Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Hostile work environment claim under Title VII & 42 USC § 1981; Prima facie case; Evidence that the alleged harassment was “race-based”; Whether the word “monkey” (when used to describe an African American) is racist; Jordan v City of Cleveland; Effect of one of the alleged harassers being African American; Comparative evidence; Whether discrimination based on color is distinct from discrimination based on race; Evidence that the harassment was “severe & pervasive”
The court held that the African American plaintiffs (Smith and Sneed) presented evidence raising a “genuine issue of material fact as to whether they experienced racial harassment.” It also found that the district court erred by (1) disregarding their comparative evidence based on a “narrow conception of racial identity” and (2) determining “that the racial harassment was insufficiently severe or pervasive.” Finally, defendant-employer did not meet “its burden of proving the first prong of” its affirmative defense. Thus, the court reversed summary judgment for defendant and remanded. Plaintiffs worked as truck drivers for defendant. They were paid a daily rate irrespective of hours or distances driven. They alleged that they were required to work more hours than the non-African American drivers for the same pay, sometimes nearly 70 hours per week. They also claimed that their supervisors referred to them as “monkey” or “monkey ass,” and that despite reporting this, no action was taken. Smith resigned to avoid his treatment. Sneed was fired, purportedly for performance deficiencies, although he was never formerly disciplined before his termination. The district court granted defendant summary judgment. The court disagreed with its ruling that the use of the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass” did not constitute evidence of racial harassment. “Based on well-established precedent across multiple circuits,” the supervisors’ use of these terms “constituted evidence of race-specific harassment.” The court rejected its conclusion that the fact one of the alleged harassers was himself African American obviated the racist nature of the terms. As to the district court’s ruling that their comparative evidence was deficient, the court found its reasoning was “deeply flawed.” By relying on a “narrow conception of racial identity, unadorned by legal precedent, the district court effectively imposed a heightened burden on” plaintiffs beyond that required by Title VII and § 1981. It noted that it “has never held that a plaintiff must proffer evidence of a comparator’s racial self-identification or genetic composition to survive judgment in a Title VII case.” Reviewing the comparative evidence, the court found that the supervisors’ alleged verbal abuse constituted “an additional piece of evidence of racial harassment, and the district court erred by rejecting it.” Further, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence “to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were required to work longer hours, drive lengthier routes, and use damaged trucks, unlike their non-African American counterparts. A reasonable jury could infer, from its racially disparate nature, that this unfavorable treatment was based, at least in part, on race.”
“Mere presence” jury instruction (M Crim JI 8.5); Possession instruction (M Crim JI 12.7); Meaningful opportunity to present a defense; The trial court’s failure to read the statement of defendant’s theory of defense to the jury; Prosecutorial error; Alleged threatening of potential defense witnesses; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object & to call certain witnesses
The court rejected defendant’s jury instruction arguments, holding that the mere presence instruction was not supported where the prosecution was not proceeding on an aiding and abetting theory, and that the instructions, taken as a whole, sufficiently protected his rights. It also found no merit in his prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth and cocaine. It noted that the mere presence instruction is warranted “when the prosecution is proceeding under a theory of aiding and abetting.” At trial, the prosecution’s theory “was that defendant possessed the illegal drugs with the intent to deliver them and was not acting as an accomplice. Because an instruction pertinent to aiding and abetting was not supported by the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give” M Crim JI 8.5. Defendant also asserted the prosecution failed to establish that he possessed the illegal substances. The “trial court instructed the jury on each element of each offense with which defendant was charged and instructed the jury that the prosecution was required to prove each element of each charged offense. [It] further instructed the jury on the meaning of possession in accordance with M Crim JI 12.7. These jury instructions were supported by the evidence. The prosecution presented evidence that when the officers entered the house on the night in question, [an officer] saw defendant run down the hallway and into the northeast bedroom. While executing the search warrant,” they found a dresser in that “bedroom contained $4,500 in cash, a bag containing heroin, a bag containing [meth], and a gun light for a pistol. On top of the dresser was a W-2 belonging to defendant and under the mattress they found two empty magazines. In the southeast bedroom, the officers found a suitcase containing clothing, paperwork, and a gun magazine that defendant admitted belonged to him. [He] also admitted that the pill bottle and cash found in the living room belonged to him, and that in the Facebook video he is holding the pill bottle. While in jail, [he] made statements on the telephone that suggested that he was engaged in drug trafficking.” Given that the record supported the trial court’s jury instructions, “no miscarriage of justice occurred.” The court also found “no evidence that the prosecutor threatened the witnesses, or even had contact with” them. Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Cumulative error; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C)(1); People v Loew; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Orlewicz; Appeals to sympathy; Denigration of defense counsel; Due process; Retrial after a mistrial; People v Thompson; People v Sierb; Sentencing; Mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a 20-year-old; MCL 769.25; People v Taylor
The court held that: (1) defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, (2) the judge was not biased, (3) the prosecution did not engage in misconduct, and (4) there was no due process violation in retrying him. Thus, it affirmed defendant’s convictions. However, because he was 20 years old at the time of the offense and the trial court imposed a mandatory LWOP sentence, it vacated his first-degree felony murder sentence and remanded for resentencing under Taylor. “On remand, due process does not require that a different trial judge be assigned.” He was also convicted of felony-firearm, carrying with unlawful intent, and CCW arising from the 2018 shooting of the victim. The court found defense counsel was not ineffective, finding that electing not to call the defense DNA expert again, after her prior testimony conceded “‘the prosecution could be right,’” was reasonable strategy. In addition, the detective’s “opinion that one person was using the phone during the time period examined was based on his expert analysis of the phone records rather than any unscientific personal views.” Thus, any objection would have been futile. Further, allowing headings on non-admitted PowerPoint slides to display a phone number next to defendant’s name was error but not prejudicial given other evidence and limiting instructions. The court next found that defendant failed “to explain how the trial judge’s comments indicate bias or otherwise require disqualification.” As to prosecutorial misconduct, playing graphic body-cam footage showing life-saving efforts was permissible, and brief sympathy remarks about the victim’s family were improper but harmless and cured by instructions. Further, defendant “failed to establish that the prosecutor impermissibly attacked defense counsel.” His due process claim also failed “in light of Thompson and Sierb, in which our Supreme Court rejected the type of due process claim that defendant is asserting.”
Sentencing; Enhanced mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); 18 USC § 924(e)(1); “Different occasions” determination; Erlinger v United States; Whether the Erlinger error here was harmless; United States v Thomas; Structural error claim; United States v Campbell; Whether the ACCA enhancement implicated double jeopardy; Applicability of United States v Bell; Presentence Report (PSR)
In this previously unpublished opinion, the court affirmed defendant-Ballinger’s mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA where the fact that he burglarized nine different unconnected victims, along with the large gap in time between offenses, showed that the Erlinger error here was harmless. He pled guilty to FIP in 2022. His 180-month sentence included the AACA’s mandatory minimum enhancement. The PSR contained a list of 22 prior felony convictions, of which 11 were burglaries. When Ballinger was sentenced, district court judges were permitted to determine whether the predicate offenses were committed on different occasions, and the district court judge did so here. But in 2024, the Supreme Court held in Erlinger that “whether predicate violent felonies were committed on different occasions ‘must be submitted to a jury and found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.’” The court rejected Ballinger’s first argument, that applying the ACCA enhancement to his sentence constituted structural error, noting that it had “already decided that Erlinger errors are not structural.” He next asserted that his prior convictions could not constitute admissible evidence because Erlinger prohibited using Shepard documents when determining facts about prior offenses. The court disagreed, noting that in Thomas, it held that “Shepard documents may still be relied on to conduct a harmless error review in the different-occasions context.” The court noted that Ballinger provided no basis for the district court to question the accuracy of the list in the PSR, and the district court was entitled to rely on it. It also found no merit to his claim that the error was not harmless “because some juries have held that large gaps in time still constitute a single occasion. That argument misapprehends the nature of the analysis.” The court noted that it examines “the harmless error question through the objective lens of a reasonable jury. . . . This inquiry does not turn on the empirics of what a specific jury did in another case, but on what a reasonable jury would have done here.” Thus, it considered “whether a reasonable jury could have reasonable doubt that the three burglaries furthest from each other” – 2010, 1/4/16, and 10/17/16 – “took place on ‘occasions different from one another.’” The court held that “no reasonable jury could conclude that any two of these burglaries took place on the same occasion.” Finally, Ballinger’s argument that the enhancement violated he Double Jeopardy Clause failed where he could not establish plain error.
Violation of conditions of supervised release; Finding that defendant had committed a crime; Whether any error was harmless
The court held that any error in the district court’s finding as to one of defendant-Kidd’s alleged supervised release condition violations was harmless where he admitted three other violations that would have supported revocation of his supervised release. Kidd was found to have violated the terms of his supervised release by failing to enroll in either a substance abuse or mental health treatment program, lying about doing so, failing to appear for a drug test, and by being charged with a state misdemeanor for assault and stalking. Kidd only contested the state misdemeanor allegation. After a hearing where it heard evidence from law-enforcement officers, the district court ruled that a preponderance of the evidence indicated that Kidd had committed the misdemeanor. Because he had violated four conditions of his supervised release, the district court revoked his supervised release in both of his federal cases and sentenced Kidd to 14 months. Kidd argued that it “should have been highly skeptical of the alleged victim’s unsworn statements to” two law enforcement officers. He noted the lack of physical evidence and claimed her allegations were made in revenge due to “an attempted ‘romantic relationship[.]’” The court noted that “weighing conflicting evidence and picking which story is more persuasive is the district court’s job, not ours on clear error review.” In any event, it concluded that any error on this issue would not have resulted in a different outcome. The court explained that Kidd had conceded to committing three other Grade C violations, and one violation was enough to support revocation. Moreover, he would have been subject to the same 8- to 14-month guideline recommendation even if the state offense had been excluded. Based on its previous contacts with Kidd, the district court “thought it best for Kidd to be incarcerated ‘as long as possible,’ resulting in the 14-month sentence.” Affirmed.
The Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; Inquiry into the breakdown of an attorney-client relationship; Whether defendant’s motion appropriately put the district court on notice that he was dissatisfied with his counsel & wanted a change; Principle that a defendant must be permitted to make important decisions as to the direction of his case regardless of whether he is represented; Benitez v United States; “Hybrid representation”; United States v Liggin
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court erred by rejecting defendant-Riley’s motion for reconsideration asserting that he was proceeding pro se because his counsel had agreed to a resentence stipulation without his knowledge and against his wishes. The court concluded his motion was sufficient to “put the district court on notice that he was dissatisfied with his counsel and wanted a change.” It was “not improper hybrid representation; it was a defendant’s proper assertion of dissatisfaction with his representation.” He was sentenced to 160 months after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Amendment 821 to the Guidelines later gave him a new range of 121 to 151 months. He “received a public defender to represent him in resentencing proceedings.” His counsel and the government stipulated that Riley was entitled to resentencing and recommended a 144-month sentence, to which the district court agreed. Riley later filed a motion for reconsideration, purporting “to appear ‘in his pro-se litigant capacity.’” He alleged that his attorney had agreed to the sentence without his knowledge or consent, and argued that he should be sentenced to time served. The district court denied his motion without reaching the merits of his claims. On appeal, the court explained that if there is “a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship” a defendant may move to replace counsel, or to proceed pro se. The district court must then “inquire into the reasons for, and nature of, the defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel and to replace or dismiss counsel if necessary.” The court noted that it has held that “a defendant is not required to make an explicit request . . . .” But not every disagreement about strategy “rises to the necessary level.” Riley claimed that his counsel “made a decision affecting the overarching aims of the representation without his knowledge or assent.” He had the right to decide whether to accept or reject the sentence disposition offered by the government even if he was represented by counsel. His motion was sufficient to give rise to an obligation by the district court “to determine whether the attorney-client relationship had in fact fractured, and, if so, what further action was necessary.” Riley’s motion did not constitute hybrid representation to the extent he “raised an antecedent issue about his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation: whether his attorney had entered a stipulation on his behalf, without his consent.” The court vacated the district court’s judgment on his motion and remanded “for the district court to conduct the proper inquiry into whether Riley wishes to dismiss his counsel and whether he is entitled to do so[,]” and to proceed accordingly.
Denial of “surviving spouse” rights under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i); “Willfully absent”; In re Estate of Von Greiff; Hearsay; MRE 803; Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs)
The court concluded that even if the trial court “erred by admitting the challenged hearsay testimony, any error was harmless,” and while it misapplied Von Greiff, it properly denied plaintiff-Andrea the rights of a “surviving spouse” under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i). She argued “that the trial court clearly erred by finding that she was ‘willfully absent’ for the purposes of MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i), given that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay and misapplied the framework for interpreting that statutory provision in Von Greiff.” The court found that “to the extent that the trial court arguably erred by admitting” testimony by one of the Co-PRs, “any error was harmless because the substance of her testimony was well-supported by the will itself, as the trial court correctly observed.” Andrea next argued “that the trial court misapplied Von Greiff when it concluded that she was not a ’surviving spouse’ under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i).” The court assumed “that the trial court correctly understood that the relevant lookback period at issue in this case” was from 12/22 to 12/23. More importantly, it agreed “with the reasoning and ultimate ruling of the trial court.” It was undisputed that in 4/21, “Andrea moved to her own condominium unit with her personal belongings and ceased contributing to” her deceased husband’s (Donald) “bills or other debts accumulated during the marriage. This suggests complete physical absence.” Further, the record indicated that they “had minimal and insignificant contact after” 4/21. The court found that simply “put, the timeline of this case removes it from the scope of Von Greiff.” But it agreed “with the trial court’s implicit reasoning that because Andrea was willfully absent from Donald from” 4/21 to 8/22, the 8/22 “initiation of divorce proceedings did not revive or renew the marital relationship for the purposes of MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i).” The court concluded “that defendants rebutted the presumption that Andrea was not ‘willfully absent’ from Donald between [12/22 and 12/23] notwithstanding that divorce proceedings were ongoing during that time.” The totality of the circumstances showed “that Andrea was completely absent from Donald for a continuous period of at least one year before his death, with the specific intent to be absent.” Affirmed.
Reasonable reunification efforts; Accommodating a respondent’s psychological & mental-health disabilities; In re Hicks/Brown; Credibility; Child’s best interests; In re Mota
The court held that (1) the DHHS fulfilled “its duty to provide adequate reunification services that reasonably accommodated” respondent-mother’s mental-health disabilities and (2) the record showed that terminating her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. She did not challenge the statutory grounds for termination. Rather, she argued the DHHS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts “because its employees failed to sufficiently assist her in obtaining suitable housing in light of her psychological and mental-health disabilities.” The court disagreed, finding that the record showed the “DHHS made sufficient efforts to assist respondent in obtaining suitable housing, but that [she] failed to follow through with referrals and otherwise failed to take advantage of the services provided to her.” The DHHS knew that she “suffered from several mental-health disabilities.” But the record did not support her claim that it “failed to provide her adequate, specialized housing assistance in light of” those disabilities. A foster-care worker (L) “testified that she provided [her] numerous housing-related resources, including sending her applications for housing commissions and waiting lists for Section 8 housing. When respondent expressed that she needed additional help, [L] personally helped [her] to the extent that she was able to do so and thereafter provided her phone numbers for resource providers who could give her more in-depth, individualized assistance. There is no indication that respondent contacted the resource providers.” L further testified that respondent’s assigned parent partner (E) “provided respondent housing-related resources and helped [her] obtain personal identification documents necessary to apply for housing.” But according to E, “respondent did not follow through with the housing resources provided to her.” As to the child’s best interests, the record showed that her “parenting ability was poor despite her participation in numerous parenting-related services.” In addition, the DHHS presented evidence of the child’s “need for permanency, stability, and finality[,]” and there were several advantages to her “foster home, as opposed to respondent’s home.” While the record showed respondent had a bond with the child, “considering the best-interest factors outlined in Mota, the” facts of this case “weighed in favor of termination despite the bond.”