he “had fabricated evidence” and committed a Brady violation by not disclosing the notes before trial. The district court granted him summary judgment based on qualified immunity on all but Hardin’s Brady claim. Thurman argued that this claim failed on the merits and that Brady caselaw in 1995 did not clearly establish that a forensic scientist had a duty to disclose observation notes. As to his first argument, the court considered its jurisdiction under the “collateral order doctrine.” It noted that here, there was a “‘mixed’ question of law and fact; Would the historical facts (when interpreted in Hardin’s favor) rise to the level required to meet the ‘favorability’ and ‘materiality’ elements of Hardin’s Brady claim?” The court noted that it held in Gregory that in the Brady context, mixed questions are “unreviewable at this stage.” Gregory foreclosed Thurman’s challenge. He asserted “that his observation notes were not exculpatory and that his failure to disclose [them] did not prejudice Hardin because they were not material. But the district court held that a reasonable jury could find for Hardin on both of these elements of his Brady claim. . . . Just as in Gregory, the elements ‘are beyond our reach at this juncture.”’ As for his second argument, the court has “held that pre-1990 cases clearly established that the police also have a ‘Brady-derived’ duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the prosecution.” Even though this caselaw involved claims against police officers and not forensic scientists, “‘every reasonable’ scientist would have recognized that this extension of Brady covered them too.” Once the court had made “the leap beyond prosecutors, we see no reasonable argument why this leap should apply only to police officers in the field and not those in the lab.” Affirmed in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction.
42 USC § 1983 action arising from a slip & fall in a jail shower; Whether plaintiff adequately alleged that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause; Whether plaintiff adequately alleged defendant-county’s “policy or custom” caused her injuries; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Whether the second amended complaint’s claims against defendant-healthcare provider were barred by the statute of limitations; Accrual; Whether the second complaint “related back” to the first complaint; FedRCivP 15(c)(1); “Equitable tolling”
In this § 1983 action, the court held that plaintiff-pretrial detainee Coleman’s due process claim against defendant-Hamilton County failed where the ordinary risk of a slippery shower “falls well below what is required to show an unconstitutional risk for inmates.” It also concluded as to her inadequate medical care claim against the County that she failed to allege it “had an official policy of mistreating injured inmates.” It further upheld the statute-of-limitations dismissal of her constitutional claims against defendants-healthcare provider, its employees, and county corrections officers added in her second amended complaint. While in the county jail, Coleman fell on her way out of the shower and broke her ankle. She claimed that the County knew the floors were slippery and violated her constitutional rights by allowing the slippery shower conditions and by failing to properly treat her injuries after she fell. She later filed a second amended complaint suing, among others, the company that provided healthcare services to the jail. On appeal, the court first addressed her Monell claims against the County. It held that she did “not ‘plausibly suggest’ that the conditions of the jail shower violated the Due Process Clause.” It noted that “the risk that shower floors will be slippery exists for all showers—whether located inside or outside a jail’s walls.” And it found that “Coleman’s proposed exacerbating factors—that she had to wear ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unsafe’ flip flops and that other inmates had fallen in the past—do not resemble the types of factors that we have opined might suffice.” The court also concluded that her complaint failed “to tie the purportedly inadequate medical care that she received after her fall to a Hamilton County policy or custom.” Turning to district court’s ruling on the second complaint’s claims against the healthcare company and others, the court held that the complaint showed “that her § 1983 claims accrued on the date of her accident.” While she asserted that “she could not have known of the ‘cause’ of her injuries to trigger the statute of limitations until she learned the identities of the medical personnel who failed to treat her and their affiliation with” the company rather than the County, she was mistaken. She did not need to know the company employees’ names “or their affiliation with that company. It was enough that she knew that they had caused her delayed care.” The court also held that the complaint could not be saved under Rule 15(c)(1) where she could not “show the required error for any of the newly added defendants.” And the court found that she failed to meet her burden to show that she qualified for equitable tolling. Affirmed.
Toxic mold action against a landlord & management company; Release of liability; Scope of release; Intended third-party beneficiary; MCL 600.1405; Extrinsic evidence; Shay v Aldrich; Latent ambiguity; “Firm”; Confidentiality clause; Rescission; Innocence; Stanton v Dachille; Effect of a breach
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding plaintiff-tenant’s claims against defendants-apartment owner (Abbott) and management company (DTN) were barred by a release agreement he signed in exchange for his relocation to a different apartment. Plaintiff alerted DTN of toxic mold in his apartment and requested that he be given a different unit. DTN granted his request on the condition that he sign a contract releasing it from liability. Plaintiff signed a release of liability and moved to the new unit. When his health deteriorated, he sued defendants. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants. The court previously remanded for further development of the record, and the trial court reached the same conclusion. The court now rejected plaintiff’s argument that Abbott was not included in the classes of entities listed in the release as being protected by its terms. Because Abbott is clearly classified as a firm, it “is a third-party beneficiary under the terms of the release.” In addition, because there was nothing in the record suggesting plaintiff intended to separate defendants for the purposes of these proceedings, “the release unambiguously applies to both DTN and Abbott.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that he nullified the release agreement by violating the terms of its confidentiality clause. “The trial court correctly concluded that, even if the record supported [plaintiff’s] assertion that he breached the contract, he cannot assert his own breach as grounds for rescission because he is not a ‘blameless’ party.” Affirmed.
Search & seizure; Motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop; Suppression based on a violation of Miranda v Arizona; Voluntary statements; Inevitable discovery; Vehicle search; The plain-view doctrine; The automobile exception to the warrant requirement; Probable cause; People v Kazmierczak
In these consolidated appeals in which both parties challenged the trial court’s rulings on defendant-Quinzy’s motion to suppress, the court held that the search of her car was completely permissible. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s grant of the motion as to the gun recovered during the traffic stop, affirmed the denial of the motion in all other respects, and remanded. Defendant told the state trooper (P) conducting the stop “that she had no driver’s license, and [P] saw the front-seat passenger trying to put something into the purse at her feet. [P] took defendant into custody, and another law-enforcement officer arrived to assist him.” They eventually seized defendant’s gun and a bag of meth. The court concluded that the gun could not “be suppressed under the Miranda doctrine for several reasons. First, ‘[p]hysical evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement remains admissible as long as the statement was voluntary.’” Every pertinent factor here indicated “the statement about the gun defendant made without prompting was ‘voluntary.’” In addition, it “was not the result of any police questioning; she simply volunteered the information about the gun without any prompting. . . . Third, because the police officers on the scene had probable cause to search” her car, her gun “would inevitably have been discovered during the warrantless search of the vehicle that was permissible as a matter of law.” Thus, the trial court erred in suppressing the gun. The court also found no basis to suppress defendant’s statement to the second officer (B) about the gun. “The casual conversation between [B] and defendant preceding Miranda warnings did not constitute interrogation because no ‘questioning’ occurred.” Further, probable cause supported P’s search of the car. While he “had to look closely at the bag to identify it as meth[], at that point he already had a substantial basis to conclude that contraband was inside the vehicle. Specifically, he knew that defendant had no driver’s license, the vehicle contained a stolen license plate, and the passenger had made furtive gestures trying to hide something. . . . Also, because [P] and [B] had probable cause to believe that the plastic bag contained an illegal substance based on the passenger’s furtive gestures and [B’s] training and experience, their search of the area where they located the plastic bag and their search of defendant’s bag were both covered by the automobile exception.”
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to suppress defendant’s statements; Miranda v Arizona; Custody; Interrogation; Lack of coercion; Invocation of the right to remain silent; Effect of defendant reinitiating the conversation; Failure to move to suppress a shell casing
Concluding that defendant was not denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as to the failure to move to suppress his statements or a shell casing, the court affirmed. Defendant’s mother (G) was shot and killed in her home. “After the shooting, defendant swallowed the shell casing from the bullet that was used to kill” her. He was convicted of second-degree murder, tampering with evidence, possession with intent to deliver heroin, FIP, resisting or obstructing a police officer, and felony-firearm. Defendant argued “that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statements [he] made to the police in violation of Miranda” and failure to move to suppress evidence. The court found that he “was in custody during his initial interview with” a police detective (R). “A reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not have believed that he was free to leave.” When R “initially approached him, defendant had recently been shot with a taser, restrained with handcuffs, and placed in the back of a police cruiser. Those circumstances also created an inherently coercive environment.” The court also concluded that defendant was interrogated. It held that he “should have been advised of his Miranda rights during his initial encounter with [R]. But that initial interview yielded nothing of any significance that could be used against defendant, so [his] claim about the Miranda violation at the initial interview necessarily pertains to the second and third interviews as well.” The court noted that “to obtain exclusion of voluntary statements made after an initial unwarned statement, the questioning must be coercive.” It found there was no such evidence of coercion here. Defendant also argued “that his Miranda rights were violated during his second interview at the Flint Police Station because the police continued to question him after he invoked his right to remain silent.” He also maintained “that his statements during his third interview should be suppressed as ‘fruits’ of the violation of his right to remain silent.” The court held that because he “reinitiated conversation with the police after stating he did not want to speak with them anymore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the statements defendant made during his second interview, nor were the statements made in his third interview ‘fruits’ of any violation.” The court added that given all the evidence and his own testimony, there was “no reasonable probability that” a suppression motion would have changed the outcome.
Motion for a sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2); Procedural reasonableness; Reduction of two criminal history points under USSG Manual § 4A1.1(d); Obstruction of justice enhancement (§ 3C1.1); The “law of the case” doctrine; Substantive reasonableness; § 3553(a)(2)
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s decision to resentence defendant-Obi under the amended guidelines at the top of his range and to include a two-level enhancement for “obstruction of justice” in doing so. Obi pled guilty to providing a woman with a fatal dose of heroin and was sentenced to 300 months. He asked for a sentence reduction under an amendment to the guidelines (Amendment 821) providing that “a defendant no longer receives additional criminal history points for committing a crime while serving another sentence unless the defendant had seven or more other” such points. The district court recalculated a range of 235 to 293 months. It sentenced him to 293 months. Obi challenged the sentence as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He objected to the district court’s inclusion of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice in the offense-level calculation. This enhancement had been included in each of his prior sentencings. He based his argument on language in one of his prior appeals, Obi II, invoking the law of the case doctrine. But the court noted that “the opinion repeatedly stated that it did not decide—and did not need to decide—the obstruction issue.” And it concluded that “Obi II did not hold the obstruction-enhanced offense level of 37 to be erroneous. Nor did the retroactive guidelines amendment Obi relied on for his § 3582(c)(2) motion affect his offense level.” As a result, the district court committed no procedural error by including the enhancement in its calculations. As for Obi’s substantive reasonableness argument, the court first decided to assume that it could “reach a substantive reasonableness challenge to a § 3582(c)(2) ruling[.]” It then found “no basis for relief.” It considered the district court’s review of the § 3553(a) factors and emphasized the “‘highly deferential review’” given to a district court’s “‘reasoned discretion’” when considering those factors. The district court considered the seriousness of the crime, along with Obi’s failure to intervene in a death that was preventable. The district court “decided that Obi’s ‘horrible’ and ‘ruthless’ crime—which included ‘having sex with the victim while she was under the influence of heroin, indeed dying,’ and then making her ‘available’ for his friend while in that same state—justified the 300-month sentence.” The court determined that it “had ‘ample reasons’ to conclude Obi deserved a within-guidelines sentence.”
Child custody; Sole legal & physical custody; Best-interest factors under MCL 722.23; Established custodial environment (ECE)
The court concluded that the “trial court’s factual findings were not against the great weight of evidence,” and thus, it “did not abuse its discretion when granting sole legal and physical custody” of LAB to defendant-father. Respondent-mother contended “that the trial court clearly erred in failing to specifically place all of the factors on the record and explicitly state which factor favored each parent. While the trial court did not individually refer to each best-interest factor on the record, [it] did make numerous findings of fact and referred to the factors.” The court noted that when “analyzing the best-interest factors, the court’s findings and conclusions ‘need not include consideration of every piece of evidence,’ but the record ‘must be sufficient for this Court to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s findings.’” It held that the record here was “sufficient to show that a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s findings.” As to factors (a)-(c), the DHHS testified to the concerns regarding the lack of bond between the mother and LAB, and the trial court found her limited parenting time with LAB was “unsuccessful.” It further found her “aggressive behavior was negatively impacting LAB because ‘the only time those type of aggressive behaviors [in LAB] arise is when [LAB] has been in the company of”” the mother. The trial court found no issue as to the father’s “ability to care for LAB, whereas” the mother did not have the ability to provide for and care for LAB. The trial court found she “had not completed any parenting classes and did not fulfill LAB’s educational needs by participating in the special services he requires.” As to factors (d) and (e), it found an ECE had existed with the father since 5/23, “who had ‘a proper home for [LAB] and [LAB] does enjoy residing with [the father] and all of his needs are being met in the home of [the father].’” The trial court acknowledged the mother “previously pleaded no contest to improper supervision of LAB, and further found [the mother’s] living situation was ‘very unstable in that [DHHS] has no knowledge as to where specifically she’s living at this time.’” As to factor (f), it “found [the mother’s] ‘moral fitness is at issue due to her substance abuse and domestic violence and the other issues that she has.’” It found there was “no issue relative to [the father]’s moral fitness nor his ability to care for the child.” As to factor (g) the trial court acknowledged the mother “failed to complete any of her court-ordered services, which included both individual counseling and substance abuse counseling.” As to factors (h) and (i), the “record indicated LAB was excelling under [the father’s] care. The trial court found LAB enjoyed living with [the father], whereas LAB was aggressive when attending parenting time with [the mother]. It did not indicate whether LAB expressed a preference.” As to factor (j), the record indicated the father “helped to facilitate parenting time with [the mother]. The trial court found parenting time was unsuccessful.” Finally, as to factor (k), it found it was an issue she “struggled with, reiterating she pleaded no contest to allegations of domestic violence.” Affirmed.
Action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the No-Fault Act; Opt out of PIP coverage; MCL 500.3107d; “Qualified person”; Claim against the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility & Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (collectively, the MAIPF); MCL 500.3172(1); Existence of an applicable insurance policy; MCL 500.3114(1) & (4)
Concluding that there was no evidence the insured (nonparty-A) opted out of PIP coverage for allowable expenses under his policy with defendant-Integon, the court held that the trial court erred in granting Integon summary disposition. But it found that the trial court properly granted defendants-MAIPF summary disposition. Plaintiff-medical provider sued for PIP benefits for treatment provided to A’s grandson (J) after an auto accident. Integon quoted A “over the phone and presented him with the option to opt out of PIP medical coverage for allowable expenses in exchange for reducing his premiums. This phone call was recorded and a transcript of the call was produced during discovery. During the recorded phone call, [A] briefly discussed opting out of PIP medical coverage because of his Medicare coverage, but he did not request to opt out of PIP coverage for allowable expenses at that time.” He signed an opt out form on 6/29/20 for the policy period starting 7/3/20, but the policy period at issue here was from 1/3/21 to 7/3/21, because the accident occurred on 3/5/21. “Even if the phone call had occurred around the time of the 2021 policy period, it would not create a question of fact on the issue of a PIP opt out because (1) [A] did not instruct the salesperson to sign the form on his behalf as stated in MCL 500.3107e(2)(b) and (2) [A] did not agree to purchase insurance during the call; rather, he discussed insurance options (including uninsured motorist coverage, liability, and PIP coverage) and told the salesperson that he would call back because he was about to receive a phone call from his granddaughter. The record contains no opt-out form for the 2021 policy period, and MCL 500.3107d contemplates that the requisite opt-out form will be completed at the time that a policy is originated and for renewals thereafter.” Thus, the court reversed the order granting Integon summary disposition and remanded. It affirmed summary disposition for MAIPF because applicable PIP coverage for J’s injuries existed through Integon’s policy and thus, he “was not entitled to benefits through the MAIPF.”
Declaratory-judgment action arising out of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident; “Insured person” & “permission”; Implied permission; Credibility; Franks v Franks; Distinguishing Price v Austin
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-insurer summary disposition of plaintiff’s action seeking a declaratory judgment related to an ATV accident. Plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on an ATV driven by his friend (S) and owned by S’s stepdad (D). He subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant was obligated to defend S in any lawsuit related to the accident and provide liability coverage under a policy held by D and his wife (A). The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, finding there was no genuine issue of material fact that S did not have permission to use the ATV. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred because “there were issues of fact whether plaintiff had implied permission to use the ATV and there were credibility issues with” the testimony of D and A. The evidence showed D was aware S “had used the ATV in a limited manner in the past after asking permission.” Plaintiff claimed that A had given S “implied permission to use the ATV because she assumed that he had been driving [it] on the family property when she found out about the accident. This argument mischaracterizes [A’s] deposition testimony, however, as she stated she assumed the accident had occurred near the cabin because the ATV did not have a license plate or off-road tags.” After the accident, S informed A “that he had been using the ATV at the time of the accident.” However, there was “nothing in the record that supports plaintiff’s contention that [S] had implied permission to use the ATV. [A] and [D] testified that they did not know [S] had been using” it, and S, A, and D all agreed S needed to ask D “for permission before he could use the ATV. There was also no dispute that there was a complete prohibition on use of the ATV while intoxicated. As nothing in the record supports that [S] had express or implied permission to use the ATV, reasonable minds could not differ as to this issue, and the trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on the basis that plaintiff was not an insured under the meaning of the relevant policies.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that the testimony of D and A “was not credible because they have an incentive to 'shield themselves from liability,' and” they have animus toward plaintiff’s family, noting “nothing in the record would support such an assertion, as the testimony of” S, D, and A “was consistent on the issue of permission, as all three testified that [S] did not have permission, and [S] admitted he used the ATV without permission.” Unlike in Price, “the testimony was consistent among all witnesses that [S] was not permitted to use the ATV without permission or while intoxicated.” Affirmed.