Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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The Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA); Unemployment benefits; Factors leading to disqualification; MCL 421.29; “Eligibility” & “qualifications”; Stephen’s Nu-Ad, Inc v Green; MCL 421.27(d); The lower court’s jurisdiction; MCL 421.38(1); Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission (the Commission)
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 78523 in the 12/15/22 edition), and reinstated the Commission’s determination as to claimant-Martin’s eligibility for unemployment benefits. It held that the lower courts had jurisdiction to decide the matter under MCL 421.38(1) but that the “Commission’s statutory interpretation and its application of Stephen’s Nu-Ad were correct as applied” here. The Commission found “Martin was not disqualified for two weeks of benefits under MCL 421.29 based on the time between her termination and her last intended day of employment but that she was disqualified for benefits after those two weeks. Based on the facts before the ALJ and the Commission, although her resignation would have disqualified her for benefits, her termination” before her notice date expired entitled her to “benefits during those intervening weeks.” The circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court. They “treated ‘eligibility’ and ‘qualifications’ as synonymous terms under the MESA. They are not.” Their decisions characterized the Commission “as finding no eligibility beyond two weeks. But [it] found Martin disqualified after two weeks based on her voluntarily quitting her job.” It did not address eligibility and only modified the ALJ’s decision as “to disqualification. Moreover, the lower courts apparently read MCL 421.27(d) as an affirmative statutory grant of 14 weeks of benefits any time an individual is determined to be eligible. It is not. MCL 421.27(d) sets forth the benefit-week range an individual is able to receive in a benefit year assuming they remain eligible and qualified during the pendency of their claim. Thus, where a claimant did not voluntarily quit or is not otherwise disqualified from receiving benefits at the outset, the claimant may not be deemed to have exhausted their benefit weeks until at least 14 weeks have passed if they remain eligible and qualified.” Assuming without deciding that Stephen’s Nu-Ad was correct, the unchallenged facts “were that Martin quit over changes in the dress code which her manager told her were not up for discussion.” As her concerns were nonnegotiable, her testimony “she would have been interested in maintaining her employment had her concerns been addressed did not” make it speculative as to whether she actually intended to leave.
Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA); Action for a declaratory judgment to recognize the “Christian Identity” religion in the Michigan prison system; Applicability of the “compelling interest test” to each plaintiff who claimed their free-exercise rights were being denied; Ramirez v Collier; Whether the government established there were no “less restrictive means” to ensure facility security; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the MDOC violated RLUIPA by not recognizing “Christian Identity” as a religion in Michigan prisons where it failed to satisfy its burden of showing that its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Thus, it reversed the district court and remanded for entry of a judgment for plaintiffs-prisoners in this declaratory judgment action. The MDOC refused plaintiffs’ request to recognize Christian Identity, an “explicitly racist” white-supremacist ideology, as a religion. Plaintiffs brought this action under the RLUIPA, asking that the MDOC be required to do so. The court previously held that plaintiffs had satisfied the first two parts of the RLUIPA test, but remanded for the district court to determine the third part—whether the MDOC’s “refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion furthered a compelling governmental interest, and, if so, that its denial was the least restrictive means of furthering such a compelling interest.” Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the district court concluded that the MDOC had met its burden, ruling that the MDOC’s “recognition of Christian Identity as a religion would likely threaten the safety and security of” its facilities. The court focused on whether the district court correctly ruled the MDOC satisfied its burden of showing that “its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” The court explained that the government was required to apply the compelling-interest test to each claimant who asserts that their free-exercise rights are being denied. “Under RLUIPA, ‘the government cannot discharge [its] burden by pointing to broadly formulated interests.’” It noted that the MDOC was required to show there were no “less restrictive means” by which it could protect its facilities. “Alternatives, other than to simply accept or reject recognition, were available and included in the Department’s policies, but never considered by it.” No evidence was presented that the individual plaintiffs were violent, and the court could not connect any “racial violence outside the prison setting” linked to Christian Identity with violence in the prison setting. The court rejected the government’s argument that “Christian Identity is simply too dangerous to recognize[,]” and that to do so “would lead to an increase in racial tension in its facilities because it cannot prevent nonwhites from attending Christian Identity services.” It noted that the MDOC already had a policy in place to mitigate this concern.
Whether a claim under the Prepaid Funeral & Cemetery Sales Act (PFCSA) was a breach of contract claim; Statutory duty to maintain records under MCL 328.218(1); Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Pleading in avoidance of governmental immunity; MCL 328.234; The PFCSA’s definition of “person” (MCL 328.215(b)); Whether a defendant was entitled to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2); “Agents”; “Employee”
The court held that while the trial court erred in ruling plaintiffs’ PFCSA claim sounded in contract, it properly denied defendants-City of Benton Harbor and Crystal Springs Cemetery (the City defendants) summary disposition. Although the PFCSA imposes tort liability, its “direct inclusion of a ‘government agency’ as a ‘person’ that can be sued for damages indicates the Legislature’s intent to waive the immunity conferred by MCL 691.1407(1) for governmental agencies.” Further, defendant-C Management was not entitled to governmental immunity as an “agent” of the City and did not qualify as an “employee” entitled to such immunity under MCL 691.1407(2). Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition for defendants where the trial court reached the correct result even though for the wrong reasons. The case arose from a person being buried in the wrong cemetery plot. Plaintiffs alleged the “City defendants breached their statutory duty to maintain their records under MCL 328.218(1). That duty was ‘separate and distinct’ from their contractual obligations with plaintiffs.” Thus, the court found the trial court erred in determining plaintiffs’ PFCSA claim “sounded in contract, not tort, as the underlying claim was premised on City defendants’ breach of a noncontractual duty imposed by law.” As a result, their PFCSA claim was barred unless they pled in avoidance of governmental immunity. The court found that they did. They asserted that a provision of the PFCSA, MCL 328.234, established “an exception to the general rule that government agencies are immune from tort liability when performing a governmental function.” The court agreed that the PFCSA’s plain language showed “the Legislature’s intent to waive governmental immunity under the GTLA and submit government agencies to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The Legislature expressly applied the PFCSA to City defendants by including ‘governmental agency’ in the definition of a ‘person’ that can be sued.” As to C Management, even if it “was an agent of City defendants, ‘agents’ do not fall under the categories of persons entitled to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2)[.]” It further rejected C Management’s assertion “that ‘employee’ under MCL 691.1407(2) includes private for-profit corporations serving as agents to a governmental agency.”
Whether Insured Covenant (IC) Agreements violated the rule against clogging a borrower’s right of redemption; Whether another entity’s payments of a lender’s claims made after plaintiffs’ default discharged plaintiffs’ obligations under the loan documents; Whether plaintiffs were bound by the Additional Named Insured Endorsements in the residual value insurance (RVI) policies; Financial Structures Limited (FSL)
The court held that the insurance contracts (IC Agreements) related to loans made to plaintiffs to finance their commercial real estate acquisitions did not violate the rule against clogging a borrower’s right of redemption. Further, a nonparty insurer’s (FSL) payments of the lender’s (PW) claims after plaintiffs’ default did not discharge their obligations under the loan documents. In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs appealed the grants of summary disposition to defendants. The cases arose from “the default of loans that resulted in the forfeiture of the underlying real properties.” As a precondition to obtaining the loans, PW had to receive RVI policies issued by FSL. As a condition for issuing the RVI policies, FSL required plaintiffs to enter into the IC Agreements. The court first rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that the trial courts erred in determining the IC Agreements did not violate the rule against clogging a borrower’s right of redemption that is inherent in every mortgage loan transaction. “FSL was not the mortgagee (or lender) and the IC Agreements were separate, distinct insurance contracts entered into days after plaintiff obtained loans secured by mortgages from” PW. The trial courts correctly held that “the ‘clogging’ doctrine only applies to contracts between a mortgagor and mortgagee. That is so because the equity of redemption is a characteristic of the mortgage.” The court noted that plaintiffs did not refer it “to case law from this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction that supports its apparent claim that a mortgagor does not enjoy the freedom to contract in any way it chooses with another business entity—including an insurer—where the mortgaged property is involved.” Plaintiffs also argued that FSL’s payment to PW “of the Insured Values of their respective properties after plaintiffs defaulted on their loans actually satisfied plaintiffs’ loans and plaintiffs were no longer liable for any outstanding balances” on them. But the court agreed with the trial courts that these arguments were “obviously not consistent with the plain and unambiguous language of the RVI Policies and Additional Named Insured Endorsements.” The policies did not state that FSL’s payment to PW “of the Insured Values of the properties would satisfy plaintiffs’ financial obligations under the loans.” Plaintiffs did not cite to any provisions supporting such an argument.
Sentencing under the Holmes Youth Trainee Act (HYTA); MCL 762.11(1), (2), & (3)(c)
Holding that defendant was ineligible for sentencing under HYTA, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The prosecution argued that he “did not qualify for HYTA status because of (a) his age at the time of the offense, (b) the date of his guilty plea, and (c) that his offense was a violation of the motor vehicle code.” The court concluded that based on the facts, MCL 762.11(1) did not apply to defendant. While he was 17 years of age when the offense occurred, he did “not meet the criteria of ‘[u]ntil [10/1/21] . . . if an individual pleads guilty to a criminal offense. . . .’” Defendant pled guilty on 12/14/21, “clearly two months after the date identified by the statutory provision.” As such, although he was 17 years old when the offense occurred on 9/29/20, “his age is only relevant to the date of the offense and not his eligibility for HYTA status, which is dependent upon when ‘an individual pleads guilty to a criminal offense[.]’” Similarly, he was “ineligible for HYTA status under MCL 762.11(2), which provides that ‘[b]eginning [10/1/21,’ ‘if an individual pleads guilty to a criminal offense, committed on or after the individual’s eighteenth birthday,’ sentencing under HYTA is permissible.” Unfortunately for him, while the date he pled guilty occurred after 10/1/21, “his age at the time of the offense precludes the application of MCL 762.11(2) because he did not commit the offense ‘on or after’ his ‘eighteenth birthday[.]’” Thus, at the time of sentencing, he lacked eligibility for HYTA status. “Regardless of the provisions of MCL 762.11(1) and (2) addressing the date of entry of a plea and the age of defendant at the time of the offense, defendant is also ineligible for youthful trainee status, as a matter of law, under the separate provision of MCL 762.11(3)(c).” The prosecutor argued on appeal that he was not eligible for HYTA status due to the offense to which he pled guilty, reckless driving causing serious impairment of a body function. The court noted that “this charge constitutes a ‘traffic offense,’ as defined by MCL 762.11(7)(b) . . . which is specifically excluded from HYTA eligibility by MCL 762.11(3)(c).” Thus, defendant “lacked eligibility under multiple provisions of MCL 762.11 for sentencing under HYTA.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; Carjacking; Intent to permanently deprive; Ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea-taking stage; Overestimating chances at trial; Failure to provide relevant discovery
Holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the bench trial verdict convicting defendant of carjacking and that he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed. It held that “gas station surveillance video and the victim’s testimony established that defendant initially approached the victim at the gas station just as the victim ‘unlocked [her] door and got ready to open it, [defendant] came up to [the victim] with the gun to [her] head and told [her], b***h, you know what it is, get in the car.’ The victim immediately panicked, and followed [his] commands to enter the car and ‘scoot over’ to the passenger seat, while [he] continued to point the gun at” her. He asked a friend who was present “to ‘get in the car,’ but the friend refused. Defendant continuously used the victim’s car, whether he was driving the vehicle himself or forcing [her] to drive the car on his behalf, to visit his sister’s residence, a local restaurant, the home of the victim’s ‘baby daddy,’ and the victim’s apartment.” He also obtained her driver’s license and cell phone, “and repeatedly threatened the victim by asserting ‘he’s got to get [her] baby daddy because [her] baby daddy supposedly took some money from him, and [she] had to help him, and if [she] didn’t help him he was going to kill [her].’” Further, Detective W “testified that defendant admitted, during their interview, that he had taken a photograph of the victim’s license for himself. As the trial court opined,” he kept control of the vehicle, the victim’s freedom, and the keys under the threat to her “of being shot or killed[.]” Regardless of whether he “predicated the return of the victim’s car on the repayment of the debt of her child’s father, or defendant intended to retain the vehicle without the purpose of returning it within a reasonable time, it is clear that [he] intended to permanently deprive the victim of her vehicle . . . .” The court noted that the only reason he “was unable to maintain possession over the victim’s car is because he was subsequently arrested at the victim’s apartment building after the local police department successfully contacted [her]. Whether the underlying offense was a completed larceny, or an attempted larceny, is irrelevant for purposes of the carjacking statute, and defendant’s conduct demonstrated that he intended to permanently deprive the victim of her vehicle, and potentially her life, and kept her hostage doing so. Moreover, the victim testified that [he] withheld her driver’s license, apartment keys, and car keys throughout the two-day incident, and” she did not try to escape because he continuously threatened her. The court concluded that in “light of the record, a rational trier of fact could have reasonably inferred and found that defendant had the intent to steal or permanently deprive the victim of her vehicle.”
Motion to vacate a conviction based on United States v Davis; 28 USC § 2255; Whether petitioner was entitled to move to vacate one conviction where he would not be released from custody due to his remaining life sentences; “In custody”; Effect of his “special assessment”; The “concurrent sentence doctrine”; Ray v United States
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss petitioner-Amaya’s § 2255 petition to vacate one of his convictions without reaching the merits where (1) his remaining life sentences meant he would not be released from custody and (2) Ray did not apply because the case did not come before the court on direct review. Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, which carried a mandatory life sentence, using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to life on each count, and received a special assessment totaling $300 for his convictions. He filed a pro se motion to vacate his firearm conviction under § 2255, arguing that under Davis, his murder-conspiracy conviction could no longer be considered a predicate violent crime for his firearm conviction. Without reaching the merits, the district court denied his motion under the concurrent sentence doctrine. On appeal, the court explained that § 2255 provides relief only to prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody. Amaya is serving three concurrent life sentences. The court reasoned that even if one of his convictions were vacated, “he would still be in prison for the rest of his life.” It rejected his argument that the $100 special assessment for each of his convictions constituted “a harm that makes his claim cognizable[,]” noting that fines do not create a sufficient “‘restraint on liberty’” and concluding that if “a fine is not ‘custody,’ then a petitioner seeking nothing more than relief from an obligation to pay a monetary assessment is not ‘claiming the right to be released’ from custody and is not entitled to relief under § 2255.” Amaya cited Ray, where the Supreme Court held that because a ruling in the petitioner’s favor would relieve a special assessment, his sentences were not actually “concurrent.” But the court held that Ray did not apply where this case did not come before the court on direct review. It explained that “Amaya has made no argument that vacating his conviction would affect his custody because his sole request for monetary relief does not suffice. So he has not shown the kind of prejudice that could state a claim under the plain terms of § 2255 (whether or not the concurrent sentence doctrine would otherwise apply).”
Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Whether the police officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized & eventually searched defendant after opening his car door without warning in the absence of any exigency; The “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement; Cady v Dombrowski; “Less intrusive” alternatives
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply where a police officer opened defendant-Morgan’s car door without warning without first trying less intrusive means to address any concerns the officer may have had about Morgan’s condition. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Morgan’s motion to suppress and vacated his convictions and sentences. The police found him seemingly passed out at the wheel with the motor running. “Without knocking on the car door, shining a flashlight into the car, or otherwise trying to arouse Morgan, the officer opened the car door and asked Morgan whether everything was okay. Morgan was groggy,” and an altercation took place when the officer asked for identification. Morgan was arrested, the vehicle was searched, and a firearm and drugs were found. He moved to have the firearm and drug evidence suppressed, but the district court denied the motion under the community caretaking exception. Morgan conditionally pled guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. He argued on appeal that his motion to suppress was improperly denied. The court held that the community caretaking exception did not apply under the circumstances. Even though the officer reasonably believed that “something was amiss,” and that a possibly intoxicated driver could be a danger to others on the road, the court held that he should have used available “less intrusive paths” to address his concerns. He could have tried “turning on the police car’s emergency lights; shining a flashlight into Morgan’s face; calling out to Morgan; or knocking on the window. In this caretaking setting, as in all of them, the intrusion must reasonably match the problem at hand.” The court rejected the officer’s argument that “he needed to open the car door suddenly because a startled and passed-out person might ‘hit the gas[,]’” where there was no empirical data or other evidence to support this supposition. Remanded.
Interest owed on a tax refund; MCL 205.30; Actions a taxpayer must take to trigger the accrual of interest on a refund; Ford Motor Co v Treasury Dep’t; Requirement that the claim or petition for a tax refund be made in writing; “Filed”; Unitary business group (UBG)
The court concluded that the memo on which plaintiff-taxpayer relied was not sufficiently “definite and specific to constitute an explicit demand or request for a tax refund without resorting to reliance on the implications of expressing disagreement with defendant’s treatment of this particular entity, which is not a proper manner of requesting a refund under” MCL 205.30. Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for defendant in this dispute over the amount of interest owed on a tax refund. In Ford, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the actions a taxpayer has to take under MCL 205.30 to trigger accrual of interest on a tax refund. Plaintiff contended the “Holdings Memo, along with the contemporaneous related oral communications with defendant,” satisfied the second and third requirements under Ford to trigger interest accrual (the first, payment of the tax, was not in dispute). But the memo did “not contain any request or demand for tax money to be refunded. The email is solely focused on arguing that U.S. Steel Holdings should be included in plaintiff’s UBG.” Plaintiff essentially asserted that when the memo was “considered in the context of other information allegedly known to defendant as a result of the audit and other contemporaneous communications between the parties, the Holdings Memo can only be understood as a request for a tax refund. Even accepting as true plaintiff’s contention that defendant was aware that plaintiff’s purpose in disputing the exclusion of the entity U.S. Steel Holdings from plaintiff’s UBG was to achieve a position from which plaintiff could seek a tax refund,” the Supreme Court rejected this type of argument in Ford. “The only evidence of a clear demand, request, or assertion of a right to a tax refund made to defendant” cited by plaintiff was evidence that its representative “orally requested a refund in her discussions with” defendant’s audit supervisor. But the statute requires “the claim or petition for a tax refund must be made in writing.” While plaintiff did not have “to use specific ‘magic words,’ such as ‘refund,’ ‘claim,’ or ‘petition’ for the” memo to be a proper claim or petition for a refund, the memo “did not contain any reference to alleged losses suffered by U.S. Steel Holdings during the relevant tax years or any assertion that including U.S. Steel Holdings in plaintiff’s UBG would create an overpayment” it could claim as a refund.
Child’s best interests; Placement with relatives
Holding that the trial court’s finding that the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests was not clearly erroneous, the court affirmed the trial court order terminating his parental rights to the child under MCL 712A.19b(f). The child “was only a few months old when she started living with the guardians. At the time of termination, the child had been in the care of the guardians for 75% of her life.” During that time, respondent “saw the child only a handful of times, and he admitted that the child would not recognize him because the child had not seen him since she was one year old. Accordingly, there is no indication in the record that [respondent] shared an appropriate parent-child bond with the child at the time of termination.” Further, the record supported the trial court’s finding that he “could not provide stability and permanency for the child in the future, because he had failed to do so during the proceedings.” The evidence showed that respondent “has been in and out of incarceration for most of his adult life.” Additionally, respondent “was homeless and agreed that the child should remain in the care of the child’s guardians because of his unstable living situation. [Respondent] adamantly acknowledged that the child was well taken care of and that the guardians were the perfect candidates to raise the child.” This evidence supported “the conclusion that the guardians have, and will continue to, provide stability and permanency for the child. As the trial court correctly pointed out, [respondent] had many opportunities to establish some sort of relationship with the child and had failed to do so; therefore, the evidence provided a strong inference that he would not now suddenly change his living situation that had been the same his entire adult life.” The court noted that at “the termination hearing, the trial court specifically addressed the lack of bond between the child and” respondent. In doing so, it reviewed his “incarceration history and domestic violence history, as well as his previous inability to care for the child. The court specifically recognized [her] excellent relationship with her guardians and that the child already had permanency and stability. In making this determination, the court appropriately reviewed the various considerations, including the child’s bond with [respondent], any domestic violence history, residential permanency, stability, and the advantages and opportunities for the child to thrive in the guardians’ home. The court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.”