Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Nuisance abatement action to enjoin a piggery; Zoning; Right to Farm Act (RTFA); Retroactivity; Travis v Preston (On Rehearing); Laches; Equitable estoppel; Generally accepted agricultural & management practices (GAAMPs)
[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 7/9/25.] The court held that “the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the RTFA defense was unavailable on nonretroactivity grounds, and did not make the additional factual findings necessary under the RTFA to enable further appellate review.” But it did not err in ruling that laches and equitable estoppel did not bar the action. This was a nuisance abatement action to enjoin a piggery owned by defendant-Haney, on real property within the boundaries of plaintiff-Township, under its zoning ordinance. The court noted that all “the relevant events in Travis occurred before the effective date of the 2000 amendment to the RTFA. In this case, plaintiff’s zoning ordinance has not changed since the 1970s, so under Travis the 2000 amendment to the RTFA did not retroactively invalidate that ordinance as applied to pre-2000 activity. But defendant began his pig farming operation after 2000, and plaintiff seeks only injunctive—not retrospective—relief. MCL 286.474(6), by providing that ‘a local unit of government shall not enact, maintain, or enforce an ordinance, regulation, or resolution that conflicts in any manner with this act or [GAAMPs]’ . . . prohibits prospective enforcement of a zoning ordinance that is contrary to the RTFA and GAAMPs, even if the enactment of the ordinance itself predated the 2000 amendment to the RTFA. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that defendant’s MCL 286.474(6) defense to plaintiff’s nuisance abatement action was barred under Travis.” Given that the “zoning ordinance must yield to the RTFA and GAAMPs,” the court turned to whether defendant “raised a meritorious RTFA defense.” It found “no error, much less clear error, in classifying defendant’s activities as a farm operation. [He] testified that he initially raised elk and deer, and later approximately 50 pigs, for profit. He also testified that he would sell variable amounts of pigs for hunting at $400 to $450 apiece and would sell approximately twenty pigs per year at auction where they would fetch $150 to $250 each.” The court found that he “met his burden to show that he was engaged in the ‘commercial production of a farm product,’ because he cultivated animals that were ‘intended to be marketed and sold at a profit.’” But because the trial court found “that the RTFA did not apply, it did not make any factual findings or a legal determination regarding the second element of the RTFA defense: whether defendant’s farm operation conformed to ‘all applicable GAAMPs.’” The court concluded that this “failure to make factual findings regarding defendant’s compliance with applicable GAAMPs inhibits appellate review of this issue, and requires a remand for the trial court to make such findings in the first instance.” It vacated the judgment for plaintiff and remanded.
Entrapment; People v. Johnson; People v Juillet; Confidential informant (CI)
In an interlocutory appeal, the court held that “the trial court did not clearly err when it found defendant was entrapped.” Thus, it affirmed the order granting his motion for a finding of entrapment. The charges stemmed from his trip to deliver meth, “preceded by his text-message communications with a [CI] for the sale of the drugs. As part of their communication leading up to the sale, the CI offered defendant sexual favors in exchange for the" meth. The court noted that in the first of the two forms of entrapment—impermissible inducement—courts consider 12 factors set forth in Johnson, although this list is not exclusive. “When an informant is involved, the inquiry is whether ‘a normally law-abiding person in [defendant’s] circumstances would be induced into committing the crime charged because of the actions of the police through their paid informant.’” The CI in this case “was not paid, but participated in the investigation for the possibility of lenient treatment for criminal charges she was facing. The CI, who was acting under the supervision and encouragement of [a deputy] throughout the entire text-message exchange with defendant, was properly treated as a government agent for the purpose of determining the existence of entrapment.” The trial court made findings for each of the 12 Johnson factors, determining “that factors 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 did not favor defendant or” did not apply, and “that factors, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 12 weighed in” his favor. While the court concluded that factors 5 and 7 did not apply or did not weigh in favor of a finding of entrapment, it was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made” in the trial court’s overall finding of entrapment. “The investigation in this case was specifically and solely targeted at defendant. [He] and the CI had a preexisting relationship as drug dealer and buyer. This relationship was not sexual in nature, but the CI knew that defendant was interested in a sexual relationship with her. When the CI’s attempt to solicit a drug sale from [him] by offering to pay a debt she owed him and by offering additional money did not succeed, the CI, under the direct supervision of a police officer, then leveraged defendant’s preexisting sexual interest in her to entice him to sell her drugs. Thereafter, the conversation between defendant and the CI shifted primarily to his desire to have sex with her.”
Jury selection; Challenges for cause; MCR 2.511(E)(10); Reaffirming People v Eccles; Juror criteria; MCL 600.1307a(1); Bias; Effect of a prospective juror’s involvement in litigation with a party in the present proceeding; Effect of a prospective juror’s being accused of a criminal offense; People v Raisanen; Peremptory challenges; Waiver; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Sentencing; Habitual offender enhancement; People v Bonilla-Machado
Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction of delivery of meth and sentence of 36 months to 30 years. His conviction arose out of his sale of meth to an undercover officer and an informant. The court rejected his argument that the trial court erred when it granted the prosecution’s challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. “Defense counsel, who had notice of the prosecution’s intent to challenge these jurors” based on MCR 2.511(E)(10), “waived the issue at trial by affirmatively stating that she had no objection to the excusal of these jurors.” The court also reaffirmed Eccles, noting it “was well-reasoned and conforms to the plain language of the court rule.” Because the “court rule does not implicate the general qualifications to serve on a jury, it does not conflict with MCL 600.1307a(1).” And contrary to defendant’s assertion, a “prospective juror must have been ‘accused by’ the same prosecutor’s office involved in the present case” to be challenged for cause under this rule. Further, “the Eccles Court’s construction of MCR 2.511(E)(10)” was not “ambiguous in a manner that improperly modifie[d] the common law of this state.” Moreover, defendant did not establish “the Eccles decision violates” due process. “From this record, we can conclude that both Jurors 25 and 32 were accused of crimes by the” prosecutor’s office involved in this case. “After the prosecution challenged these jurors for cause, the trial court was required to exclude them. Because the trial court, which was bound to apply Eccles,” properly excluded the two jurors, there was no error. In any event, “[h]ad Jurors 25 and 32 not been excused for cause, the prosecution was not prevented from validly excluding them using peremptory challenges.” Defendant also could not “show that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that his maximum sentence was invalid because the trial court failed to articulate on the record that it had discretion when imposing the enhancement. “Because the trial court was not required to articulate on the record that it had discretion to impose a lower maximum sentence and defendant points to no other evidence that [it] did not recognize its discretion, defendant has not overcome the presumption that the trial court knows the law.”
Child custody; Change of a child’s residence more than 100 miles from the child’s legal residence; Change-of-residence factors; MCL 722.31(4); Distinguishing Brausch v Brausch; Motion to modify custody; Proper cause or a change of circumstances; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Lieberman v Orr; The statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Great weight of the evidence
The court held that there was “no basis for reversal” in this case involving the parties’ child custody arrangement. The trial court modified the arrangement so that the children would attend school where plaintiff-father lives and not where defendant-mother lives. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s arguments that the trial court: (1) improperly analyzed some of the change-of-residence factors, (2) “improperly looked to circumstances that occurred after the original custody and parenting-time order, but before the modification to the order that preceded the order on appeal, in concluding that the existing” arrangement should be revisited, and (3) made findings under the statutory best-interest factors that were against the great weight of the evidence. First, “MCL 722.31 was inapplicable to plaintiff’s motion because, despite the manner in which it was titled, plaintiff sought to modify custody without also seeking to change the children’s residences.” Next, given “defendant’s own pleadings, the trial court did not err in holding that the custody arrangement should be revisited because there was evidence that adequately supported proper cause or a change in circumstances.” Finally, the trial court’s findings as to the best-interest factors were not against the great weight of the evidence, and defendant’s arguments regarding its findings were “not persuasive.” Affirmed.
Opting out of PIP medical benefits coverage; MCL 500.3107d; Whether an insurance applicant can waive his or her spouse’s or resident relative’s coverage without their consent; A “qualified person” (MCL 500.3107d(7)(c)); MCL 500.3107d(3)(g)
The court agreed with defendant-Progressive that MCL 500.3107d only required the applicant or named insured decline PIP medical benefit coverage. Thus, it held that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff-Estrada’s wife (Esther) could not waive his “PIP medical benefits coverage without his consent[.]” Esther applied for and obtained an auto insurance policy with defendant. The policy identified her “as the ‘named insured,’ and Estrada as a resident relative.” She completed a form expressly opting “out of PIP medical benefits coverage.” Estrada was later injured in an auto accident. Defendant denied his request for PIP medical benefits. Estrada and one of his healthcare providers filed this suit. The trial court denied defendant’s summary disposition motion and granted plaintiffs’ motion. The court concluded that “Esther, as an applicant and named insured, complied with the requirements of MCL 500.3107d by endorsing a provision on Progressive’s form that indicated she opted out of her PIP benefits coverage in exchange for a lower insurance premium. By electing to opt out of these benefits, [she] endorsed that she and Estrada had qualified health coverage, and that she was aware this selection would apply to anyone covered by the policy. Thus, pursuant to the plain language of MCL 500.3107d(5), Estrada—as Esther’s spouse and resident relative—did not have PIP benefits coverage through the Progressive policy.” Plaintiffs argued on appeal “that MCL 500.3107d(3)(g) required Progressive to also provide Estrada with the means to opt out of PIP medical coverage because he was a ‘qualified person’ under the policy.” But the court determined that this was “not dispositive. Esther was an applicant and named insured on the policy with Progressive, and had qualified health coverage. Thus, she was a ‘qualified person’ under MCL 500.3107(d)(7)(c), and the form had to provide her with a way to opt out of PIP coverage, which it did. MCL 500.3107d(5) expressly provides that Esther’s election applied to Estrada as her spouse. Requiring Progressive to also provide Estrada with a way to opt out of PIP coverage would essentially render MCL 500.3107(d)(5) meaningless.” Esther validly opted out on behalf of both of them. The court reversed the orders denying defendant’s motion and granting plaintiffs’ motion, vacated “the trial court’s monetary awards to plaintiffs,” and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant summary disposition.
Action for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the No-Fault Act; Motion to quash subpoenas; Independent medical examination (IME); MCL 500.3151; Expert witnesses; Credibility; Potential bias; MCL 500.3151(2)(b); Scope of discovery of the financial interests of expert witnesses retained in no-fault matters to perform IMEs on behalf of an insurer; MCR 2.302(B)(4); MCR 2.305(A)(1) & (2); MCR 2.305(A)(4)(a); Micheli v Michigan Auto Ins Placement Facility; Discovery of tax returns; Fassihi v St Mary Hosp of Livonia; Two-year limitation
The court held that while the trial court properly allowed discovery of appellants-expert medical witnesses’ financial records, it erred by granting plaintiff access to their “personal and business tax returns because the relevant information was otherwise discoverable by reviewing appellants’ Forms W-2 and Forms 1099.” It also held that “the trial court erred by ordering appellants to produce four years of records when, at most, plaintiff should receive records for two years preceding the date of each IME performed.” Plaintiff sued defendants for PIP benefits based on injuries she allegedly sustained in two separate motor-vehicle collisions. Defendants named appellants as expert witnesses and retained them to perform IMEs of plaintiff. Plaintiff served subpoenas on appellants, requesting that they produce personal tax information. They moved to quash the subpoenas. The trial court denied their motion, finding the information was “relevant to discovering potential bias and their ability to testify as expert,” but allowing them to redact certain information. On appeal, the court rejected appellants’ argument that plaintiff should not be permitted to discover their financial records to learn their gross incomes because such information is only minimally relevant to the issue of bias. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing plaintiff to discover appellants’ gross incomes in order to explore their credibility and potential bias. Information about appellants’ gross incomes is also relevant to discovering whether they were qualified to perform IMEs under MCL 500.3151(2)(b).” But the court agreed with appellants that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing discovery of their tax returns, noting there were “alternative means to obtain the relevant information without jeopardizing the privacy of appellants and their families.” Plaintiff conceded “that appellants’ W-2s and 1099s” were sufficient. Finally, the court agreed with appellants that the trial court should have limited the scope of plaintiff’s discovery. While she showed “entitlement to appellants’ W-2s and 1099s to discover possible bias and address whether appellants are qualified to testify under MCL 500.3151(2)(b), the trial court abused its discretion by requiring appellants to provide four years of tax records when the statute is only concerned with the year preceding the date of each IME performed.” Affirmed in part, modified in part, and remanded.