Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Chapter 11; Whether the funds the companies gave to the debtor constituted “loans” or “investments in equity”; Whether the bankruptcy court erred by refusing to recharacterize a “loan” as an “equity contribution” under In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc; Hearsay; Whether the bankruptcy court wrongly excluded a witness’s deposition at trial; FRE 801(c) & (d)(2); FRE 802; FedRCivP 32 & (a)(1); Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP)
The court reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision in this adversary proceeding and held that it erred by analyzing Rule 32 as barring the admission of a dead witness’s deposition when the opposition was unable to cross-examine the witness. Insight filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and some of its equity owners claimed that money they advanced to Insight was a “loan.” The bankruptcy court declined to recharacterize the funds as equity. Autumn Wind became Insight’s new owner under the bankruptcy plan, which “fully extinguished” the owners’ equity interest. Cecelia Financial Management, an equity owner, made a $6 million claim based on loan debt. Insight, now operated by Autumn Wind, filed an adversary complaint, seeking to have Cecelia’s debt recharacterized from a loan to one for equity, which would preclude recovery. Bay Bridge eventually took over from Cecelia. However, before the adversary proceeding could take place, Seigel, one of Insight’s original partners, developed cancer. The parties arranged for him to be deposed, but he died before the deposition was completed. Bay Bridge moved to exclude Seigel’s deposition as “hearsay.” The bankruptcy court considered the deposition to be “‘inherently prejudicial’ given that Bay Bridge could not cross-examine Siegel[,]" and ruled it inadmissible. It also declined to recharacterize Cecelia’s loans as equity contributions under AutoStyle. The BAP affirmed. Insight argued that the bankruptcy court erred by excluding Seigel’s deposition testimony. Bay Bridge argued that even though Seigel’s testimony met the admittance requirements under Rule 32, the Rule also “implied” that the opposing party can cross-examine the declarant before death. This led to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. However, the court held that the cross-examination provision did not operate as an “‘absolute[] bar[]’” to the introduction of a deposition when the opposing party did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In fact, “the text provides that a deposition ‘may be used’ by a party if the party satisfies the three conditions listed in” Rule 32(a)(1), and federal courts have the discretion to do so. Thus, “the bankruptcy court misread the law by holding that it had to exclude the deposition for lack of cross-examination as a matter of law.” Reversed and remanded.
Search & seizure; 42 USC § 1983; Whether defendant-officers were entitled to qualified immunity; Whether plaintiffs established that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment “clearly established” rights; Whether exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry; Whether there was probable cause for a warrantless arrest; Whether detaining a plaintiff for 30 to 45 minutes was an “arrest”; Whether the defendants helped a complainant steal a car; “Malicious prosecution”; Municipal liability under Monell v Department of Soc Servs
The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-police officers where plaintiffs failed to offer case law with specific conduct to support their claim that there were no exigent circumstances supporting a warrantless entry into their home. Similar cases from other courts supported a finding of exigent circumstances where the officers smelled marijuana and knew someone was inside the house who could possibly destroy evidence. An argument between plaintiff-Howell and his roommate, involving a car, a gun, and an allegedly drunk Howell, led to a 911 call to which police responded. The officers smelled marijuana and entered the home to search for the gun that was allegedly pointed at the complainant. The police arrested Howell and placed him in the cruiser. At that time, he consented to the search of the house for a gun. The officers had Howell’s girlfriend, plaintiff-Brown, handcuffed for 30 to 45 minutes. Howell was indicted for assaulting his roommate and resisting arrest and was tried and found guilty. He eventually spent 30 days in jail on a lesser charge. He and Brown sued the officers and the municipality under the Fourth Amendment, and the officers claimed qualified immunity. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The court focused on the second step in the qualified immunity analysis—whether plaintiffs established that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment “clearly established” rights. It explained that they offered no case law that supported their claim, and “lack of precedent about the ‘specific conduct’ at issue generally dooms a plaintiff’s effort to show that the conduct violated clearly established law.” The court considered similar cases from other courts and held that the facts supported a finding of “exigent circumstances” where the officers smelled marijuana and knew someone was inside the house who could possibly destroy evidence. “As long as a reasonable officer could have concluded that a concern with the destruction of evidence created exigent circumstances, qualified immunity would protect the officers no matter their reasons for the entry.” The court next held that the warrantless arrest was not unconstitutional where there was probable cause to believe that Howell committed a crime where the roommate had claimed so in her 911 call, and nothing at the scene contradicted this fact. It rejected Brown’s claim that when she was handcuffed she was arrested without probable cause where officers can detain individuals if they reasonably believe they have committed a crime. The court declined to determine whether the officers aided in the theft of a car when the ownership of the vehicle was in question and where plaintiffs failed to adequately brief the issue. Even if the court were to conclude that the officers aided in moving the car, “no decision would have given the officers ‘fair notice’ that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.” The malicious-prosecution claim was unsuccessful where there was probable cause to prosecute. The Monell claim was dismissed where plaintiffs could not show an unconstitutional policy or custom.
Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree murder; Premeditation & deliberation; Intent; AWIM; Aiding & abetting; Judicial disqualification; Admission of a gun; Sentencing; Alleged violation of the two-thirds rule; Scoring of OVs 14 & 19
In these consolidated appeals, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to (1) support defendant-Pruitt’s first-degree murder and AWIM convictions and (2) establish defendant-Bennett’s requisite intent for aiding and abetting first-degree murder and AWIM. Also, “under either the plain-error standard or a de novo standard, the trial judge did not err by denying defendants’ motion to disqualify herself.” Further, Pruitt failed to establish he was entitled to any relief as to the two-thirds rule. And as to Bennett, the trial court did not err by (1) admitting the gun into evidence and (2) assessing OVs 14 and 19 at 10 points each. First, defendants argued “that there was insufficient evidence to show Pruitt possessed the requisite intent to be convicted of first-degree murder. Notably, for both defendants, the prosecution had to prove that Pruitt committed first-degree premeditated murder.” The court held that there “was sufficient evidence to support Pruitt’s conviction.” The jury may “have inferred from the evidence that once Bennett instructed Pruitt to not let anyone out of the store, Pruitt formed the intent to kill if any of the ‘Joy Road Mob’ attempted to leave.” This was “supported by the evidence presented that immediately after Bennett states, ‘Don’t let no ni**a out that door, cuz!’ Pruitt moved to block the front doors, which typically serve as the store exit, and did so while reaching into his pocket, with his hand on his gun. In essence, the jury may have found [he] was ‘lying in wait’ for the next person who tried to leave the premises. The approximate 12 seconds between when Pruitt was instructed not let anyone out, at which point a jury could reasonably conclude he formed the initial intent to kill, and when [he] shot [victim-R] was sufficient to allow the jury to find that he acted with premeditation and deliberation.” There was also “sufficient evidence to substantiate the jury’s finding that Pruitt intended to kill [victim-Y].” His use of a firearm on Y, “by itself, is sufficient to support such a finding.” Also, the case did “not involve an allegation of an accidental shooting. After shooting [R] in the face while [he] was running toward Pruitt, Pruitt then aimed the gun down and deliberately shot [Y], who had tripped over the fallen [R], in the back. These circumstances permitted an inference of an intent” to kill. The court next found the “evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Bennett intended the commission of the subject offenses. Given his instruction to Pruitt to bar anyone from leaving the premises, the jury could infer [he] was expressly intending for Pruitt to plan to shoot any person attempting to exit.” This was not mere speculation. “Bennett was aware that Pruitt was carrying a” firearm, “used a cane and had significant mobility issues resulting from a recent foot amputation. The jury could infer that, with this knowledge, Bennett recognized that the only means for Pruitt to stop persons from leaving the store was to shoot them with his gun.” This minimal circumstantial evidence was “sufficient to establish the requisite intent for aiding and abetting the offenses of first-degree murder and AWIM.” Affirmed.
Grandparenting time; MCL 722.27b; “Opportunity to be heard” within the meaning of MCL 722.27b(4)(a); Olepa v Olepa; Parental fitness
The court concluded that the trial court denied appellants-Mark and Shannon Schmaus (the Schmauses) “an opportunity to be heard” within the meaning of MCL 722.27b(4)(a) because the term “includes, at a minimum, the right to testify.” As such, it vacated the trial court’s order denying the Schmauses’ motion for grandparenting time and remanded. They “sought visitation with their granddaughter [LM] under Michigan’s grandparenting-time statute, MCL 722.27b.” The court found that although it is “not bound to follow Olepa because this Court decided the case before [11/1/90], it is precedential.” It also found “Olepa persuasive because its holding is consistent with the plain language of the statute.” The court held that reviewing “the provisions of MCL 722.27b as a whole,” the trial court erred. It “erroneously determined that the Schmauses were required to rebut the presumption stated in subsection (4)(b) in order to receive a hearing. The plain language of the statute does not support such an interpretation. Rather, subsection (4)(a) required the court to hold a hearing because the Schmauses requested a hearing.” The trial “court also erred by determining that the Schmauses were not entitled to a hearing at which evidence may be presented. MCL 722.27b(4)(a) entitled the Schmauses to ‘an opportunity to be heard,’ which necessarily includes in this context, at a minimum, the right to testify as this Court determined in Olepa.” Further, the Schmauses argued “that the trial court failed to make any finding that [appellee-LM’s father (Mack)] is a fit parent entitled to the presumption under subsection (4)(b) that his decision to deny them grandparenting time does not create a substantial risk of harm to LM’s mental, physical, or emotional health. The Schmauses are correct.” The record showed “that the trial court did not make any finding regarding Mack’s fitness as it pertains to the presumption under subsection (4)(b).” Thus, the court directed “the trial court to address that issue at the hearing on remand, along with any other issues necessary to its determination under MCL 722.27b.”
Civil-commitment action; Order for involuntary mental-health treatment; Waiver of right to counsel; MCR 5.732(C); In re Londowski; Application of criminal self-representation standards in probate; In re EE; Competency to waive counsel when suffering from mental illness; People v Brooks; Requirements for waiver of counsel; People v Anderson; Mootness & public significance exception; In re Detmer/Beaudry; Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)
The court held that the probate court abused its discretion by allowing respondent, who claimed she was God and had attended law school “on another planet,” to waive counsel and represent herself in a mental-health commitment proceeding. Respondent’s court-appointed attorney reported she wished to represent herself, or alternatively have a male lawyer, and requested an adjournment. Despite psychiatrists diagnosing respondent with psychosis and delusions, the probate court permitted her to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The trial court subsequently ordered up to 60 days of inpatient treatment and up to 180 days of outpatient treatment. On appeal, the court emphasized that under MCR 5.732(C) a waiver must be “voluntarily and understandingly made,” and “[a] person who is the subject of a petition for involuntary mental-health treatment has a statutory right to be represented by counsel.” The court applied the standards for criminal self-representation in Anderson and EE, noting the requirement that waiver be unequivocal, knowing, and not disruptive. Here, the record showed respondent’s severe delusions and fixation on her name rendered her unable to knowingly and understandingly waive counsel. “Disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities…can impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation” The court found it eminently clear “that a person who verbalizes that she is God and went to law school on another planet…is not competent to waive her right to counsel.” It reversed and remanded, ordering the probate court to remove the expired commitment order from LEIN under MCL 333.1464a.
Involuntary mental health treatment; Person requiring treatment; MCL 330.1401(1)(a)-(c)
The court concluded “that the probate court did not clearly err when it found respondent was a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) through (c). [Thus], the probate court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the second order for involuntary mental health treatment.” First, her “treating psychiatrist testified that respondent suffered from schizophrenia and described schizophrenia as a thought disorder. Another psychiatrist also opined that respondent suffered from schizophrenia.” Second, the record showed that her “mental illness impaired her capacity to recognize reality.” The record also demonstrated that her “mental illness impaired her behavior, as some of her hallucinations involved commands to attack hospital staff.” Further, the record indicated that her “mental illness impaired her judgment by causing her to believe that she could heal herself and that she did not have a mental illness. That respondent was homeless before she was hospitalized also suggests that her illness rendered her unable to cope with the demands of normal life. The foregoing strongly demonstrates that the probate court did not clearly err when it found that respondent had a mental illness.” Also, the probate court “did not clearly err when it found that [she] was a person in need of treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a).” The court found that while none of the attacks appeared “to have resulted in serious harm, respondent’s willingness to listen to voices in her head allegedly instructing her to attack others demonstrates that the probate court did not clearly err by finding there was a reasonable expectation that she could seriously injure herself or others in the near future. Further, another psychiatrist opined that respondent was dangerous because she was assaultive and suffered from hallucinations. These facts were sufficient for the probate court to form a firm conviction that [she] was a person needing treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a). Additionally, the probate court did not clearly err by finding that [she] was a person in need of treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(b). When she was on her own, respondent did not provide herself with food or shelter.” That she “wanted to set up a tent near a hospital demonstrated that she did not have a good grasp on how to provide for her basic needs. Further, the fact that respondent’s delusions controlled her behavior suggested that she was unable to address her basic needs.” Additionally, the court noted that “both psychiatrists opined that respondent’s mental illness rendered her unable to care for her own basic needs. These facts were sufficient for the probate court to form a firm conviction that [she] was a person needing treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(b).” Finally, the court found that “the probate court did not clearly err by finding that respondent was a person in need of treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(c). Respondent refused to recognize that she had a mental illness and testified that she did not have a mental illness.” Though she “ultimately agreed that she would take her medication if she was discharged, this statement was undermined by her unwillingness to take her medication while under direct medical supervision, as well as her belief that she could heal herself.” Affirmed.
Jurisdiction; Petition for a redetermination of a tax deficiency; IRC § 6213(a); Jurisdiction over “late filing” under § 7482(a); Patmon & Young Pro Corp v Commissioner; Whether the deficiency notice’s 90-day appeal deadline is “jurisdictional,” depriving the court of jurisdiction over a late filing; § 6213(a); Hamer v Neighborhood Hous Servs
On appeal from an order of the United States Tax Court, the court held for the first time in this circuit that the Internal Revenue Code’s 90-day deadline for appealing an income tax deficiency notice, § 6213(a), is not “jurisdictional,” and remanded the case to determine whether petitioner-Oquendo qualified for “equitable tolling” on the late filing of her challenge to a tax deficiency. The IRS sent Oquendo a notice of a tax deficiency. About five months later, she petitioned for a redetermination under IRC § 6213(a). A taxpayer has 90 days “after the notice” to file the petition, and during that period, the IRS cannot assess the deficiency. The IRS audited Oquendo’s 2022 return and determined that she was not entitled to claim status as “head of the household,” nor could she claim the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. The notice was dated 5/30/23 and informed her that she had until 8/28/23 to contest the findings. She filed on 11/1/23. Oquendo had three children who lived with her for more than six months a year. She also argued that she was entitled to equitable tolling regarding the filing deadline where the notice was sent to her former address. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on the late filing, and the tax court complied. It ruled that its jurisdiction “‘depends on the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and the timely filing of a petition[,]’” and that it lacked authority to extend the deadline beyond 90 days. It concluded that the timely filing was jurisdictional, citing Patmon. However, the court considered the jurisdictional ruling for the first time under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamer, which held that “claims-processing rules ‘are less stern’ than jurisdictional requirements and ‘may be waived or forfeited,’ unlike jurisdictional rules.” It noted that recent Supreme Court law has instructed “lower courts to be more judicious about labeling deadlines jurisdictional.” The court found its failure to mention jurisdiction or jurisdictional indicators “compels the conclusion that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing date is not a jurisdictional requirement.” Thus, equitable tolling became available as a remedy. Because the tax court never undertook this analysis, the court remanded the case for the “fact intensive” analysis.
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Anticipatory neglect; Due process in child protective proceedings; Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Relative placement; “Relative” under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j); In re Boshell/Shelton
Holding that § (b)(i) supported termination of respondent-father’s parental rights, but that the trial court failed to consider the child’s placement with a relative, the court affirmed as to statutory grounds, vacated as to best interests, and remanded. His parental rights were terminated based on his sexual abuse of the child’s half-sibling, IW. On appeal, the court found clear and convincing evidence that § (b)(i) supported termination of respondent’s parental rights because he sexually abused IW, creating a reasonable likelihood the child would be harmed in the future. It also rejected his due process claim, explaining that the trial court properly allowed questioning related to financial support and parenting because it went to jurisdiction and that respondent was afforded an opportunity to be heard. However, it vacated the best-interest ruling because the trial court failed to address the child’s placement with his mother, a relative under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j). The court reiterated that under Olive/Metts a “trial court’s failure to explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of the children’s placement with relatives renders the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination.”