Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Whether MCL 567.251a & MCL 567.255 interact to impose a legal duty of postexamination compliance on a holder that is distinct from the annual duty to report & remit abandoned property; The Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (the UUPA); Statute of limitations; MCL 567.250(2); Dine Brands Global, Inc v Eubanks (Dine Brands III)
On second remand, the court held “that a distinct legal duty to deliver property arises from a notice-of-examination determination issued by the Treasurer, so the trial court erred when it ruled that the Treasurer was time-barred under MCL 567.250(2) from commencing future enforcement actions against plaintiffs.” Thus, it reversed the trial court’s orders and remanded both cases for entry of summary disposition for the Treasurer. Recently, the Supreme Court held “that an ‘action or proceeding’ includes an examination initiated by the Treasurer” and “that the initiation of an examination by the Treasurer does not toll the statute of limitations.” It remanded these consolidated appeals to the court to consider “whether MCL 567.251a and MCL 567.255 interact to impose a legal duty of postexamination compliance on a holder [of abandoned property] that is distinct from the annual duty to report and remit abandoned property.” The court held that the “resolution of that issue dictates how the statute of limitations in MCL 567.250(2) is applied ‘when a party refuses to voluntarily comply and the Treasurer is forced to commence a postexamination enforcement action.’” It found that the applicable “provisions reflect that the holder has a distinct legal duty to deliver property to the Treasurer as a result of the examination.” It concluded that the “conclusion is fortified by the range of penalties that are available under MCL 567.255. Although our Supreme Court declined to decide whether a distinct legal duty arises from the notice of examination determination, our Supreme Court commented on the statutory range of penalties[.]” The court held that application “of these penalties is not limited to the failure to comply with the annual duty to report and remit abandoned property. The civil penalties may be imposed for, inter alia, a willful failure to ‘perform other duties required under” the UUPA, MCL 567.255(2), and a willful failure to pay or deliver property as required under the UUPA, MCL 567.255(3).” In sum, the court concluded “that a distinct legal duty to deliver property to the Treasurer arises from the notice of examination determination. Therefore, for purposes of filing a postexamination enforcement action, the 5-year or 10-year (depending on the type of transaction) limitation period begins to run on the date of the issuance of the notice of examination determination. Because the notices of examination determination in these cases were issued in 2021, the trial court erred when it concluded that the Treasurer was time-barred under MCL 567.250(2) from commencing a future enforcement action with respect to the property deliverable to the Treasurer from plaintiffs as a result of the respective notices of examination determination.”
Possession of a machinegun; 18 USC § 922(o); Second Amendment challenge to the statute; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v Bruen; District of Columbia v Heller; Whether Hamblen v United States remains good law after Bruen; Application of the Heller/Bruen text-&-history test
The court held that defendant-Bridges’s conviction for possessing a machinegun was constitutional both on its face and as applied to him under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, and that the statute “is consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of prohibiting private possession of dangerous and unusual weapons.” Bridges was convicted of possessing a machinegun in violation of § 922(o). He argued that his conviction violated the Second Amendment, facially and as applied to him, under Bruen. Analyzing both of these challenges as one, the court held that they “fail together.” It found three cases were key – the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and Bruen, and the court’s decision in Hamblen, which was decided after Heller but before Bruen. Hamblen held “that the Second Amendment categorically does not protect the possession of ‘unregistered machine guns for personal use.’” Addressing whether Hamblen is binding after Bruen, the court rejected Bridges’s argument that Bruen required it to depart from Hamblen. “Hamblen straightforwardly applied Heller, and Bruen did nothing to displace those aspects of Heller on which Hamblen relied; Hamblen therefore remains good law after Bruen.” The court further concluded that even if Hamblen did “not control here, a fresh application of the Heller/Bruen text-and-history test yields the same result.” It explained that the Second Amendment’s plain text covered “Bridges’s possession of a machinegun, and ‘the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.’” Turning to the second Bruen step, it considered “whether the statute ‘is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’” The court looked to Heller and concluded that “whether machineguns fall within the right’s historical scope turns on whether machineguns are ‘dangerous and unusual.’” The court found that they are dangerous because of the harm they can do without necessitating a reload. As to whether they are “unusual,” it considered machinegun-ownership data. It determined that “the relevant number excludes law-enforcement equipment” and unlawfully owned weapons. “The Amendment’s protection extends only to those weapons ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’” Machineguns are not typically used for personal protection, and given their “lack of connection to lawful purposes, they are ‘unusual’ under Heller.” Affirmed.
Sua sponte amendment of a judgment of sentence (JOS); A trial court’s authority to correct mistakes in its judgments & orders; MCR 6.435; People v Worthington; Life without parole (LWOP)
Holding that the trial court erred in sua sponte amending defendant’s JOS, the court vacated his amended JOS and remanded to the trial court to reinstate his original JOS. Decades after he was convicted in 1989 for homicide and felony-firearm, defendant challenged his LWOP sentence in “the trial court by filing a motion to correct his invalid sentence along with other motions.” The trial court denied the motion as “untimely, but sua sponte issued an amended” JOS. The court noted that the only challenge properly before it as of right was to the trial court’s entry of the 2/24/23 amended JOS making defendant’s “sentences in this case consecutive to that imposed for his 1987 drug conviction.” While the court agreed that his initial JOS was invalid, the trial “court did not have the authority to substantively amend it once it was issued. The plain language of MCR 6.435, captioned ‘Correcting Mistakes,’ addresses the trial court’s authority to correct mistakes in its judgments and orders. The rule separately addresses ‘clerical mistakes’ and ‘substantive mistakes.’” As to the former, “MCR 6.435(A) provides: ‘Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on motion of a party, and after notice if the court orders it.’” MCR 6.435(B) addresses substantive mistakes and “states: ‘After giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, and provided it has not yet entered judgment in the case, the court may reconsider and modify, correct, or rescind any order it concludes was erroneous.’” The Supreme Court held in Worthington that under “MCR 6.435(B), a trial court does ‘not have the authority to amend the [JOS] after entry to add a provision for consecutive sentencing under MCL 768.7a(2)[14]’ because ‘adding a statutorily mandated term is a substantive correction that a trial court may make on its own initiative only before judgment is entered.’” The court concluded that this “rationale applies with equal force to a consecutive sentence that is statutorily mandated under MCL 768.7a(1).”
Juvenile sentencing; Successive motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.502(G); Retroactive changes in the law under MCR 6.502(G)(2); Miller v Alabama; Montgomery v Louisiana; “Good cause” & “actual prejudice”; New scientific evidence; MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) & (b)
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by finding defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was not based upon a retroactive change in law and did not satisfy the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G). Thus, it reversed the order at issue and remanded for the trial court to address the merits of his successive motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508(D). Defendant was convicted of CSC I and assault with intent to commit sexual penetration, apparently on the basis that he forced the victim to perform oral sex on him and used a mop handle to violate her. The trial court imposed a substantial upward departure, sentencing him to 75 to 150 years for the former, and 6 to 10 concurrent years for the latter. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed. The trial court subsequently denied his motion for relief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. His delayed application for leave to appeal was also denied. The trial court then denied his successive motion for relief from judgment, and his application for leave to appeal was again denied. However, the Supreme Court remanded. On remand, the court agreed with defendant that “in juvenile sentencing cases, repeated citation to and reliance upon the rationale of Miller and Montgomery is sufficient to satisfy the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a)[.]” It noted his “successive motion for relief from judgment repeatedly cited Miller and Montgomery and argued that the rationale reflected in those cases should be extended to the instant case.” And because “Miller is retroactive under Montgomery, his successive motion for relief from judgment is ‘based upon a retroactive change in law’ and therefore satisfies the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G).”
Healthcare fraud; Jury instructions on the word “willfully” in 18 USC § 1347; Bryan v United States; Ratzlaf v United States The exclusion of “hearsay” statements; FRE 803(3) (the then-existing state of mind hearsay exception); Whether an error was harmless; Denial of defendant’s motion to require the government to use an expert to testify about the medical necessity of durable medical equipment (DME); FRE 701 & 702
The court vacated defendant-Dr. Singh’s convictions for healthcare fraud based on inadequate jury instructions on the meaning of the word “willfully” in the statute, the improper exclusion of hearsay statements made by Singh, and the use of lay-witness testimony as to medical necessity. The government alleged that she defrauded Medicare by signing orders for DME for patients whom she had not herself evaluated. No evidence showed she ever personally “submitted any order, claim, or request for reimbursement to Medicare, or that she knew the amounts being billed.” Instead, she contracted with two telehealth companies to review their patient charts, allegedly believing “that she was reviewing and approving medical charts for patients whom other healthcare providers had already evaluated[.]” She reported all the money she received for reviewing the charts on her federal income tax returns. On appeal, the court agreed with her that the district court erred when instructing the jury on the meaning of “willfully” as used in § 1347. To establish “‘a “willful” violation of a statute, “the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”’” The jury instructions here “did not state that the government was required to prove that Singh ‘acted with knowledge that [her] conduct was unlawful.’” The court rejected the government’s argument that the instructions, “considered as a whole, sufficiently conveyed that the government had to prove that Singh knew that her conduct was unlawful.” The court noted that “the healthcare-fraud jury instructions were consistent with Sixth Circuit Pattern Instruction 10.05 (2024) and were agreed upon by both parties.” If she is retried, the jury instructions for a violation of “§ 1347 must specify that the government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Singh acted with knowledge that her conduct was unlawful.” The court also agreed with Singh that reversal of her convictions was merited based on her other two arguments on appeal. As to the exclusion of her hearsay statements made to an insurance company representative, the court concluded “that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing these statements under” FRE 803(3). Further, their exclusion was not harmless error because the “excluded evidence went directly to the critical, disputed issue of Singh’s intent.” Lastly, the court held that “the district court abused its discretion by allowing lay testimony on” the issue of the medical necessity of DME. This question “requires specialized knowledge of the professional standards of care for physicians and the established standards for Medicare.” Remanded.
Preliminary injunction; Hammel v Speaker of the House of Reps; Jurisdiction; Relief under the Open Meetings Act (OMA); MCL 15.263; MCL 15.270(1) & (2); MCL 15.271(1) MCL 15.273(1) & (2); Madugula v Taub; The 60-day limitations period; MCL 15.270(3)(a); Likelihood of success on the merits; MCL 15.263(1)-(3); “Public body”; MCL 15.262(a); “Decision”; MCL 15.262(d); Distinguishing Booth Newspapers, Inc v University of MI Bd of Regents, Pinebrook Warren, LLC v City of Warren, & Exclusive Capital Partners, LLC v Royal Oak; Public announcement of bids; MCL 380.1267(6); Balance of harms between parties; Harm to the public interest; Other adequate legal remedy; Temporary restraining order (TRO)
The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to invalidate defendant’s (school district and board members) decision to demolish an old school and did not otherwise abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and dissolving the TRO it had previously entered. Thus, it affirmed. Plaintiffs sought the preliminary injunction to prevent the demolition of the old school building. On appeal, as a preliminary matter, the court found that the trial court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to invalidate the decision to demolish the school “because plaintiffs failed to file their lawsuit within the 60-day limitations period.” Next, the court found that the trial court properly concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits with respect to Count I. It noted that the evidence did “not show that defendants violated the OMA with respect to the demolition and asbestos-abatement bids. The Board did not delegate its functions . . . , it held a study session and a board meeting at which it heard comments from the public, and no evidence indicate[d] that any deliberations or decisions were made behind closed doors.” In addition, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that “the balance of the harms weighed against a preliminary injunction” or that “the public interest would be harmed if a preliminary injunction was issued.” Finally, the court found that “a preliminary injunction was inappropriate regarding Counts II through VII regardless of the likelihood of the claims’ success on the merits.”
Reasonable reunification efforts; Failure to timely provide updated case-service plans; MCL 712A.18f(2) & (5); Plain error review; Whether respondent’s substantial rights were affected; In re MJC
The court held that while respondent-mother established plain error as to the DHHS’s “failure to update her case-service plan as required by statute, she” was not entitled to reversal of the termination order because she did “not show that her substantial rights were affected.” As an initial matter, the court determined that her “untimely objection to the failure to provide an updated plan” rendered the issue unpreserved and thus, subject to plain error review. It agreed with her “that the first two criteria of the plain-error analysis” were met. The DHHS filed its initial case-service plan in 12/22. The referee adopted the proposed plan the next month. MCL 712A.18f(5) then required the DHHS “to update its plan every 90 days. Yet, [it] did not file another service or treatment plan until” the middle of 2/24, when “it filed three service plans, dated in June, August, and November 2023, respectively, and three treatment plans with the same dates. Thus, given the time of filing, [it] did not make these plans available to the trial court at the time they were prepared. Further, even if [it] had filed these plans when they were prepared, the earliest case-service plan still would fall outside the 90-day statutory deadline.” But the court found that respondent’s challenge failed because she did not establish “that the failure to provide updated case-service plans affected her substantial rights.” Similarly to MJC, she did “not show that she benefited from, or substantially complied with, the services” the DHHS provided. Like the respondent in that case, “who ‘repeatedly missed drug screens, . . . failed to maintain contact with his caseworker, and missed several parenting time sessions,’” respondent in this case “attended only a few of her weekly drug screens and tested positive for cocaine multiple times. She also missed the majority of her parenting time sessions. Further, she did not contact her caseworker for weeks at a time, and she did not allow her caseworker to complete a home assessment.” Given that she failed to “participate in, or benefit from, the services” the DHHS provided to “her, she did not establish any prejudice to her substantial rights from [its] failure to file an updated case-service plan on a 90-day basis.” The court affirmed the order terminating her parental rights.