Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Challenge to a public university’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement for student-athletes; The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer; Mechanism for individualized exemptions; Fulton v City of Philadelphia; Strict scrutiny; Request for a stay of a preliminary injunction pending appeal; Crookston v Johnson; Likelihood of success on the merits factor
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] In an order, the court concluded that defendants-Western Michigan University officials likely violated plaintiffs-student-athletes’ First Amendment right to free exercise by allegedly ignoring or denying their requests for a religious exemption to the University’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement for student-athletes. Thus, the court denied defendants’ request to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction barring them from enforcing the vaccine mandate against plaintiffs. In considering the relevant factors as to whether to grant a stay pending appeal, the court focused on the likelihood that defendants would prevail on the merits on appeal. Thus, it examined the strength of plaintiffs’ free exercise claim. It determined “that the University’s failure to grant religious exemptions to plaintiffs burdened their free exercise rights.” It next considered the level of scrutiny to apply. Because the University retained “discretion to extend exemptions” from the mandate for religious reasons, the policy was “not generally applicable. As a result, the University must prove that its decision not to grant religious exemptions to plaintiffs survives strict scrutiny.” The court concluded that while the University’s interest in fighting COVID-19 was compelling, it faltered “on the narrow tailoring prong.” After considering the other stay factors, it found that “plaintiffs’ strong likelihood of success on their free exercise claim carries the day.” The court noted that its holding was narrow and that other University efforts to combat COVID-19 may be constitutional. “But having announced a system under which student-athletes can seek individualized exemptions, the University must explain why it chose not to grant any to plaintiffs. And it did not fairly do so here.”
Alleged breach of a clinical clerkship agreement; Contract interpretation; Mahnick v Bell Co
The court held that defendant-healthcare organization was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff-university board of governors’ breach of contract complaint. Plaintiff entered into a clerkship agreement with defendant that enabled students from plaintiff’s medical school to participate in clinical clerkships at defendant’s hospitals, including its children’s hospital (CH). A physician group (UP) affiliated with plaintiff administered the program, but when disputes arose, plaintiff formed another group to handle administration. A majority of the physicians from UP opted to continue as physicians with UP. CH then entered into a services agreement with UP, prompting plaintiff to sue defendant. It alleged defendant breached the clerkship agreement by granting UP an exclusive contract to treat pediatric patients at CH, contrary to provisions requiring plaintiff’s medical school faculty to teach and supervise students in their clinical clerkships, as well as exercise hospital privileges. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the clerkship agreement allowed it to choose the physicians who would teach its students. On appeal, the court framed the question as whether plaintiff had the contractual right—through the clerkship agreement—to have its faculty-member physicians supervise and teach its medical students in their clinical clerkships at CH. It agreed with the trial court that “no such contractual right existed.” The clerkship agreement “provided for the practicing physicians at each” of defendant’s hospitals “to administer, coordinate, and supervise [plaintiff’s] medical students in the clinical clerkship program.” It agreed with the trial court’s finding that there was no provision in the clerkship agreement that required defendant to either employ or utilize plaintiff’s medical school’s “faculty-member physicians to supervise and teach [its] medical students in the clinical clerkship program.” Affirmed.
Amendment of the information to reinstate a CSC I charge; Whether MCL 767.29 & MCR 6.112(H) conflict; People v Curtis; People v Ostafin; People v Richmond; Due process right to present a defense; Motion for appointment of an expert on false confessions; Refusal to conduct an in camera inspection of the victim’s medical & psychological records; Sentencing; Reasonableness; Vindictive sentencing; North Carolina v Pearce
The court held that the language of MCL 767.29 and MCR 6.112(H) do not conflict, and that because “defendant did not establish unfair surprise or prejudice,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting amendment of the information under MCR 6.112(H) to reinstate the CSC I charge. Also, even though the trial court denied his motion for appointment of an expert, he “was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present a false-confession defense.” Further, he “was not denied the right to present a meaningful defense as a result of the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for in camera review of the victim’s privileged records.” Finally, his 20 to 40 year sentence for CSC I was reasonable and was not vindictive. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s motion to reinstate the CSC I charge that had been dismissed after his first trial. He argued that “after an offense is dismissed at the prosecutor’s request, that offense can only be reinstated by the prosecutor filing a new indictment in district court. Because the prosecutor did not follow this procedure,” defendant asserted that he was entitled to another new trial. He did not directly address the prosecution’s claim that the amendment to the information was proper under MCR 6.112(H). Instead, he relied on MCL 767.29 and related case law to support his claim. The court held that the language of MCL 767.29 and MCR 6.112(H) do not conflict. Deciding that Curtis, Ostafin, and Richardson were not controlling and that “MCL 767.29 does not describe the proper procedure for reinstating a charge that was previously dismissed pursuant to” a nolle prosequi, the court turned to the court rule applied by the trial court when it amended the information and reinstated the CSC I charge, considering whether, under that rule, the amendment unfairly surprised or prejudiced defendant. “Because the amendment did not result in unfair surprise or prejudice to defendant, we conclude that the trial court properly amended the information under MCR 6.112(H) to reinstate” the CSC I charge. The court cautioned that its conclusion was based on the very specific set of facts—none of which were present in Curtis, Ostafin, or Richmond. Under different circumstances, such as those at issue in Richmond and Ostafin, it may have held that the prosecution in this case was required to begin the proceedings anew. Affirmed.
Medical malpractice; Expert testimony; MCL 600.2955; MRE 702 & 703; Standard of care (SOC); A patient’s right to refuse anesthesia & a doctor’s obligation to honor the patient’s directive; In re Rosebush; An expert’s opinion based on assumptions not based on record evidence; Badalamenti v William Beaumont Hosp-Troy; Deposition testimony; A doctor’s statements in treatment notes; Requirements for a party to be bound by a statement; Dykes v William Beaumont Hosp
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that plaintiff’s expert’s (L) opinion testimony did not meet MRE 702 and 703’s requirements, and that it properly considered defendant-doctor’s (Albers) deposition testimony because it did not irreconcilably conflict with her treatment notes. Further, no genuine issue of material fact existed based on the decedent’s (Hal) medical records, the treatment notes, and Albers’s deposition testimony. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. L testified that the SOC “for laceration wound management required x-raying the wound and thoroughly cleansing it with adequate liquid under pressure. The record” showed that L based “his opinions on his belief that Hal’s deep wound could not have been adequately cleansed, irrigated, and probed because Hal declined anesthesia and Dr. Albers did not administer any despite his refusal.” While L suggested that “Albers should have administered anesthesia or a sedative despite Hal’s refusal[,]” the court noted that Hal “had the right to decline the administration of anesthesia and Dr. Albers had the obligation to honor his directive.” The record also did not support L’s assumption “that Hal must have withdrawn from noxious stimuli and pain associated with irrigating and probing his wound making it impossible for Dr. Albers to cleanse it.” That assumption led to L’s additional assumption that “Albers failed to adequately irrigate and probe the wound to reveal and remove a suspected foreign body.” However, it could not reasonably be inferred from the medical records and “treatment notes that Hal recoiled or withdrew from Dr. Albers’s efforts and precluded her from adequately cleansing, probing, inspecting, or suturing his wound.” The trial court did not err in determining that L based his SOC opinions on speculation, and thus, they were inadmissible. It properly excluded L’s “opinion testimony and ruled that plaintiff could not establish her prima facie case because she could not rely on” L’s speculative SOC opinions.
Premises liability; Duty owed to an invitee; Hoffner v Lanctoe; Trespass; Pippin v Atallah; Open & obvious danger; Estate of Livings v Sage’s Inv Group, LLC; Special aspects; Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc; Jury instructions; Causation; The statutory collateral-source rule; MCL 600.6303; The common-law setoff rule; MCL 600.6304(4)
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant-property owner summary disposition as to plaintiffs’ premises liability claim, by denying its motion for a directed verdict, or by declining to give defendant’s requested jury instructions. It also held that the trial court properly left to the jury the question of whether the condition that injured plaintiffs was open and obvious, and properly refused to reduce the amounts of plaintiffs’ judgments under the statutory collateral-source rule or the common-law setoff rule. Plaintiffs suffered electrocution injuries while working on defendant’s premises. The case went to trial on the premises liability claim, and the jury returned verdicts for plaintiffs. Defendant claimed the allegedly hazardous condition was open and obvious and, in any event, it met its duty to plaintiffs, regardless of whether they were invitees or trespassers. “[P]laintiffs would at most be known trespassers and [defendant] would have had a duty of care to refrain from active negligence. There was evidence to show [defendant] was actively negligent when its agents assured plaintiffs that it was safe to continue working in the excavated area. There was, as a consequence, evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that plaintiffs were invitees, not trespassers.” As to defendant’s claim that the conduit was open and obvious, “notwithstanding plaintiffs’ knowledge of the conduit, th[e] evidence supported a finding that plaintiffs would not have had reason to know that the condition was dangerous.” The court next rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by declining to give its requested instructions defining what constitutes a trespasser and stating the duty owed by landowners to trespassers, and by giving plaintiffs’ requested instruction that landowners’ responsibilities may not be delegated. It was not persuaded defendant “was actually prejudiced,” and noted that omitting the instructions gave defendant “more leeway to argue that plaintiffs were trespassers to whom [defendant] owed no duty.” Further, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of causation. Because of “disputed factual issues, there was a question of fact whether [defendant] was a cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” Affirmed.
Issuance of a PPO in a domestic context; MCL 600.2950(1) & (4); Principle that a court shall not issue a PPO that restrains or enjoins conduct described in subsection (1) if petitioner is the unemancipated minor child of respondent; MCL 600.2950(26)(b); Whether respondent was the natural father or parent as defined by MCL 722.1(b); “Minor” & “emancipated”; Principle that the trial court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before issuing a PPO; Kampf v Kampf; “Good cause”; MCR 3.707(A)(1)(b); Principle that MCL 600.2950(1)(j) allows the trial court to restrain individuals from engaging in conduct prohibited under MCL 750.411h; “Stalking”; MCL 750.411h(1)(a) & (d); Principle that MCL 750.411h does not require a showing of fear; Hayford v Hayford; “Willful”; Jennings v Southwood
Addressing an issue of first impression in these consolidated appeals, the court held that because respondent’s parental rights to the children were terminated at the time petitioner-mother sought PPOs on their behalf, the children were emancipated and the trial court was not precluded from issuing the PPOs under MCL 600.2950(26)(b). It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPOs. Petitioner filed two separate petitions seeking ex parte PPOs against respondent on behalf of the children. She alleged he attended four of one of the children’s basketball games, where he stood up in the stands and tried to intimidate the child. She claimed the children exhibited mental distress after seeing him at the games. The trial court entered an ex parte PPO against respondent on behalf of the children. He unsuccessfully moved to terminate the orders, asserting they could not be issued against him because he was the parent of the unemancipated children, and that the allegations were insufficient to support their issuance. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of MCL 600.2950(26)(b). “Based on the definitions provided under MCL 722.1,” the children were “‘emancipated minors’ as to respondent because [his] parental rights were terminated at the time the petitions were filed.” As such, “the trial court was not precluded from issuing the PPOs under MCL 600.2950(26)(b) because it did not apply under these circumstances.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the PPOs and denying his motion to terminate them. “The allegations and evidence established that there was reasonable cause to believe that respondent engaged in stalking behavior.” Because he “did not dispute that he attended at least four basketball games on four separate occasions, that he stood in the stands, or that [the children] actually saw him at the games[,]" the trial court did not err in concluding he “engaged in ‘a willful course of conduct’ that included a ‘series of 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.’” It also did not err in holding that the children “experienced emotional distress as a result of respondent’s harassment.” Given the circumstances, “the trial court did not err by concluding that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage would result from the delay required to give notice to respondent or abuse its discretion by granting the” PPOs.