Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Excise tax on distilled spirits; The home distilling ban (26 USC §§ 5178(a)(1)(B) & 5601(a)(6)); Whether Congress had the authority to enact the ban as a means of collecting the federal excise tax on distilled spirits; The Taxing Clause (US Const art I, § 8, cl 1); The Necessary & Proper Clause (US Const. art I, § 8, cl 18); McCulloch v Maryland; Standing; Bond v United States
The court held that while plaintiff-Ream had standing to challenge Congress’s power to enact the home-distilling ban his challenge failed because “the ban is a necessary and proper means of collecting the federal excise tax on distilled spirits.” The home-distilling ban was enacted in 1868 as part of Congress’s efforts to collect federal excise taxes on distilled spirits. It prohibits the production of distilled spirits in homes, sheds, any vessel or boat, and other unsanctioned locations. Violators are subject to a felony conviction and a substantial fine. Ream wished to distill whiskey at home and brought this action claiming that Congress lacked the power to enact a law prohibiting the possession of a still in a “dwelling house.” The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss based on lack of standing where Ream had yet to purchase a still or been threatened with prosecution under the challenged law. The court disagreed on the standing issue, holding that Ream faced a “credible threat of prosecution” if he were to distill whiskey in his home. And his “constitutional interest and its relation to his conduct are identical to the ones that” the Supreme Court held gave the plaintiff in Bond standing to assert her claim. Turning to the merits, the court held that while the ban could not be supported under the Taxing Clause, it was supported under the Necessary and Proper Clause. It reviewed the history underlying the ban and the facts surrounding it, and concluded that the ban “addressed an actual problem that had confounded the federal government from its earliest days[,]” and that it was “lawful when enacted, and remains so today.” The court reversed the district court’s order dismissing Ream’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in defendants’ favor.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to suppress defendant’s police statements; Lack of Miranda warnings; “Custody”; People v Lewinski; Valid Terry stop; People v Steele; Limited scope & duration of a Terry stop; Johnson v VanderKooi; Prejudice; People v Yeager
The court held that defendant-Johnson’s attorney was deficient for failing to move to suppress her police statements and that she was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Thus, it reversed her third-degree retail fraud conviction and remanded for a new trial. Johnson, who was 14 years old at the time, “made two inculpatory statements during the police interrogation. First, she admitted that she had stolen several cans of alcohol. Second, after being handcuffed, she explained that she stole the alcohol so that she could get drunk.” The court found that while there were grounds to make a Terry stop, the trial court erred in determining “that because there was a valid Terry stop, the police interrogation was automatically noncustodial up until” when she was handcuffed. The court concluded there was a reasonable probability that she “did not feel free to leave. She had tried to flee from the police when they first turned around, but they pursued and apprehended her. Being prevented from fleeing would certainly lead to a belief that one is not free to leave. Then, sometime between when she was caught and when the body camera started recording, her boyfriend was handcuffed and led away by a police officer. Seeing a confederate led away in handcuffs would also suggest that one is not free to leave.” In addition, she “was ordered to sit down on a bench. A police order to sit down would also lead an ordinary person to believe that he or she is not free to leave. Next, Johnson was questioned for a few minutes, sometimes by one officer and sometimes by two officers. Both officers were in full uniform and armed. She was repeatedly accused of lying, warned to not lie, and chastised for running. Both officers conducted searches of her water bottle without first asking her if they could do so. The nature and scope of the questions likewise suggest that Johnson was not free to leave. Considered in totality, at the time that [she] made the first inculpatory statement, it is plain that she was subject to a custodial interrogation because she could have reasonably believed that she was not free to leave.” Because it “was not preceded by an adequate warning,” her statements were not admissible at trial. The court also held that her attorney’s deficient performance in failing to move to suppress prejudiced Johnson. Her “confession during the body camera footage was certainly the strongest and most persuasive evidence” against her.
Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; People v Williams; Expert testimony on drug trafficking; MRE 702; People v Murray; Prosecutorial error; Post-arrest, post-Miranda silence; People v Shafier; Denigrating defense counsel; Vouching; Sentencing; Allocution; MCR 6.425(D)(1)(c)(ii); People v Dixon-Bey; Proportionality; People v Posey (On Remand)
The court held that the traffic stop, search, evidentiary rulings, and trial proceedings did not warrant reversal of defendant’s conviction, but that his sentence had to be vacated because he was denied a meaningful opportunity for allocution. Police stopped defendant after observing traffic violations following surveillance in a high-crime area. They searched him with his consent, recovered about 79.2 grams of meth from inside multiple layers of underwear, and later found drug-sale messages and photos on his phone. The trial court denied suppression, qualified an officer as an expert in local drug trafficking, and sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 17 to 50 years for possession with intent to deliver meth. On appeal, the court held that the initial stop was lawful because officers had probable cause for traffic violations, and the continued detention was reasonable because defendant’s explanation created additional suspicion before he consented to a search. It also found that the brief exposure during the roadside search did not make the search unconstitutional and that the plain-feel exception applied. The court next held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony because drug-profile testimony is a recognized field and could help explain the significance of the seized items. It further found that the prosecutor’s remarks did not deny defendant a fair trial, although one brief comment on silence “should not have been made[.]” But the court held that resentencing was required because “allocution is the defendant’s opportunity to address the court, not the court’s opportunity to conduct an interrogation or deliver a lecture[,]” and defendant was given only an “‘illusory and superficial opportunity for allocution.’” The court rejected his proportionality challenge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); Alleged violation of NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) & (a)(5) by refusing to bargain with a recognized union representative; Preliminary injunction ordering continued bargaining under NLRA § 10(j); Starbucks Corp v McKinney; Factors for issuance of a preliminary injunction; “Likelihood of success on the merits”of the unfair labor practice (ULP) claim; “Irreparable harm”; Hooks ex rel NLRB v Nexstar Broad, Inc (9th Cir)
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court reversed the district court and vacated its order granting petitioner-NLRB Regional Director a preliminary injunction requiring respondent-Trinity Health to bargain with the union, holding that while she was likely to succeed on the merits, she failed to show that irreparable harm would result without an injunction. Trinity withdrew recognition of the union as representing hospital employees during a contentious labor dispute. In administrative proceedings, the ALJ ruled that Trinity had violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain with a recognized union representative. The Director successfully petitioned the district court for a preliminary injunction ordering Trinity to recognize the union and resume negotiations. Trinity appealed and moved to dissolve the injunction. Noting that what was at issue was “the proper application of” NLRA § 10(j), pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Starbucks, the court applied the traditional four-factor test for whether a preliminary injunction should issue. It first considered whether the Director was “likely to succeed on the merits” of the ULP claim, referring to both victory before the Board and whether the district court would grant a petition to enforce the Board’s order. The court concluded that she was likely to prevail, finding that she presented “meaningful evidence to support” the argument that the disaffection petition “failed as a factual matter to prove the union’s loss of majority support.” But the court held that she did not establish irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. This factor “‘is the core of the preliminary injunction[.]’” In the context of “§ 10(j) injunctions, irreparable harm means ‘harm that the Board, entrusted with its own enforcement powers, would otherwise be powerless to fix.’” The court found that, pursuant to Hooks, “Trinity’s alleged refusal to bargain, standing alone, does not mean that ‘irreparable harm can be inferred,’ . . . without the Director offering ‘independent factual support’ of that harm[.]” For the Director to show “irreparable harm, she needed to (1) specifically identify the injury threatened by the alleged [ULP], (2) establish that the injury is likely to result absent an injunction, and (3) explain why the Board’s § 10(c) remedial powers could not fix the injury after the fact. And she must do so through more than mere speculation.” The court determined that she failed to complete “each leg of that legal triathlon,” and thus, did not “make a ‘clear showing’ of ‘likely . . . irreparable harm.’”
Order for mental-health treatment; Compliance with the Mental Health Code (MHC); Whether respondent was improperly detained (not discharged); Probate court order that petitioner file a new petition; Whether errors affected the outcome of the proceedings; Sufficiency of the evidence respondent was a person requiring treatment; MCL 330.1401(1)(a) & (c); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prejudice
While the court concluded the probate court did not strictly comply with the MHC, it held that respondent failed to show that this affected the outcome of the proceeding and thus, did not show prejudice. It also held that there was sufficient evidence showing that she was a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c). Finally, it rejected her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. She appealed the probate court’s initial order for mental-health treatment. The court agreed with her that she “was improperly hospitalized for the time between [7/28/25] (when the initial petition was dismissed) and [7/30/25] (when the second petition was filed). When a petition is dismissed, there are no grounds to involuntarily hospitalize an individual; therefore, the individual should be released.” Given that she was not released, “the probate court did not strictly comply with the [MHC]. Further, the error was clear and obvious because there is no part of the [MHC] that gave the probate court authority, in this case, to hospitalize respondent during that time. But because this issue” was not preserved, she had to also show “that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” She did not do so. While she asserted the outcome was affected “because she was unable to access her medical records when she was improperly detained,” she did not give any “indication of what medical records she needed access to or how [they] could have helped in her defense. It is just as likely that those medical records could have been detrimental to her defense.” And while she “was improperly deprived of her liberty for approximately 24 hours[,]” the court noted that “the clinical certificates and petitions filed before and after that detainment all supported the state’s interest in compelling mental-health treatment for respondent. Accordingly, considering the brief, improper hospitalization in light of significant evidence demonstrating that hospitalization was necessary, [her] improper detainment was reasonable.” The court also found that the probate court failed to strictly comply with the MHC “when it improperly ordered the petitioner to file a new petition.” But this error also did not affect the outcome given the circumstances. And it held that there was clear and convincing evidence that she posed “a risk of seriously injuring herself or others,” or presented “a significant risk of substantial harm to herself or others[.]” Affirmed.
Uninsured (UM) or underinsured (UIM) benefits; Whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the other driver’s vehicle was uninsured; Hearsay; Speculation; Effect of incomplete discovery; MCR 2.116(C)(H) affidavits; Coblentz v City of Novi
Holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to “whether the other vehicle was uninsured or underinsured,” the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-insurer. The case arose from a motor vehicle crash between plaintiff’s vehicle and a vehicle operated by a nonparty (A). Plaintiff previously sued defendant, her no-fault insurer, for payment of personal protection insurance benefits. Shortly before that case was dismissed by stipulation, she filed a claim against A. “That case ultimately resulted in the entry of a default judgment against” A. While that case was pending, plaintiff filed this suit against defendant, seeking UM or UIM benefits pursuant to her policy. In arguing on appeal that a genuine issue of material fact existed, she relied on an affidavit she submitted in response to defendant’s summary disposition motion. In the affidavit, she stated that A “‘told [her] at the accident scene that he did not have insurance on the car.’ [A’s] purported statement, however, is inadmissible hearsay because it is an out of court statement that” plaintiff was offering “to prove ‘the truth of the matter asserted in the statement,’ i.e., that [A] did not have insurance on the vehicle.” Thus, it could not be used to avoid summary disposition. The court also found that her argument based on the default judgment she obtained against A was “nothing more than speculation[.]” Finally, as to her claim that summary disposition was premature because discovery was incomplete, she failed to “submit the affidavits of probable testimony that are required by MCR 2.116(H). As a result, the trial court did not err” in granting defendant’s summary disposition motion before the close of discovery.
No-fault insurance; PIP priority; MCL 500.3114(5); Exclusion from priority; MCL 500.3114(6); Love v Allstate Prop & Cas Ins Co; Mary Free Bed Rehab Hosp v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co; Mend-the-hold doctrine; Smith v Grange Mut Fire Ins Co of MI; Contract interpretation; Policy incorporation by reference; Whittlesey v Herbrand Co
The court held that plaintiff-Meemic remained first in priority for PIP benefits because it was not removed from the priority scheme under MCL 500.3114(6), and its policy provided $250,000 in PIP coverage for the injured motorcyclist and passenger. After a collision between a motor vehicle and a motorcycle, Meemic (the insurer of the motor vehicle) paid about $150,356.03 in PIP benefits to the motorcycle operator and passenger, then sought reimbursement from defendant-Auto-Owners (whose policy covered the motorcyclist and passenger), arguing that Auto-Owners was first in priority. The district court agreed with Meemic, but the circuit court reversed. On appeal, the court held that the mend-the-hold doctrine did not bar Auto-Owners’ position because that doctrine is meant “‘to prevent an insurance company from misleading an insured about the reasons for denying coverage under the terms of a policy,’” and this dispute was between two insurers, not between an insurer and an insured. The court next held that Love controlled because the dispositive facts were identical, and under MCL 500.3114(6) an insurer is removed from priority only if PIP medical coverage is absent through either the opt-out provision in MCL 500.3107d or the exclusions in MCL 500.3109a(2). Neither applied here because Meemic’s insured selected Option 4, not the no-PIP option, and the injured motorcyclist and passenger were not persons eligible for exclusion under the statute. The court also held that the PIP selection form was incorporated into the policy because the declarations referred the insured to it “for a summary of coverages,” and the form expressly provided $250,000 in PIP allowable-expense coverage for anyone not excluded. Any ambiguity created by the absence of a listed premium had to be construed in favor of coverage. Affirmed.
Domesticating a foreign judgment under Michigan’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA); Grounds to decline recognition; MCL 691.1134(3)(h); Burden of proof; MCL 691.1134(4); “International concept of due process”; Proof of the existence of an authenticated foreign judgment; MCL 691.1133(3); Waiver; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a); The court’s jurisdiction to hear part of the appeal; MCR 7.203(A)(1) & 7.202(6)(a)(i); Enforcement of the interest portion of the foreign judgment
In these consolidated appeals, in defendant’s appeal the court rejected his claim that the trial court erred in domesticating a Serbian judgment, and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff relief from judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). In plaintiff’s appeal, it concluded the trial court erred in ruling “that he was barred from enforcing the interest portion of the Serbian judgment.” Thus, it affirmed in defendant’s appeal, and in plaintiff’s appeal it reversed the trial court’s preclusion of interest on the Serbian judgment. Defendant argued the trial court erred in “ruling that his failure to be allowed to testify at the Serbian trial was not a ground to decline recognition of the Serbian judgment under MCL 691.1134(3)(h).” The court noted the “burden of proof is on the party seeking to establish that an exception to recognition applies.” He contended “that the Serbian proceeding was not compatible with the requirements of due process,” solely relying on the fact he allegedly was denied the opportunity to testify. But he admitted “he had no evidence of why the Serbian court denied his request to testify.” He asserted “this lack of a reason on the record is adequate to show that he was denied due process.” The court disagreed, noting there “are many acceptable reasons why a court may preclude a party from testifying.” It concluded that his “concession of a lack of evidence for why he was denied the opportunity to testify—when it is conceivable there was a valid reason for the denial—means that he failed to meet” his burden of proof. Further, “as recognized by the trial court, despite not being able to testify in the Serbian proceeding, defendant had notice of [it], had an opportunity to be heard, was represented by a lawyer of his choosing at all times during [it], and his lawyer was able to cross-examine plaintiff.” The court next found that he waived his claim that “plaintiff did not prove the existence of an authenticated foreign judgment[,]” and that in any event, “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that Exhibit 7 at trial was a valid judgment under the UFCMJRA.” The court also found there is no requirement in the UFCMJRA “for a plaintiff to establish an interest calculation or amount in order to domesticate a foreign judgment” and that “the trial court erred to the extent it ruled that plaintiff had an evidentiary burden to establish an interest amount or calculation.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Children’s best interests; In re White; Relative placement; In re Atchley; Guardianship
The court held that the trial court did not err by terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to SDJ and SLJ and respondent-mother’s parental rights to those children and TLU, because the conditions leading to adjudication continued to exist and termination was in the children’s best interests. The case began after police found the father lethargic in a running truck and the mother unresponsive upstairs while the six-year-old twins were in the home in their underwear, cooking for themselves, missing school, and exposed to drug paraphernalia. After jurisdiction was assumed, the DHHS offered substance-abuse treatment, drug screens, parenting classes, psychological evaluation, supportive visitation, and requirements related to income, housing, and contact with caseworkers. But both parents continued to miss screens, test positive, and inconsistently attend parenting time. On appeal, the court held that the conditions of adjudication persisted because respondents’ “substance-abuse issues continued throughout the pendency of the case[,]” the father failed to acknowledge a substance-abuse problem, and the mother’s apparent progress did not overcome her repeated history of relapse after prior reunifications. The court further held that there was “not a reasonable probability that the conditions could be cured in a reasonable time considering the tender ages of the children.” As to best interests, the court held that the children’s need for “safety, stability, and permanence” outweighed the relative placement. The court explained that the great-aunt was willing to adopt the twins, they were thriving in her care, TLU (who was in his father’s care) did not want to return to the mother, and guardianship was not appropriate because it would not provide permanence and would require a placement change. Affirmed.