Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Takings; Gym 24/7 Fitness, LLC v Michigan; Inverse condemnation; Hinojosa v Department of Natural Res; Const 1963, art 10, § 2; Public use; Police damage to property; Fugitive apprehension; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10)
The court held that plaintiff-landlord failed to establish a taking or inverse condemnation based on property damage caused during police efforts to remove and arrest his tenant. Plaintiff attempted to evict a tenant who became violent, and a bench warrant was issued. State police damaged the property while trying to apprehend him after he barricaded himself inside, brandished or threw weapons, and refused to surrender. The Court of Claims granted defendant summary disposition. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff could not establish a constitutional taking because defendant did not take the property “for a public use” or impose a regulation restricting its use. It also held that the inverse-condemnation claim failed because the police action was not “directly aimed” at plaintiff’s property. Rather, the officers’ actions were aimed at causing the tenant to surrender and neutralizing the threat he posed to police and other tenants. The court rejected plaintiff’s request to adopt a rule making the public responsible for police-caused property damage during fugitive apprehension, reasoning that extending the law on public-policy grounds was a matter for the Legislature. Affirmed.
Imposition of a lengthy term-of-years sentence on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder; People v Stovall; Miller v Alabama; “Cruel or unusual punishment”; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; People v Bullock; Retroactivity; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(2); Proportionality; People v Milbourn; People v Boykin
The court held that the term-of-years sentence imposed on defendant for second-degree murder committed when he was 16 (a minimum sentence of 50 years and a maximum of 75 years) was grossly disproportionate and violated Const 1963, art 1, § 16. The crimes giving rise to this case occurred in 1992. In 2021 defendant moved for relief from judgment, challenging his sentence as unconstitutional and disproportionate in light of Miller. The Court of Appeals ruled that he was entitled to resentencing. The court first found that defendant established “good cause” and that, as to actual prejudice, he could show his sentence was “‘invalid’ if it constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Michigan’s Constitution.” The court applied the Bullock factors, and found Stovall’s analysis of those “factors highly instructive.” The court determined that every Bullock factor supported “the conclusion that a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender is unconstitutionally excessive. Like a parolable life sentence,” such a sentence “exceeds what is presumptively imposed on a youthful offender for” first-degree murder, without the procedural protections. “Such a sentence means that the initial review by the parole board does not occur until after a defendant has served 50 years in prison, after which an individual’s opportunity for release is contingent on the parole board’s discretion for the” rest of their life. It was also “out of step with national trends regarding youth sentencing and with the types of sentences other jurisdictions typically impose on anyone convicted of second-degree murder, and it does not meaningfully advance the penological goal of rehabilitation.” The court further determined that its holding here, like Stovall, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Thus, defendant was entitled to relief. It affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the extent it reversed the trial court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment, vacated his second-degree murder sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The court vacated “Part III of the Court of Appeals opinion to the extent it addresses whether [he] was procedurally barred by MCR 6.508(D)(2) from raising challenges to his sentence under Milbourn and Boykin, and” Part VI, which addressed whether he was entitled to resentencing in light of those decisions. Dissenting, Justice Zahra described the holding here as “the latest volley in this Court’s continued full-scale assault on juvenile and young-adult sentencing.” He found that defendant’s case was procedurally barred, and so was “the claim the majority superimposes on [his] motion for relief from judgment. On the merits, [his] contention that his term-of-years sentence is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual fails.”
Invalid waiver of the right to counsel; People v Anderson; Forfeiture by conduct; People v Kammeraad; Violations of MCR 6.005(D); People v King; Critical stages; Motion to suppress hearing; Van v Jones (6th Cir); Henderson v Frank (3d Cir); United States v Hamilton (9th Cir)
The court held that the motion to suppress hearing in defendant-Haupt’s case was a critical stage and thus, his deprivation of counsel due to an invalid waiver was a structural error subject to automatic reversal. He was convicted of multiple crimes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding in Haupt I that his “waiver was invalid because the trial court did not comply with MCR 6.005(D) but that the error did not warrant reversal.” The court later held in King that MCR 6.005(D) violations “are subject to automatic reversal when the result is deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding and that the forfeiture doctrine does not apply to such errors.” On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals in Haupt III “held that the pretrial periods during which defendant lacked counsel were not critical stages of the proceedings.” On appeal, the court first agreed “with the Haupt I panel that the trial court failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D).” Next, assuming “without deciding that the forfeiture-by-conduct doctrine exists in Michigan,” it noted the contrasts between this case and Kammeraad, and concluded that “defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel by his conduct.” Turning to the critical stage issue, the court disagreed with the Haupt III panel that the 2019 motion to suppress hearing did not constitute a critical stage. It noted that whether “witnesses were called is but one factor that trial courts may consider when determining whether a stage is critical to a defendant’s criminal proceedings.” And in this case, defendant “was wholly deprived of the right to counsel to argue the admissibility of evidence that would speak directly to his ultimate guilt or innocence at trial.” The court also determined that, while his trial counsel later moved to suppress evidence on different grounds, “defendant could not wholly recover the privilege he lost during the hearing.” In the earlier motion, defendant sought “to suppress different evidence.” The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, vacated defendant’s convictions and sentences, and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.Concurring, Justice Hood joined the majority in full but wrote separately because he would go further and “conclude that the six weeks immediately preceding” defendant’s trial constituted its own critical stage.Also concurring, Justice Zahra (joined by Justice Bernstein) agreed with the majority that the 2019 motion to suppress hearing constituted a critical stage, and that defendant was deprived of counsel during a critical stage, entitling him to a new trial. He wrote separately to make clear that his agreement was “grounded in the facts of this case.” He noted that it did “not follow that all motions to suppress constitute critical stages.”
Diminished capacity; People v Carpenter; Legal insanity; MCL 768.21a; Guilty but mentally ill (GBMI); MCL 768.36; Specific intent; Mens rea; Mental illness; Intellectual disability; Evidentiary rules; MRE 401; MRE 403; MRE 702; Notice of expert defense; MCL 767.94a; MCR 6.201(B); Stare decisis; Retroactivity; People v Robinson
The court held that MCL 768.21a does not bar a defendant from presenting diminished-capacity evidence to contest the specific-intent element of a charged offense and overruled Carpenter. Defendant, charged with open murder, AWIM, and felony-firearm for allegedly shooting two companions, sought to present expert evidence that mental illness and intellectual disability negated specific intent. The trial court denied the motion under Carpenter. On appeal, the court held that Carpenter was wrongly decided because it treated the legal-insanity statute as foreclosing evidence that does not assert insanity but instead challenges mens rea. The court reasoned that the statute “on its face addresses only the affirmative defense available to a legally insane defendant,” and “simply does not state or imply anything about the availability of diminished-capacity evidence to negate a specific element of a crime.” It emphasized that insanity is an affirmative defense that “admits guilt but seeks to excuse it,” while diminished-capacity evidence “challenges the prosecution’s case” by disputing whether defendant had the required mens rea. The court also held that the GBMI statute did not support Carpenter because it applies “only to a defendant asserting an insanity defense,” and allowing diminished-capacity evidence does not render the statutory scheme superfluous. Turning to stare decisis, the court held that Carpenter should be overruled because its flawed statutory analysis displaced a common-law defense without clear legislative abrogation. It reasoned that reliance interests did not justify retaining Carpenter because prosecutors still must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, evidentiary rules will govern admissibility, and defendants have long argued that Carpenter impeded their ability to present a defense. The court acknowledged operational burdens but concluded that convenience is “a poor reason to continue to prohibit” a defense rooted in common law. Finally, the court found that Carpenter’s all-or-nothing rule was increasingly out of step with modern understanding of mental illness and intellectual disability, and that successful use of diminished capacity will not free defendants from liability because the state may still prove a general-intent offense. Vacated and remanded.Chief Justice Cavanagh concurred, joined by Justice Welch. She emphasized that today’s decision “should not be interpreted as a free-for-all” for mental-illness or intellectual-disability evidence. Trial courts must still apply MRE 401, 403, and 702, and expert-defense notice requirements remain relevant under MCL 767.94a and the newly adopted MCR 6.201(B).Justice Welch also concurred. She wrote separately to highlight retroactivity principles, noting that today’s decision will likely prompt postconviction motions. She emphasized that courts should look to Robinson and related cases, and that Michigan’s retroactivity framework permits courts to consider “the practical challenges placed upon the criminal justice system.”Justice Hood also concurred. He agreed Carpenter was wrongly decided and should be overruled, but wrote separately to identify “logistical, operational, and funding challenges” the decision will create. He was especially concerned that diminished-capacity evaluations could strain existing mental-health infrastructure, slow criminal cases, affect speedy-trial interests, and generate “a wave of postconviction motions and appeals.”Justice Zahra dissented. He would have retained Carpenter, reasoning that it correctly interpreted MCL 768.21a as part of a statutory scheme governing mental illness and criminal responsibility. He argued the majority’s diminished-capacity rule undermines legislative choices, creates “new and thorny questions,” and disregards stare decisis where Carpenter had been applied for nearly 25 years.
Fourth Amendment; Warrantless arrest; Continued detention; Prompt judicial probable-cause determination; Riverside Cnty v McLaughlin; Unconstitutional seizure; Exclusionary rule; Attenuation doctrine; Brown v Illinois; Miranda warnings; Voluntariness; People v Cipriano; People v Stewart; People v Manning
The court held that statements made while a defendant is detained in violation of McLaughlin must be excluded unless the prosecution proves they were sufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional detention. Defendant was arrested without a warrant after his infant daughter was hospitalized, remained detained for at least 64 hours without a judicial probable-cause determination, and made inculpatory statements after police confronted him with autopsy results. He was convicted but later granted a new trial. The trial court ruled the statements admissible, concluding they were voluntary under Cipriano. On appeal, the court first held that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was detained “for more than 48 hours following a warrantless arrest” without a probable-cause determination, and the prosecution conceded the delay was unjustified. The court next held that voluntariness alone is not the proper suppression standard. It reasoned that a McLaughlin violation makes the continued detention unlawful, and statements made during that detention are subject to exclusion unless they are “sufficiently attenuated from the taint” of the Fourth Amendment violation. The relevant factors include Miranda warnings, temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and “the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct.” The court explained that exclusion would “appreciably deter police misconduct” because McLaughlin’s 48-hour rule is “clear, simple, and easy to apply,” and police can generally avoid violations by promptly presenting an arrestee to a magistrate. The court rejected the prosecution’s reliance on Cipriano, reasoning that voluntariness protects Fifth Amendment interests, while the Fourth Amendment asks whether police exploited an unlawful seizure. Thus, “a finding of voluntariness” is only a threshold condition and does not establish attenuation. The court overruled Manning to the extent it held that a McLaughlin violation is only one factor in the Cipriano voluntariness inquiry, explaining that Manning “erred in concluding” that voluntariness sufficiently protected Fourth Amendment interests. Because the trial court did not apply the attenuation standard, the court vacated the order admitting defendant’s statements and remanded. Justice Zahra dissented. He would have retained Manning and held that Cipriano’s voluntariness inquiry adequately protects defendants because it already considers “the length of detention” and “unnecessary delays” in bringing a suspect before a magistrate. He reasoned that exclusion should remain a “last resort,” that civil remedies and voluntariness review provide sufficient deterrence, and that suppressing voluntary statements would impose high costs on the “truth-finding functions” of criminal trials.
Warrantless DNA testing; Search; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; Fourth Amendment; Trespass approach; Inventory-search exception; Search-incident-to-arrest exception; People v Trudeau; People v Carr; United States v Edwards; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to file a motion to suppress
The court held that warrantless DNA testing of defendant’s pants violated Const 1963, art 1, § 11, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the DNA evidence. Defendant was arrested on an unrelated misdemeanor warrant during a murder investigation, and while he remained in jail, police took his pants from the jail property room and later submitted them for DNA testing without a warrant or his consent. The test found a small blood stain consistent with the victim’s DNA. The evidence was admitted at defendant’s second trial, where he was convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal, the court first held that DNA testing was a search under the trespass approach because “a search occurs when the government ‘occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,’” and defendant’s pants were constitutionally protected effects. The court next held that the search was unreasonable because no warrant exception applied. The inventory-search exception did not apply because “DNA testing is not part of established inventory procedure,” and the later forensic testing did not serve the administrative purposes of protecting property, preventing claims, or ensuring jail safety. The search-incident-to-arrest exception also did not apply because defendant was arrested on an unrelated misdemeanor, and under Carr and Trudeau, that exception permits a search for evidence “‘to prove the charge on which the prisoner has been arrested,’” not evidence of a different crime. The court then held that counsel performed deficiently by failing to seek suppression because existing caselaw supported the motion, and it was unreasonable to choose only to explain the blood evidence to the jury when counsel could have first tried to exclude it and used the same theory if suppression failed. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because, without the DNA evidence, there was “almost nothing tying defendant to the victim’s murder,” and the DNA was “the only physical evidence that connected defendant to the scene of the crime.” Reversed and remanded.Justice Zahra dissented. He would have held that no search occurred because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in pants lawfully held by police after booking, and there was no trespass where police “initially received possession lawfully.” He also would have held that counsel was not ineffective because any suppression motion would have been futile.
Sentencing credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Idziak; People v Prieskorn; People v Adkins; People v Givans; People v Allen; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to promptly move to revoke defendant’s bond; Prejudice; Whether the trial court had discretion to award defendant additional jail credit; People v Lewis (Unpub); Court costs & attorney fees; MCL 769.1k; People v Konopka (On Remand)
[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 6/22/26.] The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding defendant only 57 days of sentencing credit. But it did err in failing to provide a factual basis for the court costs and attorney fees it imposed, and in not articulating a determination as to his “ability to pay his attorney fees and any attendant late penalty.” As to sentence credit, the parties disagreed “on the meaning of MCL 769.11b.” The court agreed with the prosecution. “MCL 769.11b uses the term ‘because of’ to connect the words ‘has served any time in jail prior to sentencing’ and the words ‘being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted.’ Thus, to be entitled to jail credit, it is not sufficient that the defendant has served time in jail and was denied/unable to furnish bond for the offense at hand. Rather, the time in jail must be served ‘because of’ the fact that the defendant was denied/unable to furnish bond for the offense at hand. Once a defendant has started serving a sentence on a different case, the serving of that sentence becomes the reason that he is being incarcerated. His bond status on the subsequent case becomes irrelevant—regardless of whether the trial court properly updated paperwork to indicate that bond no longer is an option, and regardless of whether the defendant has the financial means to post a hypothetical bond for release, as the defendant then is actively serving time on a sentence in an unrelated case.” As a result, “pursuant to MCL 769.11b, defendant only was entitled to 57 days of jail credit, representing the time between his” 8/9/22 arrest in this case, and his 10/4/22 “sentencing in the separate probation-violation case.” As to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to timely seek revocation of his bond in this case, the court agreed with the trial court that he could not establish prejudice. Revoking his bond “would not have satisfied the second statutory requirement” for MCL 769.11b to apply. As to his arguments related to costs, the court concluded “the trial court did not err by failing to waive court costs.” But it erred in other respects. On remand, it “should articulate a factual basis for both the court costs and the attorney fees[,]” and also adjudicate his “‘claim that his individual circumstances rebut § 1l’s presumption of nonindigency’” as to his remittance payments for his attorney fees. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to call character witnesses; MRE 405(a); Applicability of MRE 405(b) in a CSC case; Matters of trial strategy; Failure to pursue a fabrication defense; Adequate investigation; Failure to present defendant’s complete police interview video; MRE 106; People v McReavy
The court rejected defendant’s claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) call character witnesses, (2) pursue a fabrication theory, and (3) present defendant’s complete police interview video. He was convicted of CSC I and II against two children. He argued that defense counsel should have presented character evidence “in the form of opinion and reputation that defendant was not sexually interested in children.” As to MRE 405(a), the “testimony at the posttrial hearing indicated that none of [his] proposed character witnesses could competently attest to defendant’s good sexual morals or reputation in the community.” They all testified that he “did not have a reputation for having a sexual interest in children, but each also acknowledged not having spoken to [him] or anyone in his community about his sexual morals or preferences. Trial counsel testified that he doubted that” they could properly testify about “defendant’s reputation for good sexual morals, and the trial court concluded that trial counsel would not have been able to lay a proper foundation for such testimony. Defendant’s proposed witnesses did not have sufficient knowledge of [his] propensity, or lack thereof, to engage in sexual acts with children to properly offer such opinion or reputation testimony at trial.” In addition, such “testimony would have been inadmissible under MRE 405(b) because [his] character for not acting inappropriately around, or demonstrating a sexual interest in, children was not an essential element” of the offense. He next asserted defense counsel was ineffective for not pursuing the theory that the victims and his sister-in-law fabricated the allegations “as revenge against his mother[.]” But the record indicated “that, at the time of trial, counsel was not aware of specific threats against defendant and otherwise lacked strong evidence to support the fabrication theory.” As to the video, defense “counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing that he did not ask for the entire video to be played because the unplayed segments would have added or highlighted information damaging to the defense.” Defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that the “decision to prevent this potentially harmful or prejudicial information from being presented to the jury was sound trial strategy.” Affirmed.
Providing material support for an act of terrorism; MCL 750.543k(1)(b); Act of terrorism; MCL 750.543b(a); Violent felony; MCL 750.543b(h); Kidnapping; MCL 750.349; Jury instructions; Invalid theory; People v Morrison; Double jeopardy; Gang-membership felony; MCL 750.411u; Felony-firearm
The court held that, under the published decision in Morrison, defendants’ convictions had to be vacated because the jury was improperly instructed that kidnapping could serve as the underlying act of terrorism. Defendants-Musico and Bellar were tried with Morrison for alleged roles connected to the plot to kidnap Governor Whitmer. The jury convicted them of providing material support for an act of terrorism, gang-membership felony, and felony-firearm. On appeal, the court exercised its discretion to consider Morrison’s effect even though the issue was not raised in the original appellate briefs. It held that Morrison controlled because kidnapping is not a “violent felony” under MCL 750.543b(h), where the Legislature removed force as an element of kidnapping and the statutory definition of violent felony requires the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” The court reasoned the same instructional error tainted the verdicts here because the jury was expressly allowed to treat kidnapping as a valid predicate, and the verdict form did not reveal whether the jury relied on that invalid theory. It declined Musico’s request to vacate on sufficiency grounds, reasoning that Morrison required reversal for instructional error unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, so retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. Vacated and remanded.
Habeas corpus; 28 USC § 2254; AEDPA statute of limitations; 28 USC § 2244(d); Equitable tolling; Holland v Florida; Menominee Indian Tribe v United States; Attorney illness; “Extraordinary circumstance”; Maples v Thomas; Nassiri v Mackie; Causation; But-for causation; Evidentiary hearing
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations because he failed to show that counsel’s personal difficulties caused the late filing. Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition after the July 2024 deadline. The district court dismissed it as untimely while granting a certificate of appealability on whether counsel’s health circumstances could support tolling. On appeal, the court assumed without deciding that counsel’s illness and his child’s medical issues could qualify as extraordinary circumstances, but held that petitioner still had to establish “a causal link between” those circumstances and the late filing. The court found no error in the district court’s causation finding because counsel accepted new criminal cases, appeared in court, filed motions, and practiced law during the relevant period. If counsel’s “personal difficulties did not bar him from taking on new clients,” they did not bar timely filing. It also reasoned that counsel’s difficulties ended weeks before the deadline and the petition largely copied a previously filed state-court motion, so counsel could have filed at least a “simple ‘protective’ petition.” Finally, the court held that no evidentiary hearing was required because petitioner did not request one and identified no factual questions that would make a hearing necessary. Affirmed.
Child custody; Sole legal custody; Sole physical custody; Best interests; MCL 722.23(d), (f), (g), (j), & (k); Friend of the Court (FOC) psychological report; Hearsay waiver; MRE 1101; Due process; Domestic violence evidence; Personal protection order; Clear & convincing evidence
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiff-father sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children. After the parties’ reconciliation ended, defendant-mother was arrested for domestic violence, parenting time became supervised, and the trial court later relied in part on an FOC psychologist’s report and testimony after a multi-day custody hearing. On appeal, the court first held that the mother waived any hearsay objection to the report because the appointment order provided that the parties waived hearsay objections, she submitted to the evaluation, and she did not object when the report was admitted. It rejected her claim that the trial court adopted the report wholesale, reasoning that the trial court made numerous independent findings in its 37-page opinion and was permitted to give the report “great weight.” The court also held that the trial court could consider evidence of the mother’s aggressive behavior despite her acquittal of domestic violence because custody proceedings serve the children’s best interests and apply different standards than criminal cases. Finally, the court held that the findings on factors (d), (f), (g), (j), and (k) were not against the great weight of the evidence, given the children’s stable home with the father, the evidence indicating “that defendant had mental health issues she needed to address,” her denigration of him, and domestic-violence-related evidence. Affirmed.
Divorce judgment; Enforcement of judgment; Relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C); Life insurance policies; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5809(3); Waiver; Divorce court jurisdiction; Third-party beneficiaries; Property settlement; Estes v Titus; Reed v Reed; Kasper v Metropolitan Life Ins Co
The court held that defendant-ex-husband waived his statute-of-limitations defense to plaintiff-ex-wife’s request to enforce the divorce judgment, but that the trial court exceeded its authority by awarding the parties’ children ownership of life insurance policies. The divorce judgment awarded the parties joint ownership of State Farm life insurance policies on the lives of their children, but plaintiff later moved to enforce or clarify the judgment after defendant allegedly failed to make her a joint owner. On appeal, the court held that the enforcement request was governed by MCL 600.5809(3)’s 10-year limitation period, but defendant waived that defense by failing to raise it in his first responsive pleading. The court next held that defendant did not comply with the judgment because making plaintiff a successor owner “gave plaintiff no rights of ownership unless something happened to defendant.” But it also held that the trial court lacked authority to order the policies transferred to the children because a divorce court may adjudicate only the rights of the spouses and “lacks the authority to compel a party to convey property” to third parties absent an incorporated agreement requiring that result. Because the record did not show such an agreement, the court vacated the order awarding the policies to the children and remanded.
Dismissal for violation of MCR 1.109(D)(2); Vicencio v Ramirez; Dean v Tucker; Actual prejudice factor; Whether claims were improperly joined; Applicability of MCR 2.207; MCR 2.203(A)
Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s action for alleged violations of MCR 1.109(D)(2) and improper joinder of claims, the court vacated and remanded. Plaintiff sought payment for medical services provided to three individuals (A, S, and N) for injuries they received in unrelated car accidents. The complaint included a statement that plaintiff was not aware of any civil action between the parties arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. But S had sued defendant for personal injury protection benefits three days earlier, and the day after plaintiff filed suit, A did the same. The court noted the trial court did not conduct a hearing before dismissing plaintiff’s case, or “explain in its order why dismissal was warranted under the circumstances. By failing to evaluate other available options on the record before dismissing” the case, it abused its discretion. The court also concluded “plaintiff’s conduct is not the sort of conduct that typically warrants dismissal.” The record did not show that its violation of MCR 1.109(D)(2) “was either ‘flagrant’ or” wanton. Further, the failure to disclose the two cases when filing its complaint constituted a single violation, and the second of the two cases was not filed until after plaintiff filed its suit. The court also noted that actual prejudice to defendant is a factor to be considered under Dean, and defendant did “not appear to have been prejudiced by plaintiff’s failure to comply with MCR 1.109(D)(2).” As to the improper joinder basis, “MCR 2.207 does not obligate parties to do anything” and it relates “to the misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, not claims.” Rather, MCR 2.203(A) governs the joinder of claims. In “joining its three claims against defendant for an alleged failure to fully reimburse plaintiff, [plaintiff] appears to have complied with MCR 2.203(A). But, even if [its] claims were somehow improperly joined, the appropriate remedy is not to dismiss the misjoined claims, but rather to sever them and conduct separate trials.”
Negligence action arising from operation of a forklift; Causation; Ray v Swager; A proximate cause; Patrick v Turkelson; Comparative fault
The court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to defendant-Meijer’s “negligence, both the cause in fact and the legal cause of” plaintiff-Le’s injuries, and his comparative negligence, if any. Thus, it reversed summary disposition for Meijer and remanded. Le, who was employed by nonparty-FHI, was injured while operating a standup forklift at a Meijer’s distribution center. He argued the trial court erred in determining that his conduct was the sole cause of his injuries. The court agreed. It found that, based on “the record evidence, reasonable minds could conclude that the multitask handle and/or the service brake did not operate as they were supposed to and/or the stopping distance was not appropriately adjusted within the required parameters. A jury could also reasonably conclude that Le did not attempt plugging two to three times at least 15 feet from the desk and then removed his foot from the brake pedal as he testified, or that Le was attempting to jump off the forklift contrary to his testimony. Thus, reasonable minds could differ as to the cause of the accident.” The court noted that it “may not assess credibility or resolve factual disputes in analyzing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Le as the nonmoving party,” a genuine issue of material fact existed “whether the forklift was properly maintained, calibrated, and working as it should at the time of the incident.” The court next considered if there was “a material factual dispute whether defendant’s negligence was a cause in fact of” Le’s injuries. He testified that during the year plus he had worked for FHI, “he never experienced an issue with braking systems on any of the forklifts.” But he asserted “the braking system did not respond on the date of the incident and because the forklift did not stop, his leg was crushed. Le presented evidence demonstrating a logical sequence of cause and effect sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding cause in fact. A jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the forklift did not operate as it was supposed to and more likely than not, but for [it] malfunctioning, it would not have collided with the desk and Le would not have been injured.” The court also found a “jury could reasonably conclude that Meijer’s failure to maintain the forklift in a workable condition is a legal cause of Le’s injuries.”