Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Request to clarify a judgment entered after arbitration; Grounds allowing entry of a judgment deviating from an arbitration award; Effect of obtaining a certificate of withdrawal from the Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs; MCL 450.5008(i), (g), & (j); Long Mfg Co, Inc v Wright-Way Farm Serv, Inc; Penalties for a foreign limited liability company (LLC) transacting business in Michigan without a certificate of authority; MCL 450.5007; Agency; Identity of the parties to the arbitration agreement; Changing the name of the party against whom a judgment was entered; MCL 600.2301; The doctrine of misnomer; Entry of a final order closing the case before a foreclosure sale; MCL 570.1121
The court held that plaintiff-TSP did not establish grounds allowing the trial court to enter a judgment deviating from an underlying arbitration award. Further, it rejected TSP’s contention that “the trial court had the authority to change the name of the party against whom the judgment was entered under the doctrine of misnomer or under MCL 600.2301.” Finally, as the trial court did not enter an order of foreclosure, it did not err in determining that its order deciding the parties’ cross-motions for summary disposition as to TSP’s request to clarify the judgment entered after arbitration was a final order closing the case. Defendants-DW-National Standard and National-Standard are Delaware LLCs owned by the same parent. DW-National Standard owned and operated a plant on the property where TSP performed demolition work. The trial court found “there were no errors on the face of the arbitrator’s award, and it entered judgment on the award without including TSP’s desired language, i.e., to specify that the judgment was against DW-National Standard” not National-Standard. While TSP emphasized “that National-Standard withdrew its right to conduct business in this state before the events at issue[,]” the court determined that it placed “far too much weight on National-Standard’s filing of a certificate of withdrawal.” The court concluded that “the undisputed evidence showed that National-Standard owned the real property at issue as the successor to National-Standard Company and that DW-National Standard had no interest in the real property.” It additionally found that “even if National-Standard were required to have a current certificate of authority to execute a contract with TSP, the fact that it did not have a valid certificate does not establish that the actual party to the underlying agreement must have been DW-National Standard rather than National-Standard.” The civil penalties the Legislature has provided for a foreign LLC transacting business in Michigan without a certificate of authority notably “do not include that any agreement entered into by the foreign entity shall be deemed void or even voidable on that basis[.]” The court determined that “the arbitrator arbitrated a dispute between TSP and National-Standard, which was the entity that owned the real property for which TSP contracted to provide remediation and demolition services.” Affirmed.
The Occupational Code; Licensing requirements; A residential maintenance & alterations contractor (RMAC); MCL 339.2401(b); Effect of being an unlicensed RMAC; MCL 339.2412(1) & (3); The crafts & trades a license authorizes an RMAC to perform; MCL 339.2404(3); “Includes”; Whether installing a wrought iron railing onto a wood staircase constituted “carpentry”
The court held that plaintiff did not have to be licensed as an RMAC and thus, its failure to obtain a license did not bar it from suing defendant “because installing a wrought-iron railing does not fall within any of the” crafts or trades listed in MCL 339.2404(3), including carpentry. Thus, it reversed summary disposition for defendant and remanded. The parties contracted for “plaintiff to design, create, and install a wrought-iron railing for the staircase in defendant’s home.” Plaintiff sued after defendant refused to pay $16,000 it asserted remained due on the contract. The trial court found that plaintiff was required to be licensed as an RMAC and because it was not, it could not maintain this action. “Reading MCL 339.2401(b) in isolation, plaintiff fit within the persons qualifying as an RMAC. The definition of an RMAC is broad, covering in relevant part ‘a person who, for a fixed sum, price, [or] fee . . . undertakes with another for the . . . addition to . . . [or] improvement of . . . a residential structure.’ . . . Plaintiff, for the fixed price of $26,000, undertook to add to defendant’s home by installing a wrought-iron railing on defendant’s staircase. Accordingly, applying only the plain language of MCL 339.2401(b), plaintiff would qualify as an RMAC.” But the court concluded that the statute “must be read in conjunction with the crafts and trades that are exclusively eligible for licensure under MCL 339.2404(3), which . . . does not include plaintiff’s trade.” It found that the Legislature used the word “includes” in the statute “in a limiting sense. First, there is no expansive language tied to the word ‘includes,’ such as ‘for example,’ ‘but not limited to,’ or ‘such as.’” In addition, the rest of the provision “clarifies that the list is intended to be exhaustive, as the statute requires that a license specify the particular craft or trade for which the licensee is qualified.” The court also noted the fact that the Legislature “has amended this section to both add and subtract specific crafts and trades” supported a finding “that the listing is exhaustive, and not simply a list of examples.” Further, the court rejected defendant’s contention that “installing a wrought iron railing onto a wood staircase” made the work carpentry. Plaintiff “simply affixed a wrought iron fixture onto the staircase. No building or repairing of the wooden structure occurred by plaintiff’s installation.”
Motion for a directed verdict; Possession of meth with intent to deliver; People v Robar; Sufficiency of the evidence for simple possession of meth; People v Baham; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to renew the motion for a directed verdict; Request for the trial court to consider a lesser-included offense
The court held that the trial court in defendant’s bench trial did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the possession of meth with intent to deliver charge, and that there was sufficient evidence for his conviction of simple possession of meth. Further, it rejected his claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion and for asking the trial court to consider the lesser-included offense. To prove possession of meth “with intent, the prosecution must establish that: (1) the defendant possessed a controlled substance, (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance, (3) the defendant intended to deliver the controlled substance, and (4) the controlled substance weighed a specified amount.” The court concluded that a rational fact-finder “could have found that these elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. An officer testified that, during a strip search, he found two bags containing a substance in the right pocket of defendant’s shorts. The substances in each bag were identified as methamphetamine. Testimony established that the two bags weighed a total of 21 grams and that the contents of the larger bag weighed 17.8857 grams.” A police witness (D) testified, as an expert, that a typical meth user “does not purchase more than one gram at a time for personal use, that a typical user ‘can get high seven to ten times off a quarter-gram,’” and that the amount defendant possessed “had a ‘street value’ of at least $2,500 dollars. He further testified that if a smaller package and a larger package of a suspected controlled substance are found on the same person, the smaller package is typically for personal use, and the larger package will likely be sold later.” The trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict despite D’s testimony “he did not personally believe that defendant was intending to deliver” meth when he was arrested. As to the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction, a rational fact-finder could conclude that he knew two bags containing meth “were in his pocket, knew of their character, and had the right to control them. Although defendant claimed that he had borrowed the shorts and denied knowing” meth was in the pocket, the fact-finder was free to find he was not credible. Affirmed.
Whether the County Apportionment Commission adopted an apportionment plan that complied with MCL 46.404; MCL 46.404(a); Population deviation; MCL 46.404(b) (requirement that all districts be “contiguous”); MCL 46.404(d) & (e) (preserving the integrity of township, village, city, & precinct lines); MCL 46.404(h); Impermissible purpose of gaining partisan political advantage
Holding that respondent-County Apportionment Commission adopted an apportionment plan that did not comply with MCL 46.404, the court invalidated and vacated the plan, and remanded “to the Commission to adopt an apportionment plan that complies with the law.” The commissioners adopted the new apportionment plan using the data from the 2020 census. Petitioner-Pedersen argued that “the apportionment plan the Commission adopted—the McMichael Plan—did not comply with the requirements of MCL 46.404 and does not comply with the” Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements. First addressing MCL 46.404(a)’s requirements, the court noted that the “total departure was approximately 11.3% (6.286 + 5.019 = 11.305). The total departure was less than the 11.9% set by our Supreme Court as the maximum departure.” Thus, Pedersen did not show “that the McMichael Plan failed to comply with the requirement that the districts be composed of single-member districts with as of nearly equal population as practicable under MCL 46.404(a).” However, because “the McMichael Plan violated the contiguity requirement stated under MCL 46.404(b),” the court had to invalidate it, and remanded “to the Commission to adopt a new apportionment plan that complies with MCL 46.404(b).” To provide guidance on remand, it also addressed Pedersen’s additional arguments. It concluded that the McMichael Plan did not violate MCL 46.404(d) and (e), finding that Pederson did not “present sufficient evidence that the Commission violated the law when it exercised its discretion to adopt a plan that divided Dowagiac in order to meet the population requirements rather than splitting other townships and precincts.” As to MCL 46.404(h), the court noted it did not have to resolve “whether the Commission divided Dowagiac for an impermissible purpose” given that it was remanding for failure to comply with MCL 46.404(b). “Rather, if the Commission should again select an apportionment plan that divides Dowagiac on remand, we instruct the Commission to explain how that split was necessary to meet the population requirements and preserve the integrity of other municipal boundaries.”
Validity of a land transfer under the statute of frauds (SOF) (MCL 566.106); MCL 566.108; Dower interest in property under MCL 558.1; MCL 558.30(2)(a); Zaher v Miotke; Slater Mgmt Corp v Nash; Berg-Powell Steel Co v Hartman Group, Inc; Tandy v Knox; Personal representative (PR)
Concluding that Zaher’s reasoning controlled, the court held that a 2006 quitclaim deed validly transferred the land at issue to the grantees (appellants and the decedent), subject to the dower interest of the decedent’s wife Constance. Further, her dower rights were extinguished before they could vest. Thus, the probate court erred in granting summary disposition to appellee-PR of the decedent’s estate, who sought to quiet title to the property. “In 2003, the decedent received certain real property, but Constance’s name was not listed on the deed. In 2006, the decedent transferred the property via quitclaim deed to himself and to appellants. Constance’s name and signature were not listed on the deed.” Appellants argued the probate court erred in ruling that the 2006 transfer was void under the SOF. The court agreed. It noted that “Constance received a mere dower interest in the property, not a co-ownership interest. Although Constance did not sign the transfer document, this did not render void the entire transfer. Under Tandy, Slater, and Zaher, the absence of Constance’s signature merely clouded the property’s title.” The court further noted that Berg-Powell was not controlling as it was decided before 11/1/90. As for Slater, the court observed in Zaher that “Slater held that a purchase agreement was ‘ineffective to convey marketable title’ absent the seller’s wife’s signature.’” However, in this case, the decedent transferred the property by quitclaim deed, not by warranty deed. “A warranty deed covenants that the grantor has marketable title. A quitclaim deed, on the other hand, does not warrant valid title and only conveys whatever interest the grantor might have.” Thus, in contrast to Slater, the decedent here “could transfer a clouded title by way of quitclaim deed because the deed only transferred whatever interest the decedent had in the property, presumably a fee simple encumbered by his wife’s inchoate dower interest.” In addition, under MCL 558.30(2)(a), “for dower rights to be exercised, the husband must die prior to” 4/6/17. However, the decedent “died in 2020. Therefore, Constance’s dower rights were extinguished after” 4/6/17. Further, she died in 2018. Thus, “any defect in the property was subsequently cured by the extinguishment of Constance’s dower interest.” The court reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition for appellants.
Priority for the payment of PIP benefits; Waiver; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part III of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 75489 in the 6/4/21 edition), as to defendant-MAIPF’s summary disposition motion, and remanded to the Court of Appeals to address the merits of plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in granting that motion. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that plaintiff waived this issue. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining question presented.
Clam for reformation to add an additional insured for property coverage; Rescission of an insurance policy; Balancing of equities; Distinguishing Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co; Doa Doa, Inc. (DDI); Garden City Real Estate, LLC (GCRE)
The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant-PrimeOne’s renewed motion for summary disposition as to plaintiff-GCRE’s reformation claim seeking to be added as an additional insured. But it reversed the trial court’s opinion and order holding PrimeOne liable for property coverage to GCRE on the basis of a balancing of the equities, and remanded for entry of judgment for PrimeOne as to GCRE’s claim for property coverage. This commercial insurance dispute arose from a fire that destroyed a bar and restaurant business owned by plaintiff-DDI on property owned by GCRE. PrimeOne “insured DDI under a policy that included coverage for general liability and property damage. GCRE was named as an additional insured for the general liability coverage only.” On appeal, PrimeOne argued that the trial court erred by declining to rescind the “policy as against GCRE and requiring it to provide” GCRE property coverage. On cross-appeal, GCRE argued that the trial court erred by dismissing its claim to reform the “policy to include it as an additional insured for property coverage.” Because GCRE failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to the requirements necessary to reform the policy, the court affirmed “the trial court’s decision granting PrimeOne’s motion for summary disposition on GCRE’s claim for reformation.” As to rescission and the trial court’s application of Bazzi, because GCRE was “not an insured or an additional insured under the property coverage portion of the policy, and because property coverage benefits are not otherwise mandated by statute, GCRE does not have any claim for property coverage benefits under the policy or otherwise.” And because it did “not have any claim for property coverage benefits in the first instance, the trial court erred by proceeding to balance the equities to determine whether GCRE may recover property coverage benefits because of its status as an innocent party to DDI’s fraud.”
Action seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan; MCL 500.3127(1); Insurer priority; Whether a vehicle was “involved in the accident”; MCL 500.3115(1); Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n; Physical contact; Auto Club Ins Ass’n v State Auto Mut Ins Co; Distinguishing Department of Soc Servs v Auto Club Ins Ass'n & Hastings Mut Ins Co v State Farm Ins Co; Harmless error
The court held that the trial court properly determined defendant-Nationwide was a higher-priority insurer than defendant-Geico. Defendant-Anderson, who was uninsured, clipped another vehicle (insured by Geico) then veered off the road and hit plaintiff-pedestrian, who was also uninsured. Plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits was assigned to Nationwide. Based on the case law "interpreting the phrase ‘involved in the accident,’” the court had little difficulty concluding that the vehicle insured by Geico “was not involved in the accident” that injured plaintiff because it “did nothing that actively contributed to the happening of the accident beyond its mere presence.” Noting Department of Soc Servs “stated that ‘a vehicle which is motionless in a lawful position is less likely to be considered’” involved, the court found there was no dispute that the Geico-insured vehicle “was motionless and in a lawful position when it was hit by Anderson’s vehicle, so this statement would support the trial court’s” ruling. Hastings was also readily distinguishable from this “case because the two cars that did not have physical contact with the motorcyclist still did something to actively contribute to the accident.” Here, in contrast, the Geico-insured “vehicle did nothing to actively contribute to the accident; it was stopped and waiting to turn for about 10 seconds before it was hit by Anderson’s vehicle.” Finally, the court rejected Nationwide’s claim that the trial court impermissibly injected fault into its analysis of whether the Geico-insured vehicle actively contributed to the accident, given its “comment that ‘it doesn’t at all’ seem ‘fair’” for Geico to be held responsible for the accident. “This single comment was made in response to a comment by Nationwide’s counsel that holding Geico responsible ‘doesn’t seem fair,’ and we disagree that this off-the-cuff comment shows that the lower court injected fault into its analysis.” Moreover, any error was harmless given the court’s “conclusion that, regardless of who was at fault for the accident, there can be no question under the facts of this case that” the Geico-insured vehicle “did not actively contribute to the accident, and therefore cannot be considered ‘involved in the accident’ for purposes of the" No-Fault Act. Affirmed.
Dispute the scope of an easement; Little v Kin; The law of the case doctrine; Duncan v Michigan
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendants-backlot owners after finding the grantors intended to allow them to engage in activities unrelated to the water beyond mere access and to give them riparian rights, including the ability to moor boats at docks overnight. Plaintiffs-lakefront owners sued defendants seeking a declaration that defendants’ rights were very limited as well as injunctive relief. The trial court agreed, finding defendants had an easement of access to the lake for water-related activities only and that they were permitted to erect docks at specified outlots for daily use but not for seasonal or overnight mooring of watercraft. In a prior appeal, the court reversed and remanded, finding the language of the restrictive covenant appeared less restrictive than the trial court determined, and that extrinsic evidence should have been considered. On remand, the trial court found that “the intent of the grantors was to give the [d]efendants, as backlot owners, riparian rights, including the ability to build, maintain, and use the docks, and for overnight mooring of boats on the docks . . . .” In the present appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that only contemporaneous historical extrinsic evidence may be considered in construing the ambiguous language of the restrictive covenant. “[I]n considering extrinsic evidence when construing an ambiguous grant, that historical evidence not contemporaneous with the grant is not per se inadmissible; rather, a court, in considering such evidence, may disregard it if it determines that it is irrelevant.” It also rejected their claim that defendants’ access to the lake is limited to mere access and does not include overnight mooring of boats or activities unrelated to the water. It noted that, in the prior appeal, it ruled that “the rights granted to defendants under the restrictive covenant are akin to the rights and obligations held by the riparian owners and not limited to mere access.” The question left to the trial court on remand was the scope of riparian rights that defendants backlot owners possessed. As such, “to agree with plaintiffs, i.e., to conclude that the restrictive covenant only allows access to the lake, would violate the law of the case doctrine. While this Court’s obligation to adhere to prior decisions of the appellate court in the same case may be suspended where there has been a material change in the facts or intervening change in the law, plaintiffs have not highlighted any new material facts or a change in the law that would support their position.” In fact, the new evidence proffered on remand “does not support plaintiffs’ position, but instead supports defendants’ position.” Affirmed.
Quiet title action; Whether plaintiff received unencumbered title; Jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(A)(2); “Aggrieved party”; Standing; MCL 600.2932(1); Mootness; Foreclosure by advertisement; MCL 600.3238; Termination of the redemption period; MCL 600.3238(10); Whether an affidavit had legal effect under MCL 565.451a(b); Whether an “expungement affidavit” filed under MCL 565.451a(b) can serve to expunge a foreclosure sale & revive an extinguished mortgage; Distinguishing Wilmington Sav Fund Soc’y v Clare
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant-Dyck O’Neal on plaintiff’s quiet title and slander of title claims. Plaintiff and defendant-Wolf entered into a purchase agreement for Wolf’s property, contingent on her first and second mortgages being discharged. After the closing, Wolf paid off the first mortgage and received a discharge. But the statement of discharge made no mention of the second mortgage, so Wolf requested a payoff statement as to that mortgage. Dyck O’Neal then notified Wolf that she still owed a debt on the second mortgage, but payments were not made. After the second mortgage was assigned to Dyck O’Neal, it initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff then filed suit. Meanwhile defendant-Malavia purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale. On appeal, the court first found meritless Malavia’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction to decide this case because plaintiff was not an aggrieved party. “Because the trial court’s order ‘operates on [plaintiff’s alleged] rights and property’ and because plaintiff has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case,” plaintiff was an aggrieved party. It also rejected Malavia’s claim that the appeal was moot because the redemption period terminated. “[B]ecause the district court’s decision to enter the judgment of possession could be overturned and because Malavia’s interest in the property hinges on the legal effect of” an affidavit, it considered plaintiff’s appellate argument. The court further rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for Dyck O’Neal because the “affidavit did not have legal effect and the second mortgage was extinguished,” leaving Dyck O’Neal without an interest in the property. “[U]nlike the affidavit in Clare, the affidavit in this case did not create the condition that affected an interest in the property.” Rather, Wolf and defendant-Litton’s independent agreement to set aside the sheriff’s sale on the property “created the condition, and the affidavit merely stated facts concerning the representative’s knowledge of that agreement.” In addition, when the affidavit was executed and recorded, “Wolf still had a present interest in the property as the holder of the redemption rights.” In sum, the affidavit “contained information within the scope of MCL 565.451a(b) and therefore had legal effect. Because the undisputed evidence establishes that the second mortgage was not extinguished in 2009, Dyck O’Neal had an interest in the property by virtue of the lien.” Affirmed.
Whether petitioner was entitled to a 100% principal residence exception (PRE) even though a portion of the property was rented out for part of the year; MCL 211.7cc(16); MCL 211.7dd(c); Rentschler v Melrose Twp; “Multi-purpose structure”; The Michigan Department of Treasury Principal Residence Exemption Guidelines; Tax Tribunal (TT)
Holding that where a property otherwise qualifies for the PRE, the fact that a portion of the property is rented out for part of the year as an Airbnb or similar use does not disqualify it from a 100% PRE, the court reversed the TT’s decision to the contrary and remanded for entry of judgment for petitioner. Respondent-township found petitioner’s property was disqualified from receiving the PRE because over 50% of the property was used as an Airbnb. The TT then found that only 30% of property was used as an Airbnb and thus, petitioner was entitled to a 70% PRE. On appeal, the court agreed with petitioner that the TT erred in its analysis and that he should receive a 100% PRE. The TT’s “opinion provides no analysis or citation to authority for the proposition that use of a portion of the residence for Airbnb turns the house into a ‘multiple-purpose structure’ under” MCL 211.7cc(16). And respondent presented “little argument regarding the multi-purpose structure analysis other than referring to four examples contained in the Michigan Department of Treasury Principal Residence Exemption Guidelines.” As the court noted in Rentschler, the Guidelines lack the force of law. Further, it did “not see that allowing transient guests to stay in one’s home is being a sufficiently distinct purpose to lead to the conclusion that the structure now has multiple purposes.” Rather, the court determined “that the purpose for which the structure exists, whether it be for the property owner or for the Airbnb guests, is to provide a place to sleep, rest, read a book, look out over the lake, etc. While there may be a pecuniary interest for the property owner, it is not sufficiently different than providing a room to a boarder who pays rent to deem it a separate purpose.” The court noted it could neither ignore nor distinguish Rentschler. “If completely renting out a principal residence for a portion of the year does not disqualify it from the PRE, we cannot conclude that renting out a portion of the property for a portion of the year would disqualify the owner from claiming the PRE.”
Reasonable reunification efforts; Factual findings
The court held that the trial court did not err by determining the DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reuniting respondent-mother with her family, and thus did not err by finding that statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights were established. Also, she did not show “that, even if the trial court made erroneous factual findings, these errors infected its termination decision such that reversal was required." Respondent cited “the portion of her psychological evaluation recommending that she attend AA or NA and obtain a sponsor, but [did] not explain how DHHS failed to facilitate her doing this.” She testified that she “attended some AA meetings, although no testimony was solicited concerning whether she had obtained a sponsor.” Respondent did not show the trial court should have found that the “DHHS failed to provide her with services regarding respondent’s participation in AA or NA, programs which do not generally require a referral and which respondent herself admitted she had attended.” She also argued that the “DHHS refused to provide family counseling despite” her request. The testimony of her “caseworker made it clear that respondent was informed that the prerequisite for family counseling was that respondent engage with and make progress in her individual therapy.” Yet the record showed that she “only sporadically attended her individual counseling sessions over the period of a few months in late 2019 and early 2020, before, according to respondent, beginning individual counseling with a new therapist” in 3/21. But her “recent participation in counseling could not be independently verified by either records or testimony, and in fact the trial court did not find this testimony credible.” Additionally, she “was referred to a comprehensive program that included family counseling as a service provided, but quit the program after less than one month.” And even if her testimony as to “her counseling was credible, respondent herself testified that she and her therapist were ‘not ready’ to have her mother join their therapy sessions.” She also did “not explain how any additional services provided by DHHS would have made a difference in the outcome” here. The court held that even if the “DHHS had permitted family counseling, the record shows that respondent repeatedly failed to engage with or benefit from counseling services. DHHS’s duty to provide services is matched by a respondent’s corresponding duty to benefit from" them. The court found no clear error in the trial court’s ruling. Affirmed.