Become a mentor! The Mentor Center needs experienced attorneys to offer support & advice to young attorneys.
 
  • News and Moves

    Robert J. Andretz
    Michael P. Ashcraft Jr.
    Andrew W. Barnes
    Mohammad G. Beydoun
    Jeffrey Bullard Jr.
    John R. Colip
    Jennifer E. Consiglio
    Matthew S. Derby
    Zachary J. Diederichs
    Mowitt (Mitt) S. Drew III
    Jennifer Dukarski
    William M. Engeln
    Jordan D. Florian
    Audrey J. Forbush
    Fraser Trebilcock Davis Dunlap & Cavanaugh P.C.
    Andrew S. Gipe
    Michael F. Golab
    Michael D. Hanchett
    Laura E. Johnson
    Garett Koger
    Bill Lentine
    Scott K. Lites
    MDTC
    Daniel P. Makarski
    Fadee A. Nakkash
    Sarah L. Nirenberg
    Amber D. Peters
    Rachel Roseman
    Kelly L. Travis

 

Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Criminal Law (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 77158
    Case: People v. Sale
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Cavanagh, Markey, and Servitto
    Issues:

    Deadlocked jury instructions; People v Walker; Coercion; Exclusion of testimony about contradictory statements previously made by the victim about another matter; MRE 608(b) (allows impeachment of a witness by specific instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness)

    Summary:

    The court determined that there was no evidence of the type of coercion involving deadlocked jury instructions that would require reversal. Also, the trial court did not err by excluding evidence that the victim had previously given contradictory statements as to an incident in which her father hit her. Defendant was convicted of CSC I. He argued that “the trial court made statements that did not conform with the standard deadlocked-jury instructions, and these off-script instructions constituted reversible error because they were unduly coercive.” Defendant’s first issue was “whether the trial court committed reversible error based on the content of its ad-lib remarks immediately after the deadlocked-jury instructions.” He admitted the “trial court’s first set of instructions complied with the standard deadlocked-jury instructions under M Crim JI 3.12.” However, he argued the additional statements it “made immediately after were a substantial departure from the standard instruction because the statements ‘crossed the line from encouraging deliberation to instead impressing the need to reach unanimity.’” Rather than being coercive, the court held that “the trial court’s statements were words of encouragement, meant to inspire and compliment the jury." The trial court was "merely pointing out the fact that the jurors constituted a jury cannot be considered coercive language.” An important piece of context in this case was “the fact that the standard instructions and the trial court’s off-script remarks were given contemporaneously.” Also, the court held that “the coercive atmosphere created by the Walker trial court” was not present. The trial court’s instructions here “did not lack constructive advice to encourage further deliberation and, because the standard instructions were given only moments before the ad-lib instructions, the necessary safeguards were communicated to the jury.” Further, the atmosphere created by the trial court here was not coercive or adversarial as in Walker. There was nothing here “to suggest a hostile courtroom atmosphere; the jury and trial court appeared to be cooperating with one another during communications back and forth after the jury asked for assistance and clarification.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 77151
    Case: People v. Smith
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Riordan, K.F. Kelly, and Swartzle
    Issues:

    Right of self-representation; People v Dunigan; Waiver of right to counsel; MCR 6.005(D); Credibility; “Competence”; People v Anderson; Equivocality; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); MRE 802; Police radio transmissions; People v Eady; Present sense impression exception; MRE 803(1); Excited utterance exception; MRE 803(2); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Smith v Spisak; Failure to make a futile objection; People v Gist

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not violate defendant’s right of self-representation or his right to a fair trial, and did not err by allowing the prosecution to present hearsay testimony. He was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 30 to 45 years for each armed robbery and 2 to 15 for fleeing and eluding. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation. “Given defendant’s equivocal assertion of the right to represent himself, deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations regarding defendant’s ability to comprehend the risks of self-representation and his competence to represent himself, and mindful of the presumption against waiver of the right to counsel,” the trial court did not err by finding he did not validly waive his constitutional right to counsel. The court also rejected his claim that the trial court’s evidentiary decisions violated his right to a fair trial by depriving him of the meaningful opportunity to present a defense and to confront the witnesses against him, noting he “failed to establish that the trial court’s evidentiary decisions constituted abuses of the trial court’s discretion or violations of his right to a fair trial.” He was able to “use affidavits in an attempt to impeach [a detective’s] credibility, as well as to cross-examine the detective regarding his [] entry into defendant’s impounded car. The trial court’s instruction about the lawfulness of the searches of defendant’s car did not bar the jury from concluding that, during one of those lawful entries, someone planted cash in defendant’s red hoodie.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to present extensive hearsay testimony, and that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to it. It found that “[m]uch of the testimony to which defendant objects arguably fell under the present sense impression or the excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule.” And even if any of the evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay, “its admission was harmless, given that the same facts were established by evidence that was not hearsay.” Further, any objection by counsel would have been futile. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Real Property

    e-Journal #: 77164
    Case: Henk v. Labree Homes, LLC
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Shapiro, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Foreclosure & sale of a condominium unit; Effect of failing to tender the redemption amount on tort claims; Whether plaintiff stated a claim for money damages

    Summary:

    The court held that summary disposition on plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, silent fraud, and conversion were not warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (8). Also, it rejected defendants’ claim that she did not state a cause of action for money damages. Plaintiff did “not dispute the trial court’s decision to dismiss her claims for quiet title, claim and delivery, constructive trust, and promissory estoppel on the basis of her failure to tender the redemption amount.” She only argued that her failure to do so “did not entitle defendants to summary disposition on her tort claims—fraudulent misrepresentation, silent fraud, and common law or statutory conversion.” The court noted that her tort claims were not dependent on her retaining rights in and to the property. “Thus, to the extent that the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s tort claims ‘based upon the failure to tender the amounts due for redemption,’ that decision was error.” Defendants next argued that her “complaint asked only for equitable relief—not money damages—and therefore her contention that her legal claims should have survived summary disposition” was disingenuous because she never raised any legal claims. They were correct to the extent they noted that her “request for relief in her complaint did not explicitly request money damages. Yet defendants ignore that plaintiff’s complaint specified what money damages she believed she was owed. For her fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud claims, plaintiff contended that her money damages were ‘a total loss of the equity value in the condominium unit less the redemption price.’” As to her statutory and common-law conversion claim, the complaint contended that she was “wrongfully deprived of said property and is therefore entitled to treble damages under the conversion statute.” Thus, the complaint “did specify that she was seeking damages.” Further, defendants ignored that, at the hearing on their summary disposition motion, “plaintiff repeatedly clarified that she was seeking money damages on her tort claims.” The court added that, while their confusion about whether she “was asserting a legal claim for her claims of fraud is perhaps understandable given that such claims can be equitable,” or legal, the same could not be said for her statutory and common-law conversion claim, which was “clearly a legal claim.” Reversed and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Personal Protection Orders (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 77166
    Case: CRB v. SAB
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Riordan, K.F. Kelly, and Swartzle
    Issues:

    PPO case; MCL 600.2950(30)(d); Issuance of an ex parte PPO; MCR 3.310(B)(5); Pickering v Pickering; Acts necessitating a PPO; MCL 600.2950(1); Whether there was imminent danger; Kampf v Kampf; Motion to modify or rescind a PPO; MCL 600.2950(13); Mootness; In re Tchakarova; People v Richmond

    Summary:

    The court dismissed as moot petitioner’s appeal of the trial court’s order granting respondent’s motion to terminate an ex parte PPO. On 1/19/21, petitioner filed a petition for a PPO against respondent, who was her husband and with whom she shared children, alleging she feared for her safety because of his threatening and violent behavior. On the same day, the trial court entered an order prohibiting respondent from having contact with petitioner in the manner she requested. The order provided it would remain in effect until 1/18/22. In response, respondent filed a motion to terminate or modify the PPO. At the hearing, the trial court found that petitioner no longer wanted to have a relationship with respondent, and that he “‘has not favorably reacted to that, basically, engaging in conduct that can only be described . . . as stalking.’” It indicated it would only terminate the PPO after the parties presented documentation of the initiation of divorce proceedings. On 3/23/21, after divorce proceedings had been initiated, it granted his motion to terminate the PPO. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court made an error of law by terminating the PPO upon the initiation of divorce proceedings, or, alternatively, that it abused its discretion because there was reasonable cause to believe respondent might commit one or more acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1). The court held that because the PPO had already expired, it could not afford her any relief, and the appeal was moot.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Real Property (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

    e-Journal #: 77164
    Case: Henk v. Labree Homes, LLC
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Shapiro, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Foreclosure & sale of a condominium unit; Effect of failing to tender the redemption amount on tort claims; Whether plaintiff stated a claim for money damages

    Summary:

    The court held that summary disposition on plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, silent fraud, and conversion were not warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (8). Also, it rejected defendants’ claim that she did not state a cause of action for money damages. Plaintiff did “not dispute the trial court’s decision to dismiss her claims for quiet title, claim and delivery, constructive trust, and promissory estoppel on the basis of her failure to tender the redemption amount.” She only argued that her failure to do so “did not entitle defendants to summary disposition on her tort claims—fraudulent misrepresentation, silent fraud, and common law or statutory conversion.” The court noted that her tort claims were not dependent on her retaining rights in and to the property. “Thus, to the extent that the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s tort claims ‘based upon the failure to tender the amounts due for redemption,’ that decision was error.” Defendants next argued that her “complaint asked only for equitable relief—not money damages—and therefore her contention that her legal claims should have survived summary disposition” was disingenuous because she never raised any legal claims. They were correct to the extent they noted that her “request for relief in her complaint did not explicitly request money damages. Yet defendants ignore that plaintiff’s complaint specified what money damages she believed she was owed. For her fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud claims, plaintiff contended that her money damages were ‘a total loss of the equity value in the condominium unit less the redemption price.’” As to her statutory and common-law conversion claim, the complaint contended that she was “wrongfully deprived of said property and is therefore entitled to treble damages under the conversion statute.” Thus, the complaint “did specify that she was seeking damages.” Further, defendants ignored that, at the hearing on their summary disposition motion, “plaintiff repeatedly clarified that she was seeking money damages on her tort claims.” The court added that, while their confusion about whether she “was asserting a legal claim for her claims of fraud is perhaps understandable given that such claims can be equitable,” or legal, the same could not be said for her statutory and common-law conversion claim, which was “clearly a legal claim.” Reversed and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Tax (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 77168
    Case: Cohen v. City of Oak Park
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Shapiro, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Dispute as to the true cash value (TCV), state equalized value (SEV), & taxable value (TV) of a residential property; Standing; The Tax Tribunal’s (TT) jurisdiction to address economic-condition-factor (ECF) issues; Burden of proof as to ECF neighborhoods; MCL 205.737(3)

    Summary:

    The court found that petitioners’ standing argument was misplaced, and that the TT addressed and decided their issues as to the valuation of their property, including their challenge to the establishment of the property’s ECF neighborhood. Further, the court held that “MCL 205.737(3) does not place a burden of proof on the assessing agency with regard to justifying the ECF applied to a property as part of the initial assessment process.” They appealed the TT’s judgment as to the TCV, SEV, and TV of their residential property, contending that it was overvalued due to the manner in which respondent-city created ECF neighborhoods in the city. “ECFs are used as part of the cost-less-depreciation mass-appraisal technique to adjust costs as listed in the Michigan Assessor’s Manual to local conditions. Calculation and application of ECFs requires the grouping of properties into various ECF neighborhoods.” On appeal, the court noted it could not find error as to their standing issue because the TT did not determine that they lacked standing to challenge the ECF as applied to their property. In its final judgment, the TT held that they failed to provide any proof that their property’s “ECF neighborhood was improperly established.” Likewise, while they asserted the TT erred in concluding that it lacked authority over issues related to the establishment of ECF neighborhoods, the TT “made no such holding.” It permitted them to present their case that the ECF neighborhood for their “property was invalid and resulted in an inflated valuation” and it concluded that they “failed to show any errors in the creation or application of the ECF or any overvaluation of the” property. Finally, the court found that their reading of MCL 205.737(3) – that respondent had the burden of proof to justify the basis for the ECF applied to their property – was “untenable.” It noted that petitioners bear the burden of proof as to TCV. “It follows that, because TCV is calculated using the ECF, the petitioner has the burden of proof when contesting issues related to ECFs.” Thus, the TT did not err in allocating the burden of proof. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 77171
    Case: In re Williams
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Shapiro, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Due process; Advice of rights under MCR 3.971; In re Pederson; Right to appeal a child’s removal; MCR 3.965(B)(15); Placement; MCR 3.965(C)(2); Reasonable reunification efforts

    Summary:

    The court held that respondent-mother was not entitled to reversal based on the trial court’s explanation of her rights under MCR 3.971, that it properly advised her of her right to appeal the child’s (A) removal, and that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. Thus, it affirmed the order terminating her parental rights. “The trial court properly advised respondent at both the preliminary hearing and at the pretrial hearing about her right to appeal.” It did not specifically advise her “of her right to a court-appointed attorney in order to appeal the adjudication.” But there was no indication she “was unable to speak with her attorney about her right to appeal, of which the trial court advised respondent on at least two occasions.” There was no reason to believe she “would have been more likely to appeal had she thought that she had the right to have two separate court-appointed attorneys.” Further, she failed to indicate on what “grounds she would have appealed the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” This case was similar to Pederson – the trial court “advised respondent of most of her rights, including the right to appeal the trial court’s orders, and respondent had a court-appointed attorney at all times during the case. There is no indication that respondent’s plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made or that the trial court’s advice of rights affected the adjudicative or dispositional stage of the proceedings;” thus, she did not establish prejudice. In addition, there “was significant evidence supporting the original exercise of jurisdiction[.]” As to MCR 3.965(B)(15), the referee properly advised her of her right to appeal A’s removal during the preliminary exam and the pretrial hearing. While respondent asserted A should have been placed with her maternal grandmother, the DHHS pursued this before and after the maternal grandmother moved out of the state, “but she failed to attend the planned meeting. The trial court made all the appropriate findings pursuant to MCR 3.965(C)(2) for removal before ordering a foster-care placement . . . .” As to reunification efforts, she was discharged from parenting programs due to no-shows, “left inpatient treatment programs early and did not participate in other treatment programs.” There was no indication that “the DHHS failed to tailor services to her needs.”

    Full Text Opinion

Ads