Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Educational modifications mandated during COVID-19; Breach of contract; Tuition & fees; Allen v Michigan State Univ; Implied contracts; Room & board refunds; “Illusory” contract; Unjust enrichment
The court held that plaintiffs-students failed to establish implied contracts for exclusively in-person instruction or particular campus services, that the housing contracts were not breached or illusory, and that unjust enrichment was not shown. They sued when defendant-university (U of M) moved classes online during COVID-19. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court first held that nothing “about the course catalog or U of M’s historical conduct suggested an assent . . . to provide live, in-person instruction under any and all possible circumstances.” In addition, the Fee Schedule “showed that the fees at issue were mandatory and associated with enrollment, not with any exchange of services.” Moreover, the fees were paid “regardless of whether plaintiffs utilized the associated services.” And they “were used during the 2020 Winter Semester to support ongoing university operations, which remained available to students throughout the entire semester.” The availability of a withdrawal-period refund did not convert enrollment fees into service fees. Even assuming an implied contract, no breach was shown because U of M used the fees to support ongoing operations during the semester. It was clear “‘there was no offer—and thus no meeting of the minds—on any specific format for delivering education and services,’” and thus, no enforceable contractual promise. As to housing, “U of M encouraged its students to leave but explicitly allowed them to remain and for their needs, including food, housing, and health services, to be met.” It also “offered a $1,200 refund for those students who chose to move out. Both plaintiffs took the $1,200 refund in exchange for voluntarily moving out of campus housing.” The parties agreed on “price, early termination, and refunds, and it is undisputed that plaintiffs never availed themselves of these terms. Instead, [they] chose to voluntarily leave and take a $1,200 refund, but the terms of the contract they agreed to still made them responsible for the remainder of their housing costs.” As to the illusory-contract argument, the court found plaintiffs “failed to show any promise that U of M did not perform.” While they sought “a prorated refund for time spent away from student housing, they point[ed] to no contractual language that would grant them the relief they seek.” Finally, as to unjust enrichment, the court noted that “U of M moved live, in-person courses to online learning and cancelled campus events . . . due to the unexpected COVID-19 pandemic. Even in the face of a devastating public health crisis, [it] ‘successfully maintained the core of its educational mission— providing instruction and various services for students—throughout the pandemic.’” It was not unjust, under the circumstances, for it to retain the tuition and fees paid by plaintiffs. Affirmed.
Motion for relief from judgment (MFRJ) seeking SORA removal; MCR 6.508(D); “Good cause” & “actual prejudice”; Invalid sentence; MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv); Ex post facto challenge to the 2021 SORA; People v Betts; Whether the 2021 SORA constitutes criminal punishment as to sexual offenders; People v Lymon; People v Kiczenski; Reaching the right result for the wrong reason
The court held that although the trial court used the wrong rationale to reject defendant’s MFRJ, it nonetheless reached the right result because the 2021 SORA is not punishment as applied to sexual offenders and defendant failed to show an invalid sentence under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv). In 2005, defendant, after a plea, was ordered to comply with Michigan’s SORA. In 2023, acting pro se, he sought removal from the registry based on Betts and the SORA amendments. The trial court denied his motion, reasoning Betts would apply only if he had a conviction for failing to comply with SORA. On appeal, the court found that “the trial court’s holding that defendant must be convicted of failing to comply with SORA in order to challenge SORA’s application” inconsistent with “recent Michigan Supreme Court orders directing trial courts to consider a defendant’s request for removal from the sex offender registry as a part of his or her motion for relief from judgment.” However, it found the trial court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason. It noted that “after Lymon, whether the 2021 SORA constitutes criminal punishment as to sexual offenders was still an open question.” But it noted that the Kiczenski panel “concluded that ‘the 2021 SORA does not constitute punishment as applied to CSC-I offenders,’ and, therefore, ‘there is no ex post facto violation’ when it is applied retroactively.” It then concluded that although “Kiczenski was limited to offenders with CSC-I convictions, defendant fails to establish that the circumstances of his CSC-IV conviction should lead to a different result. Indeed, [he] repeats arguments that were considered and rejected in Kiczenski, such as the lack of an individualized risk assessment rendering the 2021 SORA excessively punitive.” As such, he “has not met his burden to establish that his sentence is invalid in light of this Court’s recent precedent in Kiczenski, and he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv).” Affirmed.
Expert testimony; Alleged vouching for the victim’s credibility; People v Peterson; Testimony about the victim’s psychiatric diagnoses; Prosecutorial misconduct/error; Evidence of defendant’s alcohol consumption; Relevance; Whether error warranted reversal; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a futile objection
The court held that challenged expert testimony was not improper, and rejected defendant’s prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. While it concluded evidence about defendant’s alcohol consumption was erroneously admitted, it found that he failed to show the error was outcome determinative. Thus, it affirmed his CSC I and II convictions. The victim (KR) reported that defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted her between the ages of 7 or 8 through 10. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of a forensic interviewer’s (W) testimony. But the court found that W’s general testimony about “delayed disclosure provided relevant information, and defendant has not presented any basis for concluding that [it] strayed from its proper purposes. Further, [W’s] explanation of the forensic-interview process did not vouch for KR’s credibility. [W’s] statements about the forensic-interview process, which were primarily centered on her qualifications as an expert, demonstrated that the protocol could either support or refute an allegation.” While defendant asserted that W’s “use of the word ‘disclosure’ implied that KR was bringing forth a hidden ‘truth’ and that defendant was guilty[,]” the court concluded that her statements “were not specific to KR and did not constitute any comment on the veracity of KR’s specific allegations. Significantly, [W] acknowledged that she had not spoken with KR or reviewed any of her records. Therefore, [W’s] testimony was not improper and did not vouch for” KR’s credibility. As to a doctor’s (V) testimony, V “testified about KR’s diagnoses, but the testimony was devoid of any reference to sexual abuse.” The court found that V “properly testified about KR’s hallucinations without directly or indirectly referring to KR’s allegations.” The court held that the evidence about defendant’s alcohol consumption “should have been inadmissible as largely, if not wholly, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial.” It noted this “was a ‘he said/she said’ trial, not a ‘he doesn’t remember/she said’ trial.” But this evidence “was a relatively minor part of defendant’s testimony and the trial evidence as a whole. The trial court gave a proper limiting” jury instruction, and “the key evidence—KR’s testimony of abuse versus defendant’s testimony of no abuse—did not involve alcohol, except for KR’s one-word answer that [he] smelled of ‘alcohol’ during” one incident, and the jury acquitted him of a related CSC I count.
Whether a rideshare vehicle is a “place of business” for purposes of MCL 750.227(2); People v Brooks; Vagueness; Concealed pistol license (CPL)
Holding that the “place of business” exception in MCL 750.227(2) is not unconstitutionally vague, and there was no constitutional violation, the court affirmed defendant’s CCW conviction. Police conducted a 4:30 am welfare check at a gas station where defendant was sleeping inside his vehicle in the parking lot. During a brief exchange, he said there were two guns in the vehicle and that he had no CPL. Officers verified the lack of a CPL, arrested him for CCW, and recovered two loaded pistols. The trial court rejected the statutory defense that a rideshare vehicle is a “place of business.” On appeal, the court held that longstanding caselaw limits “place of business” to fixed locations on land, citing Brooks. “The words ‘other land possessed by him’ which immediately follow the words ‘place of business’ compel the view that the place of business referred to is land.” The court also held that defendant’s void-for-vagueness challenge failed because a “statute is sufficiently definite if its meaning can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial interpretations,” and the phrase has been consistently construed for decades. The court concluded defendant “failed to show in this case that MCL 750.227 did ‘not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed’ or was ‘so indefinite that it invites arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.’”
Sentencing; Denial of a reduction in base offense level for “acceptance of responsibility”; USSG §§ 3E1.1(a)–(b) & Cmt. n.1(A); Whether any error in the district court’s application of Note 1(A)’s “specific definition of ‘relevant conduct’” would make its final decision “clearly erroneous”
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant-Jett a sentence reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” based on his drug possession and attempted smuggling while incarcerated. Jett pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute meth. During the three years between when he committed the crime and his arrest, he had no encounters with law enforcement. But after his arrest, he attempted to smuggle drugs into jail and get them from other inmates. Also, drugs were discovered in his cell. At the PSR interview, Jett, after consultation with counsel, denied responsibility for smuggling a drug known as K2 into jail. He later indicated he would admit to the smuggling but then changed his mind again “and his counsel notified the government that Jett did not intend to admit responsibility for the K2.” A new PSR recommended that Jett be denied the reduction. He argued for the reduction at sentencing, but the district court denied it based on the evidence of his drug activity while incarcerated. On appeal, Jett argued that it erred by denying him the reduction for what he characterized as “irrelevant conduct.” The court noted that “Application Notes to § 3E1.1 offer a non-exclusive list of factors that a district court may treat as ‘appropriate considerations’ in deciding whether a defendant has accepted responsibility.” It held that the district court properly relied on Jett’s acts related to the K2 and his repeated denials regarding his actions. The district court referenced Note 1(A) (false denial) and the actual Guideline itself to support its decision. The court noted that it has previously rejected reductions for acceptance of responsibility “to defendants who engaged in conduct similar to the offense of conviction while awaiting the entry of a plea or sentencing.” It further noted that “caselaw forecloses the conclusion that a defendant is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility merely because he has pleaded guilty.” Also, the court did not see why the three-year gap between his meth offense “and his K2 infractions would, as a matter of law, render” those infractions irrelevant. While “a substantial period of crime-free living could” perhaps be significant evidence of contrition, when, “as here, the defendant’s conduct after indictment casts doubt on the defendant’s expression of repentance, the district court is entitled to take that into account when weighing whether the defendant has accepted responsibility.” The court added that “any error in applying Note 1(A)’s specific definition of ‘relevant conduct’ did not make the district court’s ultimate conclusion ‘clearly erroneous.’” Affirmed.
Dismissal as a sanction. Vicencio v Ramirez; Dean v Tucker; Failure to appear for a mandatory pretrial settlement conference; MCR 2.401(G); MCR 2.504(B)(1) & (3); Whether plaintiff’s entire case was remanded to the trial court for a decision on the merits
Concluding that dismissal was too severe a sanction, the court vacated the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s action “as a sanction following his failure to appear for a mandatory pretrial settlement conference” and remanded. In moving to set aside the order of dismissal, plaintiff attested via affidavit that, among other things, “he: received no prior actual notice of the scheduled pretrial settlement conference; has diligently, vigorously prosecuted the case for over 5 years, including appeals to this Court and Michigan Supreme Court, and would never knowingly miss any scheduled event or appearance[.]” On appeal, the court found that arguments could “be made that the trial court was incorrect or abused its discretion in reaching the” conclusions on which it relied, “which were arguably conclusory and/or not supported by the record[.]” But the court was “convinced that, even if the factors were analyzed correctly, the remedy selected by the trial court was not appropriate given the lengthy period of time the case has been litigated, the steady and committed prosecution of the claims by plaintiff in the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, and the absence of any pattern of disregard of the court’s prior orders.” But the court rejected plaintiff’s assertion that, based on “the preceding appellate decisions in this litigation, the trial court order of summary disposition was reversed, and [his] entire case was returned to the trial court for a decision on the merits.” Rather, the appellate court decisions’ plain language established “that the proceedings on remand to the trial court are limited to plaintiff’s claim for defendant’s breach of any oral agreement for splitting the proceeds of the sale of the . . . property that survived the parties’ 2015 execution of the warranty deed and a purchase agreement for that real property. Otherwise, plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied and” the court’s 11/18/21 unpublished opinion affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition was the law of the case. On remand, the trial court must determine “what sanction, short of complete dismissal, should be imposed for plaintiff not attending” the settlement conference.
Municipal zoning dispute; Statutory & ordinance interpretation; “Use”; “Accessory use”; Principal purpose of a lot; Anchor Steel & Conveyer Co v Dearborn; Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA)
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that plaintiff was permitted to construct a pedestrian pathway on a portion of its property. Defendant-township determined that plaintiff could not construct the pathway. The ZBA affirmed defendant’s position, but the trial court reversed and ordered that plaintiff be permitted to construct it. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by holding that plaintiff was permitted to construct the pathway on the “R-1 zoned portion” of the property. It agreed with plaintiff that the trail is not a “‘use’ but rather an accessory use to an otherwise proper R-3 use, i.e., the apartment complex.” It found that “[p]laintiff has the better argument. The proposed pathway is serving the high-density residents of the adjoining zone, and a high-density use would not be permissible on the R-1 zoned portion. The pathway, however, does not constitute a ‘use’ under this Ordinance because it is not the ‘principal purpose’ of plaintiff’s lot. Rather, the pathway amounts to an ‘incidental and subordinate’ activity within the R-3 zoned apartment complex, i.e., it is an ‘accessory use.’” Further, although “the Ordinance follows permissive zoning, only permitting uses that are explicitly identified, the pathway does not constitute a ‘use’ for purposes of permissive zoning. Moreover, R-1 zones explicitly allow for accessory uses,” and this pathway “will be ‘incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the main building or lot[.]’” Finally, plaintiff correctly pointed “out that, under the Ordinance as written, it has the right to build a pedestrian pathway across the R-1 zoned portion of its property. The trial court did not err by reversing the ZBA’s determination.” Affirmed.
Negligence; Duty; Causation; Prematurity; Trespass
Concluding that the trial court erred by prematurely granting summary disposition in defendant-appellee’s (Arbor Hills Landfill) favor when genuine disputes of material fact remained, the court reversed and remanded. The case involved the flooding of two of plaintiffs’ properties located downhill and to the west of defendant’s landfill. Defendant argued that plaintiffs could not “create a fact question that [defendant] had a duty to design a water retention system to accommodate a flood of the magnitude that occurred[.]” Plaintiffs first contended that there was a material question of fact as to the severity of the storm. The court concluded “that the evidence plaintiffs submitted created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the severity of the storm and the credibility of” a professional Meteorologist and Consultant who classified the storm as a 200-year event. The court analyzed “defendant’s duty of care under common law,” which imposes “‘on every person engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use due care, or to so govern his actions as not to unreasonably endanger the person or property of others.’” As to causation, the court concluded “that the evidence plaintiffs submitted created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether defendant: (1) failed to maintain its stormwater management system, and (2) had notice that its stormwater management system posed an ongoing threat to nearby properties. Whether defendant’s conduct—in the maintenance (or lack of maintenance) of its stormwater management system—was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries is a question for the jury.” Thus, it found that “the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in defendant’s favor.” Further, the court held that because “there was a reasonable chance that further discovery into these issues could have resulted in factual support for plaintiffs’ claims, summary disposition was premature.” Finally, as to the trespass claim, the court concluded that for the reasons it previously discussed, there was “a genuine dispute as to whether the flow of water in this case was natural or the result of a poorly maintained stormwater management system.” There was “also a genuine dispute as to whether defendant knew or reasonably should have known that its actions could lead to a flood. Therefore, the trial court improperly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for trespass.”
Auto negligence; Sudden-emergency defense; White v Taylor Distrib Co; Presumption of negligence in a rear-end collision case (MCL 257.402(a))
Holding that defendant-McConnaughey did not show he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on his sudden-emergency defense, the court reversed summary disposition for him and remanded. This auto negligence case arose from a rear-end collision. MCL 257.402(a) “establishes a presumption of negligence in a rear-end collision case[.]” In support of his summary disposition motion, “defendant offered his affidavit and the invoice from the repair shop” that examined his vehicle after the collision, “but that did not provide the necessary ‘clear, positive, and credible evidence’ to demonstrate that [he] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Defendant’s affidavit opined that he ‘was unable to stop the vehicle due to an unexpected mechanical failure.’ [His] conclusory belief to that effect, however, is insufficient in itself to support his” summary disposition motion. The court noted that he did not “purport to specify exactly what that ‘unexpected mechanical failure’ was, in his view. Taken together and on their face, the affidavit and invoice” showed that he “applied his brakes before the collision but they failed to stop his vehicle, and that the drive shaft on [his] vehicle was found to be damaged after the accident. To the extent [his] claimed mechanical failure was of his vehicle’s brakes, there is nothing in the evidence presented to support that conclusion; the invoice from the repair shop reflects no such failure, nor can mechanical failure simply be assumed from the mere fact that defendant says he applied his brakes but still hit plaintiff. And to the extent defendant’s claimed mechanical failure was of his vehicle’s drive shaft, the evidence provides nothing to connect the damage to that drive shaft to his vehicle’s failure to stop.” Thus, the court concluded his offered evidence was inadequate to support his sudden emergency claim. It found that the trial court erred in “looking past these deficiencies in defendant’s proofs and focusing instead on plaintiff’s evidentiary offerings (or lack thereof) in response.” By law, defendant “was presumed negligent.” He did not present “evidence that would, even unopposed, be adequate to rebut his presumed negligence and demonstrate that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the sudden-emergency doctrine.” Plaintiff’s failure to produce further evidence in response to his evidence did not make his motion any more viable.
Child’s best interests; Guardianship; Bond with the parent
Holding that the trial court did not err in determining termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in child-JEB’s best interests, the court affirmed. It found that “the trial court properly considered alternatives to termination and found that a guardianship would not be in JEB’s best interests.” The court concluded that “the record indicated that, although father loved JEB, it was unclear if JEB was bonded to father. Even if they were bonded, the trial court observed that the bond was not healthy for JEB.” It was “clear that any bond JEB maintained with father was not healthy for JEB, who needed permanency and stability that father could not provide.” The court also held that as “further found by the trial court, father did not provide a stable living situation for his current children and would be unable to provide stability and permanency for JEB. Father lacked commitment to completing services and failed to provide proof that he had obtained suitable employment or housing. He smoked marijuana throughout the proceedings and refused to quit or submit to drug screenings, despite the recommendations of his substance abuse assessment. Father did not properly store his marijuana to keep it out of JEB’s reach. Because father failed to comply with or benefit from the services provided to him during the two-year proceeding, he lacked the ability to provide proper care to JEB. Meanwhile, JEB was thriving in his foster care placement and was bonded with his foster parents. The foster parents were interested in adopting JEB, who had been in their care since” 9/23.