Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Other acts evidence; Mistrial; Great weight of the evidence; Sufficiency of the evidence; Mentally incapacitated; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 8 & 10; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the introduction of a 2004 conviction; Failure to move for a mistrial; Failure to object to the scoring of the OVs; Proportionality
The court held that the probative value of a relative’s testimony as to “the 2004 assault weighs in favor of admission, and the other acts evidence from 2004 was properly admitted.” Also, defendant-Laundry proffered “nothing to suggest that a mistrial was manifestly necessary.” Further, given “the victim’s testimony, Laundry’s convictions were not against the great weight of the evidence.” Additionally, the court held that “the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of” CSC III and IV. It found that the trial court did not err when it assessed 15 points for OV 8 and 10. And it “correctly denied a new trial based on ineffective assistance.” Finally, Laundry had “not overcome the presumption of proportionality for his within-guidelines sentence.” Defendant was “on parole for a sexual assault of an adult with an intellectual disability when he sexually assaulted the same person.” A jury found him guilty of CSC III and IV. He was sentenced to 217 months to 30 years for CSC III and to 34 months to 4 years for CSC IV, “with no credit for time served and consecutive to the sentence for which he was on parole.” He challenged, among other things, the admission of the other acts evidence from 2004. The court held that the “2004 assault was a similar act of exploitation against a vulnerable victim, and it demonstrated Laundry’s pattern of sexually assaulting victims who were not capable of consenting or resisting.” Laundry argued “that his incarceration after the 2004 assault should demonstrate probable rehabilitation, but his actual history shows the opposite—in 2012, he pleaded guilty to” CSC III. Thus, “the probative value of the relative’s testimony regarding the 2004 assault weighs in favor of admission, and the other acts evidence from 2004 was properly admitted.” Affirmed.
Right of confrontation; People v Masi; The rape-shield statute; MCL 750.520j; Admissibility of evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct; People v Butler; People v Williams
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to introduce prior allegedly false allegations of sexual assault made against him. He was charged with CSC II, accosting a child for immoral purposes, and aggravated child sexually abusive activity, for allegedly sexually assaulting the complainant multiple times when she was between the ages of 11 and 13. The trial court denied his motion to introduce four previous allegedly false allegations of sexual assault against him by the complainant’s mother on behalf of the complainant and herself. In a prior appeal, the court denied leave, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Butler. The court remanded to the trial court, which again denied defendant’s motion, finding he did not sufficiently offer proof of a prior false allegation and, thus, an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. In the present appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court’s order should be reversed because it “‘failed to articulate an appropriate standard of proof for the admissibility of evidence of prior false allegations of sexual assault by the complainant.’” As the trial court made clear, “it did not need to articulate that standard because, as a threshold matter, it ‘determined that defendant did not make the requisite offer of proof on any of the false allegations.’ This was fully consistent with the direction of the Supreme Court and this Court on remand, which likewise made clear that the trial court was not required to determine an appropriate standard of proof for admission of the evidence unless it first determined that defendant made the requisite offer of proof.” As such, “the trial court did not err by failing to articulate the appropriate standard of proof for admissibility of the evidence.” In addition, he failed to show that the trial court erred in its determination that he failed to make a sufficient offer of proof of a prior false allegation. He criticized its “use of the phrase ‘concrete evidence’ as ‘not an appropriate standard of proof for the admissibility of evidence of prior allegations of sexual assault.’” However, it “was not purporting to articulate any such standard of proof for admissibility; instead, it was describing why defendant’s offer of proof was insufficient. And its use of” this phrase “aligned with this Court’s use of that very same language in” Williams, which was cited by the Supreme Court in its remand. The trial “court further made clear that it understood the phrase to be synonymous with the language used by our Supreme Court in Butler to describe a sufficient offer of proof—that is, ‘a showing of at least some apparently credible and potentially admissible evidence that the prior allegation was false.’” Defendant claimed “he ‘proffered sufficient credible evidence,’” but offered “no meaningful explanation as to how the trial court reversibly erred in applying the standard above to his offer of proof.” Affirmed.
Second-degree murder; Great weight of the evidence; The Self–Defense Act; MCL 780.972(1)(a); First-time identification of defendant at trial; Due process; People v Posey; Claim the prosecution failed to adequately investigate; Applicability of Brady v Maryland; Distinction between the failure to disclose evidence & the failure to develop it; People v Coy; Prosecutorial error; Closing argument; Plain error; Prejudice
The court held that defendant’s second-degree murder conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence and that he was not entitled to relief based on a witness’s (W) “first-time identification of him at trial as a shooter” in the incident. Further, his “right to a fair trial was not violated by the prosecution’s alleged failure to adequately investigate the shooting.” Finally, while the court found that an isolated comment by the prosecutor during closing argument was plain error, defendant was not entitled to reversal because he failed to establish prejudice. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. He was with his codefendant (M) when M “fired a warning shot into the air” as a group of people approached. Defendant “fired at the group,” fatally striking the victim (F) from behind. Defendant asserted that “the lack of ballistic evidence rendered his conviction against the great weight of the evidence because it was impossible for the jury to infer that his actions caused (F’s) death. However, the bulk of the evidence was adequate to prove causation.” A witness (T) who was in the approaching group “stated that he fired back at defendant and [M] after seeing muzzle flashes. [W] confirmed that he heard gunshots coming from” the direction of defendant and M. The medical examiner confirmed that F “was hit from behind, suggesting that he was running away from [M] and defendant.” In addition, a detective “noted there were casings from three calibers recovered from the scene. [M] fired into the air and [T] fired at [M] and defendant, not toward [F]. Thus, although circumstantial, the jury could infer based on this testimony that the two bullets that hit [F’s] back and head originated from defendant’s gun.” As to his self-defense claim, the trial court instructed the jury on “self-defense, and the jury rejected” the defense. The record indicated “that this rejection was not against the great weight of the evidence[.]” The court found that “the trial court likely committed plain error by allowing [W] to identify defendant as a shooter at trial because, under Posey, such a first-time-in-court identification procedure generally is inadmissible without a consideration of reliability factors.” But the court agreed with the prosecution that there was “no prejudice to defendant. The surveillance video showed [him] as a shooter” and his self-defense theory “was an admission that he was a shooter.”
Fraud claims arising from a home sale; Claim for attorney fees; Sanctions for bringing a vexatious appeal; MCR 7.216(C)(1); Relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b); South Macomb Disposal Auth v American Ins Co; People v Rogers; Evidentiary support for damages award; Fraudulent misrepresentation & silent fraud; Mercurio v Huntington Nat’l Bank; Motion for involuntary dismissal; MCR 2.504(B)(2); Application of the wrong standard; Harmless error; Right result; Admission of photo evidence; Authentication; MRE 901; Mitchell v Kalamazoo Anesthesiology, PC; Seller disclosure statement (SDS)
Because plaintiff failed to “properly advance her claim for attorney fees based on fraud committed by” defendant in the amended complaint, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying them. To the extent her request could be read as one “for attorney fees as exemplary relief for defendant’s ‘intentional and malicious actions,’” it still failed. The court also rejected her request for sanctions against defendant for a vexatious appeal. As to defendant’s cross-appeal, it held that the trial court did not clearly err in (1) “awarding plaintiff $35,000 in actual damages” or (2) finding “the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud were met[.]” And it did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for relief from judgment or a new trial, or in admitting photo evidence. She also was not entitled to relief as to her involuntary dismissal motion. The case arose from defendant’s sale of a home to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued she was “entitled to attorney fees based on the trial court’s determination that defendant committed fraud.” The court and the Supreme Court “have recognized that attorney fees are permissible in limited situations where a party incurs legal expenses from another party’s fraudulent or unlawful conduct.” The court has also “held that to recover attorney fees as a form of damages, the party seeking such damages must have brought a claim for” them. Plaintiff failed to “specifically plead a claim for attorney fees based on fraud as she differentiated between exemplary damages and reasonable attorney fees in her request for relief. It was not until she moved to amend the judgment that she alleged that she was entitled to attorney fees based on the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had committed fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud, made in the judgment entered after trial.” Further, she did not assert, and there no evidence offered at trial, that she “suffered any form of humiliation, outrage, or indignity from defendant’s alleged failure to disclose flooding issues in the SDS before the” sale. As to defendant’s challenge to the damages award, the trial court “was permitted to use repair costs as a measure of damages in the context of misrepresentations related to the sale of real property, . . . and the testimony of the contractors provided a range within which to reach this number. The $35,000 amount was within this range. The trial court did not have to reach a number with mathematical precision, and its approximation was sufficient because a reasonable basis for the final amount existed.” Affirmed.
Floating homes ordinance; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Governmental immunity; Governmental or proprietary function; Distinguishing Morgan Dev LLC v City of Detroit (Unpub); Breach of the Docks Clause & Representation Clause in a contract; Promissory estoppel; Breach of contract (BOC); Land Swap Agreement (LSA)
In Docket No. 367059, the court reversed the trial court’s order finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether defendant-City was engaged in a governmental or proprietary function. The City was entitled to immunity on plaintiff’s (collectively, Dune Ridge) Counts IV, V, VI and IX. In Docket No. 367078, it affirmed “the trial court’s orders granting the City’s BOC Motion and Promissory Estoppel Motion and the trial court’s orders denying Dune Ridge’s BOC Motion and Ordinance Motion.” Dune Ridge entered into an agreement with the “City to swap parcels of land located along the Kalamazoo River. Though not expressed in the agreement itself, Dune Ridge planned to develop its resulting parcel into a high-end floating homes rental business. The Saugatuck City Council (City Council), however, subsequently enacted several ordinances regulating the use of floating homes, which disrupted Dune Ridge’s plans.” The City argued, among other things, “that the trial court erred by denying its Immunity Motion because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the City’s entitlement to governmental immunity as to Dune Ridge’s tort claims.” First, the court agreed “with the City that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the City was engaged in a governmental function when the alleged torts occurred, and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise.” There was “no genuine issue of material fact that the City was authorized to enter into the LSA and therefore was engaged in a governmental function when the alleged torts occurred. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the City’s Immunity Motion on this basis.” The court concluded that the “trial court also erred by finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City was engaged in a proprietary function.” The court found “no merit in Dune Ridge’s argument that the property exchange was commercial in nature or that there is otherwise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City’s primary purpose was to produce a pecuniary profit. Accordingly, the trial court also erred by denying the City’s Immunity Motion on this ground.” Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
Termination of parental rights; Effect of a trial court’s failure to conduct a statutory-grounds analysis under MCL 712A.19b(3); Findings of fact & conclusions of law; MCR 3.977(I)(1)-(2); Children’s best interests; The doctrine of anticipatory neglect
Holding that the trial court erred by proceeding directly to the best-interests analysis without first determining whether a statutory ground for termination was met, the court vacated its order and remanded. This case concerned respondent-father and his two sons (CAZ and MAZ). It was initiated on the basis of his “prolonged and severe sexual and physical abuse of their half-sister, JFS.” The trial court declined to terminate his parental rights, finding that doing so was not in the boys’ best interests. On appeal, the court noted that the trial court “held a combined adjudication and termination hearing but took the matter under advisement without making findings on the record. It later entered a written order exercising jurisdiction over the” children but concluded that termination was not in their best interests. The trial court “dismissed the petition and released the children to their nonrespondent mother. In doing so, it made no findings regarding statutory grounds . . . stating only: ‘Now that the court has found jurisdiction, the next step is to look at best interests.’ Even when a court declines to terminate parental rights, it must ‘state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.’ Skipping the statutory-grounds analysis altogether was a clear procedural defect that warrants remand.” The court noted that, on remand, the trial court “must determine whether petitioner established a statutory ground for termination” and if “it finds such a ground, [it] must then consider whether termination is in the best interests of the children, giving appropriate weight to the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.”