Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Warrantless audit search of a business; Consent; Schneckloth v Bustamonte; Authority; Scope; Pretext; Equal protection; TriHealth, Inc v Board of Comm’rs, Hamilton Cnty; Class-of-one test; Green Genie, Inc v City of Detroit; Rational basis; Due process property interest in public contract; Enertech Elec, Inc v Mahoning Cnty Comm’rs; Municipal liability; 42 USC § 1983 & Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Request for proposals (RFP)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that: (1) the warrantless “audit” searches of plaintiffs’ (Rockwood) premises were consensual, (2) their class-of-one equal-protection theory failed under rational-basis review, (3) the RFP created no property interest to support a due-process claim, and (4) the derivative Monell claim therefore failed. Rockwood had long worked with the sheriff’s office, handling vehicle maintenance and towing. After defendant-Goodnough (the new sheriff) took office, he and a deputy conducted an on-site audit at Rockwood and at the owner’s pole barn, the county bid out fleet maintenance to another shop, and the sheriff revised the towing rotation, reducing Rockwood’s share. Plaintiffs sued on a variety of theories. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court first rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the warrantless audits violated the Fourth Amendment. “Defendants have provided evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude that [the owner’s son] had actual and apparent authority to consent to the search of Rockwood. Plaintiffs have not raised any genuine factual dispute.” The court also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments as to the scope of the search and pretext. Their class-of-one claim attacking the fleet-maintenance award and tow-list changes also failed. The court found rational bases supported both decisions. Defendants “had a rational basis for selecting [another company’s] clarified bid over” Rockwood’s original one. And plaintiffs “are ‘unable to disprove all conceivable justifications’ for that selection.” Further, distance “to travel and timeliness are rational reasons for selecting one tow company over another.” Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ due process contention that the RFP created a protected property interest, emphasizing that defendant-county “‘reserve[d] the right to accept or to reject any and all proposals, to waive any irregularities and to make an award that is determined by the’” county to be in its best interests. As such, plaintiffs did not demonstrate “that they had a property interest in the contract . . . .” Because no issue of fact as to an underlying constitutional violation remained, summary judgment was also appropriate for the county on the Monell claim. Affirmed.
Breach of contract; Distinguishing Al-Maliki v LaGrant; Conversion; Piercing the corporate veil; Distinguishing Allstate Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co of Am & Klager v Robert Meyer Co; Damages; Motion to amend the complaint; Dismissal of the subsequent lawsuit
As to Docket No. 364169, the court affirmed the trial court’s 9/8/22 order granting summary disposition to defendant-Zachery on plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and conversion, to defendant-Stubborn Rebel Farms on plaintiff’s claims for conversion, and to defendant-Modern Shed Design on plaintiff’s claim for piercing the corporate veil. It also affirmed the trial court’s 2/16/23 judgment entered against Stubborn Rebel Farms in the amount of $52,868.42; but it vacated “the portion of the judgment reflecting that ‘THIS IS A FINAL ORDER AND CLOSES THE CASE.’” The court further reversed the trial court’s 12/12/22 order denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and remanded. As to Docket No. 367451, it affirmed in part the trial court’s 8/21/23 order granting summary disposition to defendants as to count 3 (piercing the corporate veil); but it reversed in part as to counts 1 (fraudulent conveyance), 2 (successor liability) and 4 (civil conspiracy), and remanded. The cases related to plaintiff’s purchase of sheds from Stubborn Rebel Farms. She first argued “that the trial court erred and violated her right to due process of law by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in favor of Zachery on plaintiff’s breach of-contract claim in the initial lawsuit because neither party raised the issue of Zachery’s individual liability.” The court concluded that “because insufficient evidence was submitted to create a question of fact as to whether Zachery agreed to be personally bound by the terms of the contract, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against” him. It found that while it agreed that she “did, in fact, allege in her complaint that Zachery was liable to her for breach of contract, we nonetheless find that dismissal of the breach of contract claim as to Zachary was proper." Plaintiff next contended “that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor on [her] common-law and statutory conversion claims because the trial court considered legal issues relating to the conversion of cash that were not raised in the summary-disposition briefing.” The court held that “the trial court did not err by concluding that [she] failed to establish a common-law or statutory conversion of plaintiff’s money.” There was no dispute that she “did not consent to a creditor-debtor relationship.” But there was “no evidence that defendants were obligated to keep the $29,100 intact or deliver that specific amount to plaintiff. Rather, the $29,100 constituted a payment for construction of the three sheds. Furthermore, while plaintiff asserted that defendants exercised wrongful dominion and control over the $29,100, which they had promised to keep separate, and converted the funds to pay preexisting debts and for other personal beneficial uses, [she] presented no evidence to support her argument that [they] promised to keep the $29,100 separate, or that they had any obligation to return that specific money to plaintiff should the parties rescind the contract. Nor did defendants obtain the money without plaintiff’s consent.” Instead, she “acknowledged that she voluntarily paid defendants the $29,100.” Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that she “could not establish the elements of common-law or statutory conversion.” Finally, as to piercing the corporate veil claim, the court found that plaintiff “cited to no Michigan case that is comparable to the present case.” In fact, she had “cited to no case in which a court pierced a corporate veil where the defendants held liable for that corporate entity were not shareholders or owners of the corporate entity.”
Double jeopardy; Multiple punishments for the same conduct; Administrative segregation as punishment; Civil vs criminal sanctions; Hudson v United States; Seling v Young; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
Holding that double jeopardy was not violated by defendant’s conviction despite his lengthy confinement in administrative segregation, the court affirmed. Defendant, an inmate, was charged with assault of a prison employee after he stabbed a corrections officer. He had already been sanctioned administratively with 20 days of disciplinary segregation and 60 days loss of privileges, after which the MDOC reclassified him to long-term administrative segregation based on security concerns. The trial court convicted him of assault. On remand, after factual findings that he remained in segregation for nearly four years, the court rejected his claim that this additional confinement constituted multiple punishments for the same conduct. The court explained that under Hudson, double jeopardy analysis requires courts to look to the statute or regulation “on its face” rather than the sanction actually imposed. As Seling emphasized, “harsh executive implementation cannot ‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” Because MDOC rules create civil, not criminal, sanctions, defendant’s administrative segregation did not bar later prosecution. The court noted that claims of excessive solitary confinement may raise concerns under other constitutional provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, but “when it comes to addressing a Double Jeopardy Clause question, we must only consider the regulation on its face.”
Life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder; Effect of a defendant’s age at the time of the crime; People v Taylor
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 80028 in the 8/24/23 edition), the court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his LWOP “sentence for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder based on his age in light of Taylor.” It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Motion to quash evidence; Cell phone search warrants; Probable cause; Particularity requirement; People v Carson; The exclusionary rule; People v LoCicero (After Remand); The good-faith exception; People v Hughes; The independent source doctrine; People v Smith; Oral argument; MCR 2.119(E)(3); Evidentiary hearing; Franks v Delaware
[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 8/13/25.] Holding that the second warrant at issue in this case was sufficiently particular pursuant to both Carson and “the independent source doctrine because it draws from sources independent of the” first warrant, the court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion to quash the evidence obtained pursuant to the second warrant. He moved to quash the evidence obtained from his cell phone during an investigation into an arson and murder. The trial court denied the motion, finding that arguments pertaining to the validity of the first warrant were moot because a second warrant was issued, and that the second warrant was valid. It also denied his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the court first declined to consider the validity of the first warrant, finding it moot based on its holding as to the second warrant. It then agreed with the prosecution that the second warrant “was valid pursuant to the independent source doctrine because it drew from sources independent of the [first] warrant, and therefore any property seized under that warrant does not harken back to the purportedly invalid” first warrant as its source. “[D]efendant has not alleged, let alone demonstrated, that the affidavits for the search warrants that allowed police to obtain data from the victim’s bank account, delivery service, videogame service, or PayPal, referred to defendant’s cell phone or anything found on” it. Thus, the second warrant “was valid because it drew from sources independent of the” first warrant. The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court wrongfully denied him the right to present oral argument at the hearing on his motion to quash. “[T]he trial court properly invoked MCR 2.119(E)(3), explaining that the parties’ briefs were so thorough as to require no additional elaboration[.]” The record demonstrated “that the issues were, in fact, thoroughly briefed in the” trial court. As such, it did not “abuse its discretion by omitting oral argument as to his motion to quash the search warrants.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing as to the issuance of the warrants in this matter under Franks. He “effectively abandoned the issue of whether the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing as to the veracity of the warrants issued in this matter by failing to actually make that argument here and, instead, presented arguments that were never made to the trial court in defendant’s motion to quash.”
Sentencing; Scoring of OV 2; Lethal potential of a weapon used or possessed during the crime; MCL 777.32; Possession or use of an incendiary device, an explosive device, or a fully automatic weapon; MCL 777.32(1)(b); Possession or use of a knife; MCL 777.32(1)(d); Possession or use of a harmful chemical substance; MCL 777.32(1)(a); Scoring of OV 3; Life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim; MCL 777.33(1)(c); People v Houston; Departure sentence; People v Walden; Reasonableness & proportionality; Mitigating factors
The court held that the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 2 and 3, and that defendant’s upward departure sentence was not unreasonable or disproportionate. She was convicted of second-degree murder for her role in brutally beating the victim and then burning his dead body. The trial court sentenced her to 40 to 60 years. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred in scoring OVs 2 and 3. As to OV 2, a “preponderance of the evidence . . . supported the conclusion that defendant used a ‘harmful chemical substance’ against the victim to murder him, and [she] has offered nothing to suggest otherwise.” As to OV 3, Houston “remains binding precedent, and defendant identifies . . . no reason why it would not dictate the outcome of [her] challenge here.” The court also rejected her claim that the trial court’s departure sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate. First, she “has shown no error in the [trial] court’s conclusion that [the OVs] failed to duly capture ‘the seriousness of the crime,’ such that an upward departure was warranted.” Second, the “nature of defendant’s prior record was already accounted for in the scoring of her guidelines and [she] has not explained how that accounting may not have been adequate.” Third, the trial court “adequately explained ‘why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have been[.]’” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a special jury instruction on unlawful use of force; People v Carroll (I & II); Trial strategy; People v Yeager; Prejudice; Sufficiency of the evidence for an assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer conviction; Lawfulness of the officers’ use of force; People v Quinn; People v Jones; Graham v Connor
The court rejected defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a special jury instruction on unlawful use of force and held that there was sufficient evidence that the officers acted lawfully. Thus, it affirmed his assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer convictions. The jury instructions were inadequate because while they addressed the lawfulness element, they “did not address the legal standards applicable to determining whether the officers’ actions were lawful in this case.” But defendant’s argument did not concern “defense counsel’s failure to request the full” instruction on the applicable legal standards for “determining the lawfulness of the traffic stop or arrest.” Rather, he asserted “defense counsel should have requested a special jury instruction regarding defendant’s right to proportionately resist the officers’ allegedly unlawful use of force. Although defendant attempts to frame this as a matter affecting the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct under MCL 750.81d(1), he does not dispute that [they] had grounds to conduct a valid traffic stop, nor does he challenge the legality of the initial arrest for reckless driving or the lawfulness of [their] commands throughout the encounter.” The court noted that the defense theory at trial was “that defendant did not know he was under arrest or that the officers were acting lawfully, and he resisted out of fear and confusion.” The court found that defense “counsel could have reasonably decided not to focus on the legality of the officers’ conduct or subsequent use of force, especially considering defendant plainly resisted [one officer’s] lawful commands to stay in his car and attempt to handcuff defendant, which escalated the encounter.” It further concluded that, on this record, an instruction on “unlawful use of force would not have been warranted.” And defendant failed to show prejudice. The court also found that while his alleged underlying crime “may not have been severe, per se, the . . . evidence supported a finding that defendant was actively resisting a lawful arrest and posed an immediate threat to the officers through his physical resistance, proximity to [an officer’s] duty belt, and repeated refusal to comply with the officers’ commands.” It held that, “viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the officers’ use of force against [him] was lawful.”
Sentencing; Scoring of OV 13; Continuing pattern of criminal behavior; MCL 777.43(1); Number of crimes; MCL 777.43(1)(c)
Agreeing with defendant and the prosecution that the trial court erred by scoring OV 13 at 25 points, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. He was convicted of CSC I, accosting a child for immoral purposes, and indecent exposure, but acquitted of another CSC charge and a third indecent exposure charge. The trial court scored OV 13 at 25 points, noting “multiple instances of touching.” On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in its “three-crimes finding underlying its OV 13 assessment” because the victim “testified that defendant touched her breasts on only two instances, and because [it] could not hold the jury’s acquittal on the other [CSC] charge against defendant for purposes of assessing OV 13.” And because the trial court “relied on this assessing error to determine defendant’s guidelines score and ultimate sentence (again, as conceded by the prosecutor), defendant is entitled to resentencing.”
Tort claims arising from a report of suspected child abuse; Reasonable suspicion of child abuse; Alleged retaliatory reporting; Immediate reporting; MCL 722.623(1)(a); MCL 722.625; Child Protection Law (CPL)
The court held that appellants “have not shown, through their allegations or otherwise, a viable basis to conclude that [defendant-doctor] lacked even a reasonable suspicion for her concerns of abuse under the circumstances presented by this case, such that the presumption of her good faith in reporting those concerns would be overcome and her immunity for doing so would be stripped.” Nor did it see “a question of fact whose further development could provide that basis.” It also held that “assuming Doctor did not report ‘immediate[ly]’ as required by MCL 722.623(1)(a), that did not render immunity under MCL 722.625 inapplicable in this case.” The court first addressed “appellants’ claim that Doctor acted in bad faith when she made the report to CPS because the report was motivated by personal animosity toward” plaintiff-Mother. Appellants argued “that Doctor filed the CPS report not due to any reasonable suspicion of child abuse, but in retaliation for Mother’s threat to report Doctor’s conduct to Doctor’s supervisor, and because Mother generally refused to follow Doctor’s medical advice. According to appellants’ version of events, Doctor made the report shortly after a particularly contentious phone call with Mother regarding Doe’s (plaintiff’s child) care, followed by Mother informing Doctor’s coworker that she intended to file a formal complaint about Doctor.” The court held that even “accepting appellants’ version of events as true, they do not show that Doctor acted in bad faith such that she would not be entitled to immunity under the CPL for her report.” It found that as “to reasonable suspicion, there is no meaningful dispute that Doctor had significant concerns about Doe’s prior diagnoses and medication regimen, which Doctor assessed to be misguided and unduly dangerous for Doe.” And, as appellants claimed “in their complaint, Doctor’s report came on the heels of a contentious conversation between Mother and Doctor about these concerns, in which Mother insisted that any change ‘was completely out of the question’ while ultimately agreeing to only one ‘potential[]’ dosage adjustment of one of the medications. Appellants strongly disagree with Doctor’s concerns regarding Doe’s treatment and Mother’s role in it. But they do not contest that those collective concerns, if they were correct as reported, would require mandatory reporting under the CPL—and thus that Doctor would face civil and criminal liability for not reporting them.” And while appellants contended “Doctor’s concerns were wrong and impugn her judgment as to them, those criticisms go beyond what reasonable suspicion requires or entails, and do not themselves betray a lack of good faith in Doctor’s reporting.”
Failure to comply with the requirements of MCR 3.977; Skipping the statutory-grounds analysis & the best interest analysis
Holding that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of MCR 3.977, the court vacated its order denying termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to his children, EF, IF, and AF, and remanded. The “trial court noted its extensive years of experience and gave an in-depth explanation of the standards of review applicable to child protective proceedings. It gave both a layman’s description and a quotation from this Court to explain what ‘clear and convincing evidence’ entails. However, [it] never provided findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision to allow father to retain his parental rights.” Likewise, although it “made a brief note about the accusations of sexual assault by GS, it never once mentioned father’s children, EF, IF, and AF, who were named in the petition.” The trial “court then announced its decision to dismiss the petition for termination, apparently finding (without making findings) that there were no statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3) to terminate father’s parental rights. In the written order that followed the hearing, the trial court only stated that statutory grounds existed for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the children. No further explanation of the decision to dismiss the petition for termination was included.” The court noted that “MCR 3.977(I)(1) and (2) require the trial court to explain why the termination of parental rights is improper and to give ‘brief, definite, and pertinent findings’ in support of that decision.” While the court did “not expect or require the trial court to give a detailed explanation of its ruling, the trial court in this matter erred by failing to present any findings of fact or conclusions of law, either on the record or in writing, to support its determination.” It appeared “that the trial court held the adjudicative hearing where GS and respondent testified and found the preponderance of the evidence to take jurisdiction of the three children, but it never moved to the dispositional phase of the initial hearing where it would accept evidence regarding whether one of the statutory grounds for termination existed; it simply dismissed the ‘permanent custody’ request without explanation.” The court held that “the trial court completely ‘skipped’ the statutory-grounds analysis and the best interest analysis in violation of MCR 3.977(E) and (I).” The court retained jurisdiction.