Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Divorce; Attorney withdrawal; Adjudication of a settlement agreement’s validity without allowing a party an opportunity to retain a new attorney; Bye v Ferguson; Harmless error; Right to counsel; Const 1963, art 1, § 13; Haller v Haller; Mediated settlement agreements in domestic relations cases; MCR 3.216(H)(8); Reliance on MCR 2.507(G); Duress; Vittiglio v Vittiglio; Skaates v Kayser; Whether the judgment of divorce (JOD) adequately addressed the equitable distribution of the marital estate; MCR 3.211(B)(3); Request for a new judge; Kuebler v Kuebler
The court rejected plaintiff-ex-wife’s constitutional violation claim as to the opportunity to retain new counsel after her original attorney withdrew. While it found the trial court abused its discretion in entering the JOD without allowing her to acquire new counsel, it held that the error was harmless. It determined that her reliance on MCR 2.507(G) and related “case law to argue for the necessity of a signed written agreement for the settlement is erroneous as MCR 3.216(H)(8)” controlled here. It also rejected her duress claim. But it held that the trial court erred in not conducting “an evidentiary hearing to establish whether the settlement agreement—and subsequently, the [JOD]—fully adjudicated the marital estate.” Plaintiff appealed the JOD. “Considering established jurisprudence surrounding the right to counsel in divorce proceedings,” the court first determined that her constitutional claim was unfounded. She also argued “that the trial court erred by failing to afford her the opportunity to secure a new attorney after allowing her current attorney to withdraw.” The court concluded Bye indicated “that in light of plaintiff’s consistent requests for an adjournment to secure new legal representation and to address the potential issues of fraudulent activity and incomplete adjudication of the marital estate, the trial court’s decision to enter divorce judgment without allowing [her] to acquire new legal representation falls outside the bounds of reasonable judicial outcomes.” However, given that she “had the opportunity to obtain a new attorney prior to the [JOD’s] entry and subsequently received competent representation regarding her new claims, the trial court’s error was harmless.” Further, the record showed “plaintiff was not under duress at the time the settlement agreement was executed.” But the court found that the “trial court never made findings to ascertain whether the [JOD] aligned with the terms of the settlement, particularly in terms of disposition of all marital assets. Notably, the divorce judgment does not address disputed property items, such as” a home and a car. Thus, the court vacated the order denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside the JOD and directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It denied her request for remand to a new judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Judicial conduct; People v Stevens; Veil of judicial impartiality; Right to a fair & impartial trial; Motion to suppress; Evidence flowing from an allegedly illegal stop & arrest; Reasonable suspicion; In-court identifications; Expert witness funding; Motion for a new trial
The court held that based on its review of the record, “the nature of the judge’s conduct does not favor a conclusion that the veil of impartiality was pierced.” Further, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and his other appellate claims also failed. He was convicted of bank robbery, armed robbery, and making a false report of terrorism. He first claimed “that the trial judge pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, and denied him a fair and impartial trial, through certain comments the judge made in front of the jury.” The court found as “to the judge’s conduct during cross-examination, it is evident from considering the judge’s statements in their full context, rather than out of context as defendant has described them, that each cited instance represented attempts by the trial court to prevent needless repetition in defendant’s cross-examinations and to keep the questioning focused on relevant issues and the issues that defendant was apparently intending to explore to the extent such issues were relevant and permissible.” While a few statements by the trial judge “could have been left unsaid, it is abundantly clear from the transcript that the trial judge generally allowed defendant to conduct his cross-examinations as he wished while still exercising the court’s authority to control the trial and avoid unnecessary waste of time. In doing so, the trial court merely redirected [him] so that defendant could still get to the point of his questioning without extraneous detours and repetition.” As to his “complaints about the judge’s conduct during voir dire, it is indisputably the sole duty and responsibility of the judge to instruct the jury on the law.” Next, as “to the judge’s comments to the jury venire that jury duty is a duty to fulfill even if a person does not want to fulfill it, the judge again merely provided a true statement of law.” Next, the court considered “defendant’s argument that the trial judge coerced the jury into reaching a hasty verdict by informing the jury that court would be adjourned for the weekend in approximately an hour, with deliberations to continue if necessary on Monday.” The court found that the “judge merely provided the jury with information about the schedule so jurors would know what to expect, while simultaneously indicating that the jury would have the time it needed to deliberate.” Also, the court found that the judge’s tone and demeanor did “not favor a conclusion that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced.” Finally, none of the remaining Stevens factors favored “a finding that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced.” Thus, the court concluded that defendant did not show “that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced in this case because it is not reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct created the appearance of advocacy or partiality against defendant.” Affirmed.
Prosecutorial error; Improper vouching; People v Bahoda; Distinguishing People v Humphreys; Prejudice; Commenting on defense counsel’s honesty; People v Unger; Distinguishing People v Dalessandro; Appeal to sympathy; People v Watson; Curative instruction
The court held that the prosecutor did not commit error and, even if she did, defendant was not prejudiced. He was convicted of CSC I, kidnapping, felonious assault, and AWIGBH. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that “the prosecutor erred when she: (1) improperly vouched for the victim; (2) commented on defense counsel’s honesty; (3) appealed to the jury’s sympathy to secure a conviction; and (4) referenced evidence not in the record during closing argument.” Given the “procedural circumstances of the case and the context of the prosecutor’s comments, [she] did not improperly vouch for the victim. [Her] comments did not convey or imply she had special knowledge of the victim’s truthfulness. Rather, context demonstrates the prosecutor made the comments after presenting evidence of the victim’s assault.” In any event, defendant could not establish prejudice. In addition, while the prosecutor’s comments about defense counsel’s honesty “certainly insinuated that any testimony from defendant would have reliability issues and defense counsel knew as much,” the court did “not read the comments as suggesting that defense counsel knew defendant would lie in his testimony at trial or that counsel was ‘intentionally attempting to mislead the jury.’” Further, in “context, the prosecutor’s comments did not appeal to the jury’s sympathy. Rather, [they] were benign inquiries about the victim’s ability to continue after reviewing evidence of her assault.” Affirmed.
Divorce; Credibility; The trial court’s factual findings as to marital debt; Division of marital debt; Distribution of marital property; Earning capacity; Distinguishing Berger v Berger
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that defendant-ex-husband’s “testimony was less than credible and that any difficulties in his testimony was not based upon a language barrier.” It also held that the trial court did not err in its division of marital debt and that its marital property distribution was not inequitable. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s assessment of his credibility, noting its findings were “supported by the record, which reflects that [he] often declined to directly answer questions and . . . would testify to one version of events only to . . . testify to the exact opposite.” His demeanor, which included “‘smiling’ during his testimony was noted on the record by the trial court.” Also, notwithstanding his “multiple convictions for domestic violence and a conviction of stalking, [he] represented to the [trial] court that he was the ‘victim’ and that he had never harmed” plaintiff-ex-wife. Further, the trial “court’s finding that he outright lied was based upon three different circumstances.” And the record did “not support his assertion that his testimony was negatively impacted by a language barrier.” The court also rejected his challenges to some of the trial court’s factual findings related to the marital debt. “Given that the testimony supports the . . . finding that the debt was for payment of [his] legal fees in his criminal cases and in his divorce case, the [trial] court did not err by finding that the debt was not marital debt and should be [his] sole responsibility.” In addition, “there was no competent evidence presented as to the vehicles values or loan balances.” Further, given that the trial “court’s decision to award the parties the vehicles in their possession and the debts associated with them, [its] failure to divide the repair-bill debt on” defendant’s vehicle did not warrant reversal. The court next rejected his argument that the trial court erred by not dividing marital debts in the form of loans that the parties received when purchasing marital property. The trial court did not “err by finding that the credit card debt was not marital debt because it was used to pay [his] attorney fees and legal costs in his criminal cases and in the divorce proceedings. It also did not err by awarding the parties the debts related to their respective vehicles “given that no evidence was admitted to establish the value of the vehicles and the amount of debt owed on the vehicle awarded to” defendant. And it did not err by “finding that the loans for the purchase of various properties and that the loans for the payment of” his legal fees were fabricated. Finally, the court rejected his claim that the trial court’s property division was inequitable and was based upon its disproportionate consideration of his fault in causing the breakdown of the marital relationship. Its “consideration of [his] fault in causing a breakdown in the marital relationship and his ongoing harassment of [plaintiff] is a factor that supported [its] decision to award a larger share of the marital estate to” her. Affirmed.
The court’s jurisdiction; “Aggrieved party” requirement for an appeal of right; MCR 7.203(A)(1); Failure to preserve the right to appeal in a stipulated order dismissing the case; Distinguishing Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC; Uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff-Ellington’s appeal because it could not say that she was an “aggrieved party” where she agreed in a stipulated order “without reservation to the dismissal of her ‘claims’ against” defendant-State Farm. State Farm was her auto insurer. Due to her opt-out, the “declarations page of her policy provided that she had ‘No Coverage For Medical Expense.’” The case arose after a hit-and-run auto accident. The trial court entered an order partially dismissing her UM/UIM “claim by dismissing with prejudice Ellington’s ‘claims for allowable medical expenses against’ State Farm.” After her motion for reconsideration was denied, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and she “signed a release of her uninsured motorist claim against State Farm.” The trial court later entered the stipulated order dismissing the case, from which Ellington now appealed. In Jaber, the court recently “determined that a party ‘may raise issues arising out of an earlier order relating to one party, even if the appellant has failed to reserve the right to appeal in a subsequent, stipulated order of dismissal as to another party.’” But it expressly declined to consider there “the question at issue in this appeal, i.e., whether a party ‘may raise issues arising out of an earlier order if the [party], while failing to reserve the right to appeal, subsequently enters into a stipulated order of dismissal as to the same party that was the subject of the earlier order.’” In this case, the “parties to the stipulated order are Ellington and State Farm. The language that [they] chose to use is broad, indicating that Ellington’s ‘claims against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company shall be dismissed with prejudice and without costs to either party.’ Review of [her] complaint reveals that she only brought a single claim for [UM/UIM] coverage. Although the trial court’s earlier order precluded her from recovering medical expenses under that claim, there is no language reserving the right to appeal that earlier decision.” Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over appeal; Auto negligence; No-fault benefits; Assignment; Standing; MCL 500.3112; Real party in interest; MCL 600.2041; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Reg'l Transp; Leave to amend; Relation back; Rescission
The court vacated the trial court’s 5/16/23 order granting defendant-Progressive’s motion for summary disposition and remanded. Plaintiff sued defendant for no-fault benefits after a 9/1/19 auto accident. As a preliminary matter, the court noted it had jurisdiction over this appeal. A previous order “expressly states that it reserves plaintiff’s right to appeal the limited issue regarding” an earlier “order granting Progressive’s summary disposition motion and dismissing” two other parties. Turning to the merits, the trial court “granted summary disposition to Progressive because plaintiff was not the real party in interest as a result of the assignments she executed and thus had no right to prosecute this action for recovery of the benefits she assigned.” It also “ruled that the revocations were ‘too late’ because plaintiff was not the real party in interest ‘at the time of filing.’” Finally, it “concluded that ‘no supplemental pleadings have been filed in this case and any additional claims [p]laintiff would wish to make would be barred by the one year back rule MCL 500.3145.’” The court held that under “C-Spine, the legal framework employed by the trial court in the present case” was erroneous, so it reversed its ruling granting Progressive’s motion for summary disposition. In addition, because the trial court “did not engage in a rescission analysis, . . . the matter must be remanded to the trial court for it to consider in the first instance whether equitable rescission should apply and any further implications of that determination.” And because “the trial court’s ruling that the one-year-back rule would have still barred plaintiff’s claims was also based on the trial court’s incorrect understanding regarding the effect of a valid mutual rescission, that ruling is also vacated so the trial court may reconsider that ruling under the proper legal framework.” Finally, the court noted that plaintiff did “not appear to claim to have complied with” the applicable “procedural requirements and the remedy of legal rescission is not at issue at this juncture.”
Reasonable reunification efforts; Accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA); Waived issue; Abandoned issue; Parenting time modification; MCL 712A.13a(13); In re Ott; Child’s best interests; In re Gonzalez/Martinez
Holding that reasonable reunification efforts were made, and that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed. She primarily contended that reversal was required because she was not given reasonable accommodations under the ADA based on her mental health issues. However, the referee specifically asked the parties, “‘do all parties agree that ADA does not apply?’ Respondent’s attorney expressly answered, ‘Yes.”’ Her “intent to waive any claim for accommodation under the ADA could not have been clearer, and this argument is thus waived for appellate review. Moreover, ’when challenging the services offered, [respondent] must establish that she would have fared better if other services had been offered’ because ‘[w]ithout an identification of services to accommodate mother’s intellectual disability, we are left to speculate what other services the DHHS could have offered.’” She had “not explained how she would have fared better if other services had been offered, nor has she proposed other services that should have been offered; she merely complains in conclusory fashion that the services offered were deficient.” Thus, she failed to establish that reversal was required on this basis. Respondent additionally asserted “that she should have been given more time to work toward completing her parent-agency treatment plan.” However, she ignored “her own failures to engage with many of the services that were referred, her failure to obtain and provide her insurance card that prevented therapeutic services from starting, and her failure to demonstrate that she had sufficiently benefited from services thus far.” The court next noted that respondent “failed to cite any authority prohibiting the imposition of conditions on parenting time generally,” or any authority supporting “that the trial court erred by mposing remote parenting time in light of [her] behavior at the conclusion of a parenting time visit that led to the involvement of security. Therefore, this issue is abandoned.” Finally, based on its review of the record, the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.”