Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Meaning of “interconnect” under the Transmission Infrastructure Planning Act (enacted by 2021 PA 125 - Act 125); Incumbent electric transmission line owners’ rights of first refusal over future regionally cost-shared transmission projects; MCL 460.593(1); Use of the word “connecting” in MCL 460.593(3)(a); Long-Range Transmission Plan (LRTP)
In an issue of first impression concerning the Transmission Infrastructure Planning Act (Act 125), the court held that the trial court correctly ruled “that a direct, physical connection is necessary to show that the facilities are ‘interconnected’ under Act 125.” The parties were electric transmission companies. The dispute involved two new transmission-line projects. “Act 125 gives incumbent electric transmission line owners . . . rights of first refusal over future regionally cost-shared transmission projects.” The issue here was “whether defendant’s electric transmission line interconnects with a regionally cost-shared transmission line, which would grant defendant the right to engage with plaintiff as a co-owner of that regionally cost-shared transmission line.” The trial court granted plaintiff summary disposition. Defendant argued that it erred in determining there was no evidence “that defendant’s facilities would ‘interconnect’ with the Projects within the meaning of Act 125.” The court disagreed. As the “word ‘interconnect’ is not statutorily defined,” the court could “consult a dictionary to determine the word’s ‘common and ordinary meaning.’” And it found that “[d]efining ‘interconnect’ with its root word, ‘connect,’ appears to comport with surrounding” statutes. MCL 460.593(3)(a)’s “use of the word ‘connecting’ strongly suggests that defining ‘interconnect’ is meant to include ‘connect.’ The more common and ordinary meaning of the word ‘connect’ is to ‘become joined[.]’ Taking this definition into account,” the court concluded “that defendant’s Oneida Lines must physically ‘join’ with the Projects.” The court added that it agreed “with the trial court that defendant’s interpretation could lead to absurd results.” That interpretation seemed to render “the word ‘interconnect’ meaningless by allowing a company to meet the requirement simply by being connected to a different company’s transmission lines, which in turn directly connect to a regionally cost-shared transmission line.” As to the merits of defendant’s argument that summary disposition was improper, the court concluded there was “no genuine issue of material fact that defendant’s Oneida Lines did not interconnect with the Projects. Both the LRTP and the physical geography demonstrated that the Oneida Lines did not touch the Projects. Instead, the Oneida Lines were separated by plaintiff’s facilities, which were the only direct connection to the Projects.” Affirmed.
42 USC § 1983 action arising from a weapons seizure; Qualified immunity in a defendant’s individual & official capacity; Takings claims; Procedural & substantive due process claims; Second Amendment claims; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v Bruen; Fourth Amendment claim; Inverse-condemnation claim under Michigan law; Claim & delivery under Michigan law; MCL 600.2920(1); MCR 3.105(A)(1)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that because plaintiffs-Novak and Wenzel produced affidavits attesting to their ownership of the guns seized, the district court erred by granting defendant-Sheriff Federspiel summary judgment on the federal takings claim against him in his official capacity. Summary judgment was also improperly granted on the Second Amendment claim because “the right to keep or bear one’s own firearms is quintessentially conduct that falls within the text of the Second Amendment.” And they can proceed with their state-law claim-and-delivery action. They alleged they endured a “taking” where Federspiel refused to return guns he had confiscated from a cabin where a domestic violence incident occurred. Plaintiffs were not involved in that incident. They asserted that they owned the guns seized but admitted that they lack documents establishing their ownership. The district court granted Federspiel summary judgment on all claims. The court held that he was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ takings claim in his individual capacity but vacated the grant of qualified immunity in his official capacity. It held that plaintiffs’ affidavits stating that they owned the firearms created “a genuine issue of material fact as to” ownership. But they did “not put that fact beyond dispute, and Novak’s and Wenzel’s credibility is for a factfinder to evaluate.” The court upheld summary judgment on the procedural and substantive due process claims, concluding among other things that “the circumstances surrounding the firearms’ initial seizure did not require pre-deprivation process. In investigating the allegation of domestic assault against” nonparty-H that led to the seizure of the guns, “law enforcement needed to act quickly to preserve evidence and safeguard the victim and her infant child.” As to the Second Amendment claims against the Federspiel in his official capacity, the issue was whether the “right to own guns includes the right to possess—that is to ‘keep’—the guns that a person lawfully owns. The right to keep or bear firearms would mean little if an individual lacked any presumptive right to keep or bear his own firearms.” Thus, the case must be remanded to determine whether plaintiffs “owned” the guns and if so, “whether Federspiel’s possession of them has been ‘consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’” The Fourth Amendment claim failed because that Amendment “does not apply to retaining property[.]” As to the Michigan claim and delivery claim, a “reasonable jury could find that [plaintiffs] own the firearms at issue and that Federspiel has unlawfully kept those firearms after [they] requested their return.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC I; MCL 750.520b(1)(a); “Sexual penetration”; MCL 750.520a(r); People v Payne; Right to a fair trial; Evidence from a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE); Hearsay; Exception for statements made for medical treatment & diagnosis; MRE 803(4); People v Kosters; Improper vouching; People v Douglas; Prosecutorial error; People v Dobek; Right to a fair & impartial jury; People v Budzyn; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection
Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions of CSC I and II, which arose out of his sexual assault of the 6-year-old victim. It rejected his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support that he penetrated her beyond a reasonable doubt. Even though the victim, “who was eight years old at trial, did not use the proper nomenclature to describe anatomy, the evidence and reasonable inferences from it indicated that defendant sexually penetrated her genital opening.” She described his “actions as peeing in her ‘vulva,’ and stated [he] used the part of his anatomy from which he urinated for activity in her ‘privates.’” She was also “consistent in her reports of defendant’s actions.” And the forensic evidence indicated that he had sexually penetrated her. The court also rejected his claim that he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to the testimony of the SANE, which he asserted included inadmissible hearsay and improper vouching. It was readily apparent that the victim’s “statement to the SANE was for medical purposes, because the examination took place the day after the assault and included taking pertinent history from [her] before conducting the actual detailed physical examination.” In addition, because the SANE “did not comment on the veracity of” the victim’s comments or allegations, he did not establish “that any improper vouching took place.” The court next rejected his contention that the prosecutor’s closing argument included improper commentary that encouraged the jury to view the victim sympathetically. It noted that “because the challenged prosecutorial argument did not imply that the jury should consider [her] bravery as a factor in considering the evidence, there was no impropriety.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting during trial to the testimony and commentary at issue on appeal, noting that “no objection would have been successful.” Affirmed.
Modified jury instruction on the elements of first-degree home invasion; MCL 750.110a(2); “Without permission”; Instruction on the defense of property by ejectment of a trespasser; Failure to give an instruction on the defense of others; Admission of false statements defendant made to police; Relevance; MRE 401; Lying to police as evidence of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt; Denial of an adjournment
The court rejected defendant’s arguments as to the jury instructions and concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing some false statements he made to police into evidence. It also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for an adjournment. Thus, it affirmed his first-degree home invasion conviction. He claimed that the trial court improperly modified the jury instructions on the elements of first-degree home invasion. At the prosecution’s request, it “revised the definition of ‘without permission’ to omit the phrase ‘from the owner or lessee of the dwelling,’ instructing the jury that ‘[w]ithout permission means without having obtained permission to enter from any person lawfully in possession or control of the dwelling.’” Defendant contended that the omitted language makes it clear that “permission can be obtained from the owner of the property, which in turn means that [he], as owner of the house, could grant himself permission to enter, rendering him not guilty of the charged offense. Settled caselaw, however, belies this argument.” The court noted it has explained that “an individual may commit a home invasion of his or her own dwelling if the individual has lost the legal right to enter the dwelling, such as through a court order.” There was no dispute that at the time of the incident, “defendant was prohibited—by court order—from entering the house. Accordingly, as the trial court correctly concluded, [he] was not entitled to a jury instruction on ‘permission . . . from the owner’ because he did not have a legal right to be present in the house and could not, therefore, grant himself permission to enter.” The modified instruction “fairly presented the issue to be tried in this case in a manner that was clearer and more accurate than the unmodified version, and that was sufficiently protective of defendant’s rights.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred in “failing to give a complete instruction regarding defense of property by ejectment of a trespasser.” Given that he “was not legally entitled to physical presence or control of the house at the relevant time, the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence did not support” this theory. Further, the court found “no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence did not support a defense-of-others instruction.”
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to seek suppression of custodial statements; Miranda warnings; Miranda v Arizona; Principle that the Fourth Amendment’s fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis does not apply to Miranda violations; Oregon v Elstad; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); Relevance; MRE 401; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Res gestae; People v Jakcson; Prosecutorial misconduct; References to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence; People v Shafier
The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and the prosecution did not commit misconduct. He was convicted of second-degree murder, FIP, and felony-firearm in the death of the victim, whom he had been dating. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was “denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) failed to move to suppress the statements [he] made to the police, and (2) failed to object to certain evidence regarding his multiple sexual partners and out-of-wedlock children.” It noted that defendant made no argument “that the police’s failure to give Miranda warnings during the initial interview was the product of improper tactics or that [his] subsequent waiver of his rights and statements to the police were not knowing and voluntary.” As such, he failed to “show counsel performed deficiently in not seeking to suppress the statements he made at the police station. And even if counsel could have successfully sought suppression of [his] initial statements, [he] has failed to show any reasonable probability that, had those statements been suppressed, the result of his trial would have been any different.” As to the admission of evidence related to his sexual partners and out-of-wedlock children, it “was probative of what happened in the hours before the victim was shot, and why she may have been shot.” This evidence “was relevant both to defendant’s ‘motive,’ MRE 404(b)(1), and to the res gestae of the charged conduct.” And it was not unfairly prejudicial. The court also rejected his claim that the prosecutor “(1) improperly questioned a witness about [him] ending his second interview with the police to speak to a lawyer, and (2) made improper comments during closing arguments.” Although this line of questioning unduly suggested he should have continued to provide information instead of “remaining silent and requesting a lawyer, and did not make clear that [he] was within his constitutional rights to choose not to speak further with” the police, he failed to show relief was warranted as the “questioning and related comments were themselves fairly brief and isolated.” Moreover, there was “overwhelming, and untainted, circumstantial evidence of” his guilt. Affirmed.
Hearsay & the Confrontation Clause; Prejudice; Cumulative evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Operating under the influence (OUI); Operating with license suspended or revoked (OWLS)
The court held that any error in the admission of testimony that defendant challenged as hearsay was not outcome determinative, and that his related ineffective assistance of counsel claim also failed due to the lack of prejudice. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of third-degree fleeing and eluding; felony-firearm (third offense); FIP; assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer; OUI; OWLS; and failure to stop after a collision. A 911 dispatcher (R) received a call from an individual (B) stating “that a Crown Victoria had hit his car at” a specified intersection and fled. B provided the other vehicle’s plate number and a description of the driver. Officer M responded to the call and spoke to B. M testified at trial about what B told him. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony as it was inadmissible hearsay and violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The court concluded that, “assuming without deciding that it was plain error for the trial court to allow [M] to testify about what” B said to him, defendant was not prejudiced by the error. In B’s “911 call, the jury heard [B] say that the person in the Crown Victoria pointed a gun at him, and [R] confirmed that [B] told her during the call that a gun was pointed at him. [M’s] testimony that [B] told him that the perpetrator pointed a gun at him was thus cumulative to other evidence that was before the jury.” In addition, “there was strong untainted evidence supporting that defendant was aware of the firearm in his car, undermining his defense that he had no knowledge of [it]. Considering the weight and strength of the untainted evidence, combined with the fact that [M’s] disputed testimony was cumulative to other evidence that was before the jury (and to which defendant does not raise any objection),” the court concluded “that any error in the admission of [M’s] disputed testimony was not outcome determinative.” It also found that “there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant’s trial would have been different had defendant’s trial counsel objected to” M’s testimony.
Admission of the nurse examiner’s testimony; Hearsay; MRE 803(4); People v Meeboer (After Remand); Recorded recollection; Prosecutorial misconduct; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Due process
The court held that the trial court did not plainly err by admitting nurse examiner-S’s testimony about what victim-AM “and AM’s mother told her during AM’s medical” exam, and defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to S’s testimony. “Defendant waived any claim of error arising from the trial court’s decision to allow the prosecutor to play a portion of the videorecording, and defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of AM’s videorecorded forensic interview because the foundational requirements were met to allow it to be played as a recorded recollection under MRE 803(5).” While the trial court erred in playing the audio of the “interview during deliberations, the error did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.” His prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance claims failed, “and he waived any challenge to the trial court’s jury instructions as given.” Lastly, he did not establish “a due-process violation arising from the investigating detective’s processing of the underwear that AM was wearing at the time of the sexual assault.” He was convicted of CSC I and CSC II. AM was seven years old at the time of the offense. Defendant argued, among other things “that the trial court plainly erred by admitting the hearsay statements of AM and her mother through” S’s testimony “because the statements did not meet the requirements of MRE 803(4).” The critical questions were “whether AM’s statements were reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and if AM had a self-interested motivation to be truthful in order to receive proper medical care.” The court held that AM’s statements to S “were reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment.” Evidence also supported “that AM had a self-interested motivation to be truthful in order to receive proper medical care.” The court concluded “that the totality of the circumstances supports the admission of AM’s statements because they were trustworthy.” Thus, defendant had “not shown that the trial court committed plain error by allowing [S] to testify about AM’s statements during the forensic medical examination.”
Jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2)
The court affirmed the trial court’s order assuming jurisdiction over the child, OM, under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Respondent-father argued “that the trial court clearly erred by finding that statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction in his case existed by a preponderance of the evidence.” The court found that the DHHS clearly established by a preponderance of the evidence that the father “neglected or refused to provide OM with proper or necessary support and educational, medical, or mental-health care and subjected her to a substantial risk of harm to her mental well being, despite being able to provide for OM’s needs.” Thus, it held that “statutory grounds for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction existed under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).” Also, in light of the testimony presented at the father’s adjudication trial, the DHHS “established by a preponderance of the evidence that [his] home was unfit for OM.” Therefore, the court concluded that “statutory grounds for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction also existed under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).” Thus, it held that because the DHHS “established statutory grounds for exercising jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by exercising jurisdiction over OM.”