Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA); Settlement agreement containing a release; Attorney fees & costs; Michigan Office of Administrative Hearings & Rules (MOAHR); Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA)
The trial court correctly ruled that defendant violated the parties’ “settlement agreement by submitting documents to the ALJ stating that plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment benefits because she was terminated for misconduct.” But it found “the trial court awarded plaintiff an excessive amount of attorney fees and costs because the settlement agreement only contemplates that attorney fees and costs that are directly incurred in judicial litigation are awardable.” Defendant (plaintiff’s former employer) argued that the trial court erred by ruling that it violated the 8/23/21 settlement agreement (which contained a release and prohibited the parties from disparaging each other) “by submitting documents to the ALJ within the [MOAHR] stating that plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment benefits because she was terminated for misconduct.” The court noted that according “to defendant, MCL 421.20(a)(2) and MCL 421.54(a) of the MESA, taken together, implicitly require an employer to comply with requests for information from the UIA.” Thus, defendant asserted, “it was required to submit documentation to the ALJ indicating the reason why plaintiff was terminated.” The court found that “the parties would have been better served to expressly reference plaintiff’s ongoing claim for unemployment benefits in the settlement agreement.” Nonetheless, it agreed “with plaintiff and the trial court that paragraph 4 is sufficiently broad to encompass defendant’s conduct in the administrative proceedings after the [8/23/21] date of the settlement agreement.” While defendant strenuously argued “that it is required under the MESA to comply with UIA requests for information,” the court noted that “the administrative case was transferred to a separate agency, the MOAHR, on about [1/5/22], when plaintiff appealed the Notice of Redetermination. Thus, the MESA provisions relied upon by defendant do not shield its conduct after that date.” Further, defendant did “not argue that it was required, by statute or administrative rule, to submit incriminating documentation about plaintiff to the ALJ. To the contrary, the [3/18/22], ‘Notice of Telephone Hearing’ states that defendant may provide documentation ‘[i]f you wish.’” The court held that the “trial court correctly ruled that defendant violated paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement by continuing to challenge plaintiff’s claim for unemployment benefits, and that its violation in this regard was not excused by the MESA.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Confirmation & enforcement of an arbitration award; Court review of arbitration awards; Michigan Dep’t of State Police v Michigan State Police Troopers Ass’n; Abandonment & waiver; American Arbitration Association (AAA)
The court held that the trial court did not err in granting plaintiff-Cornwell’s motion to confirm and enforce the arbitration award in this dispute arising from a franchise agreement. Cornwell manufactures and distributes auto repair tools. It entered into the franchise agreement with defendants-Karrips and their company, DK. “After a dispute arose regarding DK and the Karrips’ alleged failure to pay Cornwell for inventory, the parties participated in” an arbitration hearing before the AAA. “The arbitrator awarded Cornwell roughly $91,000 in addition to prejudgment and postjudgment interest.” Cornwell then filed suit to confirm and enforce the award. In response, defendants contended “they never executed a valid arbitration agreement” and filed a counterclaim. The court affirmed “the trial court’s decisions to enforce the arbitration award and dismiss the Karrips’ counterclaim on summary disposition for several reasons.” It found that the Karrips “abandoned these issues by failing to address the underlying merits of the trial court’s orders, and they waived any challenge to the trial court’s decisions on the basis of their former attorney’s alleged legal malpractice. Additionally, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority or commit a legal error apparent on the face of the arbitration award. And the trial court correctly dismissed the Karrips’ counterclaim on summary disposition because it arose from the parties’ franchise agreement and was subject to arbitration.” They alleged in the counterclaim “that Cornwell deliberately sabotaged their business by neglecting to fulfill product orders, interfering with sales, and requiring them to use faulty software that ruined multiple computers.” Thus, this claim arose from “the parties’ franchise agreement and was subject to arbitration.”
“Member’ of an LLC under the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act (MLLCA); MCL 450.4501; Common law & statutory conversion; Proper notice & an opportunity to be heard; Fraud; Unjust enrichment; Safe Transportation, LLC (STL); Safe Transportation 4, LLC (ST4L)
[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 3/19/25.] The court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendants-Kevin and ST4L, and dismissing all the claims against them, and it affirmed “those decisions. But the trial court improperly dismissed the claims against [defendant-]STL because plaintiff was not provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether summary disposition was warranted in” STL’s favor. Thus, the court vacated the dismissal of the claims against STL and remanded to the trial court for it to address them. Plaintiff argued, among other things, “that the trial court erred when it concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether Kevin was a member of STL.” The court noted that “plaintiff could only potentially prove that Kevin was a member of STL under MCL 450.4501(1)(b)(ii), which states that a person is admitted as a member if ‘[t]he person’s status as a member is reflected in the records, tax filings, or other written statements of the limited liability company.’” The trial court record did “not contain any tax filings of STL, so the only possibility for plaintiff was to provide ‘records’ or ‘other written statements’ of STL. In an apparent attempt to comply with this requirement, plaintiff submitted the Bank Signature Card Document, which was on a Chase Bank letterhead and listed Kevin as a ‘member.’” But the court found that “plaintiff’s argument must fail because the Bank Signature Card Document is not a record or other written statement ‘of the limited liability company.’” Rather, plaintiff provided “a record or other written document of Chase Bank. While it contains information on it suggesting that Kevin was a member of STL, the statute requires the information to be on records or statements of the LLC itself. This is important because the presumptive intent of the Legislature in codifying the statutory subsection at issue, which is discerned from the use of the phrase ‘of the limited liability company,’ was to allow LLCs to identify their own members in records or written statements produced by the LLC.” The court found that this “goal would not be realized by allowing written statements or records of a bank to be used to establish membership in an LLC.” As a result, Kevin’s “membership could not be established under MCL 450.4501(1)(b)(ii).” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request an involuntary-manslaughter jury instruction; People v Yeager; People v Holtschlag; Keeble v. United States
The court concluded that because defendant “was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to request a manslaughter jury instruction, the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.” Thus, it vacated her convictions and remanded to the trial court for a new trial. She was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges arising from driving while intoxicated. The court held that “given the defense’s theory of the case, defense counsel’s failure to request a manslaughter instruction ‘fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness’ and, therefore, constituted deficient performance.” The question turned to whether “counsel’s failure to request the manslaughter instruction prejudiced the defense.” The court noted that “counsel chose to focus on malice as the intent to kill or intent to cause great bodily harm, but ignored the other definition of malice, which focuses on ‘the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.’” The court found that “defendant’s willful disregard here—in driving while intoxicated at high rates of speed—had the natural tendency to cause death.” Nevertheless, it noted that “counsel continued to inform defendant that the prosecutor could not prove malice.” Counsel’s theory “was that defendant ‘was in fight or flight survival mode’ when she caused the car accident. In other words, defendant acted in fear because” she was being chased. Therefore, “counsel argued the absence of malice to the jury.” Pursuant to Holtschlag, “‘the sole element distinguishing manslaughter and murder is malice.’” The court concluded that failing “to provide a lesser-included offense instruction gives life to precisely what Keeble predicted: ‘Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.’” It believed it was “more probable than not that the trial court’s decision that it was harmless error to withhold a manslaughter instruction undermined the verdict’s reliability.”
Dismissal sanction; Trial courts’ inherent authority to sanction litigants & their counsel; Failure to comply with a court order; MCR 2.504(B)(1); Factors for consideration; Gueye v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; The trial court’s use of its contempt power; MCL 600.1701; Consideration of lesser sanctions; The clean-hands doctrine; Maldonado v Ford Motor Co
Holding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err” in dismissing plaintiffs’ action, the court affirmed. They argued that it “improperly used its contempt power to enforce a monetary debt that plaintiffs owed to defendants and this is contrary to the typical application of MCL 600.1701(e).” But the court found that this “argument improperly conflates the issues of the initial contempt holding, the implementation of sanctions, and the trial court’s ultimate dismissal of” the case. It determined that, reading “the trial court’s ruling in its proper context, plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court incorrectly applied MCL 600.1701(e) does not support reversal because it does not address the [trial] court’s reasoning for the dismissal.” As to their claim that the trial court did not consider lesser sanctions, it “in fact extensively considered whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. The trial court expressly stated that whether a lesser sanction would be appropriate was the most important factor for it to consider. It reasoned that it previously had found” plaintiff-Haddad in contempt, “and it determined that an intermediate sanction, such as precluding Haddad from presenting evidence, was not possible.” It concluded there was nothing it could do to get him to comply with its order. It also found that he “simply ignored [its] order instead of requesting relief, such as additional time or a payment schedule.” Considering all the relevant factors, the court held that the trial court’s decision did “not fall outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Throughout this matter, plaintiffs repeatedly failed to comply with, or outright violated, [its] orders. [They] violated an order to not remove specific property, and after the trial court ordered [them] to pay the Gentilozzi defendants to replace the wrongfully removed property, plaintiffs did not take any steps toward payment. In light of [their] repeated violations of the trial court’s orders and the lack of less-serious sanctions available to the [trial] court, it was reasonable for [it] to impose the harsh sanction of dismissal.” Finally, as to the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against a defendant “who was a defaulted party at the time of” the ruling, the record did not support their assertion they had no notice that those claims might be dismissed, and the court held “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when using its inherent authority to sanction plaintiffs for misconduct by dismissing [their] entire case.”
Sealing documents; The district court’s jurisdiction; Rudd Equip Co v John Deere Constr & Forestry Co; Standing; Whether sealing the documents was justified; In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co, Inc; Shane Group, Inc v Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp v FTC
The court vacated the district court’s order, which declined to unseal 24 deposition transcripts, and remanded for the district court to provide specific findings and conclusions justifying nondisclosure to the public. Defendant-CoreCivic (formerly known as Corrections Corporation of America) operates private prisons and contracted to house federal prisoners. There were safety and security concerns, and the Bureau of Prisons decided not to renew one of their contracts. After a Department of Justice report cited the high violence rate at CoreCivic’s facilities, and a related Deputy Attorney General memo, CoreCivic’s stock value fell, and this stockholder class-action was brought. Throughout the proceedings, the district court designated a high number of documents as “confidential,” “under seal,” and “protected from public disclosure.” When the case finally settled, “hundreds of documents in the court record were under seal. For none of them,” as far as the court could “tell, did the district court set forth any reasoning in support of its orders to seal.” Two years later, the Nashville Banner intervened and moved to unseal the documents. The majority were unsealed, but two dozen deposition transcripts (and other documents) were kept under seal. The Banner appealed as to the deposition transcripts. The court first held that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the order here because a court “‘may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending.’” It also held that the Banner had standing. It then reiterated its prior holdings “that ‘[o]nly the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of court records.’” Moreover, a district court that seals a document is required to “‘set forth specific findings and conclusions “which justify nondisclosure to the public.”’” The court noted that the district court here, in sealing these transcripts, “made no findings whatever. That ‘is itself grounds to vacate’ the” seal. The court further noted there was no “attempt to make the seals narrowly tailored.” It vacated the order as applied to the sealed deposition transcripts and remanded for the district court to determine, within 60 days, whether any part of them “meet the requirements for a seal.”
Premises liability; Proximate cause
The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying defendant-apartment complex's (Barrington) “motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to establish that Barrington’s alleged negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries.” The case arose out of an assault on plaintiffs-Briggs and Jenno, that occurred at the apartment complex. The court found that “Barrington met its burden. Barrington presented evidence that entry to the apartment building could occur independent of any alleged breach of its duty to maintain the door locks. Specifically, the assailant could have entered the building by using the door at the same time as somebody else or by buzzing another apartment because each apartment had a buzzer to remotely allow people access inside. Alternatively, multiple people testified the exterior doors at the apartment complex were constantly being propped open. And, although it was possible that the assailant entered by a defective exterior door lock, it was equally as possible as any of Barrington’s proffered theories.” Once it “met its burden, plaintiffs were required to establish a genuine issue of fact existed regarding causation.” In response to Barrington’s motion, “plaintiffs asserted causation was a question for the jury, and argued several factors caused the assaults, stating: ‘[T]he inadequacy of the outside locks, the dangerousness of [the assailant], and the failure to take mandatory actions to ensure that [the assailant] was taking his medications, combined to bring about the tragic result. As such, questions of fact are created as to causation, precluding summary disposition.’” Beyond the “claimed defectiveness of the locks, none of the factors plaintiffs mentioned address[ed] how the assailant entered the building. Plaintiffs speculated he likely entered through the courtyard door because Jenno testified she saw him in the courtyard; however, plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence supporting this theory.” Moreover, according to Jenno, “the courtyard door was propped open nearly every day in the month she lived at the apartment complex and, while it required a push, the courtyard door did lock. Plaintiffs offered no evidence indicating it was more likely the assailant accessed the building because of a defective lock rather than by a propped-open door or by any of Barrington’s alternate theories. Plaintiffs failed to exclude other reasonably possible explanations as to how the assailant accessed the building, and, therefore, failed to establish a question of fact regarding causation.” Reversed and remanded.
Quiet title action; Applicability of the race-notice statute; MCL 565.29; Penrose v McCullough; Whether a purchase agreement constituted a “conveyance”; MCL 565.35; Whether plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser; The after-acquired-title doctrine; Richards v Tibaldi
The court held that the race-notice statute was not implicated “because plaintiff’s purchase agreement did not constitute a ‘conveyance,’ and even if the race-notice statute was implicated, plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser.” Further, it agreed with defendant-42 Fullerton “that the after-acquired-title doctrine cured the fraudulent chain of title” and as a result, the trial court did not err in ordering that it “held full legal and equitable title to the property.” Plaintiff’s claims against defendants-appellees in this quiet title action were dismissed after the trial court granted defendants’ motions for reconsideration and summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that it erred “because plaintiff’s claim of interest in the disputed property was the first recorded.” The court disagreed, noting that “plaintiff never had a deed to the property; it simply had a purchase agreement. Moreover, [its] purchase agreement was never fully executed—plaintiff did not pay the full purchase price, and [defendant-]Bohadana never conveyed the deed.” Thus, the agreement was “an executory contract, not a ‘conveyance’ of property.” Further, the trial court correctly determined “that plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser because plaintiff knew of [defendant-]Estell Manor’s interest in the property. Plaintiff’s knowledge is indisputable considering the fact that there was a contingency statement regarding Estell Manor within plaintiff’s purchase agreement with Bohadana.” As to the grant of title to 42 Fullerton, that party acknowledged that the 2017 quitclaim deed from nonparty-Global-Michigan to defendant-Anderson “constituted a fraudulent conveyance.” It argued this “issue was rectified by the 2021 warranty deed from Bohadana to” defendant-Precipice, and the court agreed. “Bohadana—who was in the nonfraudulent chain of title—attempted to sell the property three times: (1) first, to Anderson; (2) second, to plaintiff; and (3) third, to Precipice. But” the first two sales “were never completed—the sale to Anderson was never recorded, and plaintiff never paid the full purchase price or received the deed. Conversely, [the] conveyance to Precipice was completed and recorded. Because Precipice ultimately received a valid warranty deed from Bohadana, who was within the proper chain of title, the after-acquired-title doctrine holds that Precipice’s earlier warranty deed with [defendant-]Legacy One, and Legacy One’s subsequent warranty deed with 42 Fullerton, be enforceable.” Affirmed.
Child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors; The doctrine of anticipatory neglect
Holding that the trial court did not err in finding that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s (BMM) best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. While she asserted the trial court failed to “adequately weigh the undisputed evidence showing that she shared a bond with BMM, regularly exercised her parenting time, and acted appropriately during parenting time[,]” the court noted that these were “only two of several factors that the trial court considered.” It was also presented with evidence showing “a continuing inability to effectively parent. For example, respondent[] left her stable housing voluntarily to ‘live with another man’ and as a result, was left without a suitable home. There also was evidence of an incident during which [she] broke a window during an argument with BMM’s father when BMM was inside the home.” As to the child’s “need for permanency, stability, and finality, the trial court stated respondent[] was ‘not prepared on today’s date to plan for the child,’ specifically mentioning the lengthy CPS history that” she had related “to her other children that never resulted in improvement.” Evidence that respondent “had untreated mental health needs” was also presented to the trial court. And the court held that the trial court “properly applied the doctrine of anticipatory neglect to find that” termination was in BMM’s best interests. There was evidence that three other children were removed from respondent’s care after one of them “sustained multiple serious physical injuries in 2020.” That child was released to his father, who obtained full custody in 2022. Respondent’s rights to the other two children were terminated in 2023. “At the best-interests hearing, the trial court considered BMM individually.” However, it “noted that it ‘can look at how you treat one child and . . . determine . . . that may be probative of how you may treat another child.’” It found respondent’s “inability to treat ‘mental health needs’ was one example indicating her ‘behaviors are unlikely to change.’ As a result, there was an increased risk of BMM ‘being subjected to an unstable and unhealthy environment.’” The court determined that the “finding that BMM was at risk was not mere speculation, considering that respondent[] threatened physical abuse to BMM on one occasion and broke a window when BMM was present on another occasion.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Child’s best interests
The court concluded that: (1) § (c)(i) existed, (2) the trial court did not plainly err when it found “that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to promote reunification consistent with the ADA[,]” and (3) the trial court did not clearly err by determining that termination served the child, MM’s, best interests. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. The conditions pertaining to the mother “at the time of adjudication include[d] her inability to recognize and care for MM’s needs and her participation in an unsafe relationship despite a history of domestic violence.” The court held that “‘the totality of the evidence’ amply supported that [the mother] ‘had not accomplished any meaningful change’ in the conditions that led to the [trial] court assuming jurisdiction over MM.” For example, she “felt that MM ‘would be fine if he were home with her’ and that he would not ‘need these services if he were home with her,’ despite extensive testimony from the service providers otherwise.” Moreover, the trial court noted that the mother “essentially ‘left the door open’ to her boyfriend because a provider saw an image of him appear on respondent-mother’s phone during a session and that ‘she would have cut him off’ had she ‘benefitted from . . . domestic violence counseling that domestic violence is harmful, not just to the victim, but it’s harmful to the child.’” Also, § (c)(i) required the trial court to find that the “mother would be unable to rectify the conditions within a reasonable time.” She eventually participated in services but not until 2/24, “approximately nine months after the trial court issued the initial order of disposition.” MM’s case manager testified that there were no “services that would be relevant in a reasonable amount of time” considering that MM had been in placement since his birth and that services had lasted ‘well over a year’ by the date of trial.” Moreover, the record supported that her “boyfriend attempted to contact her during one of MM’s sessions despite repeated recommendations from her providers to eliminate contact with him, indicating that, even if she was afforded more time with services, she likely was not going to benefit from it.”