Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Landlord-tenant dispute; Appellate jurisdiction; Consolidated actions; Lease validity; Local certificate-of-compliance requirement; Void ab initio; Breach of contract; Disgorgement & unjust enrichment; Conversion; Security deposit; Truth in Renting Act (TIRA); Anti-lockout statute; MCL 600.2918; Housing Law of Michigan (HLM); “Occupant”; Exemplary damages; Contribution; Default; MCR 2.603(D); Costs under MCR 2.625(D)(1); Sanctions; MCR 1.109(E)(5) & (6); Due process
The court held that the parties’ residential lease was void ab initio because it violated a local rental-certificate ordinance, which affected several of plaintiff-tenant’s claims and defeated defendant-landlords’ breach-of-contract claim. Further, plaintiff was denied due process before sanctions were imposed. The dispute arose after plaintiff stopped paying rent and eventually left the rental condominium, asserting persistent roof leaks and mold. The landlords sued for unpaid rent, while plaintiff filed a separate action raising numerous landlord-tenant claims. On appeal, the court first rejected the landlords’ jurisdictional arguments. Turning to the lease, the landlords admitted they never obtained the certificate of compliance required by the applicable township ordinance. The court explained that “a contract is void if it is made contrary to law or public policy” and rejected the reasoning that illegality could matter only if the ordinance created a private cause of action. Rather, “courts should not recognize illegal contracts regardless of who has a right to enforce the underlying law.” Because renting and occupying the unit were “‘central to the parties’ agreement,’” the entire lease was void ab initio. Thus, the landlords could not recover for breach of the lease, and plaintiff likewise had no contractual claim against them. But the court reinstated his disgorgement and unjust-enrichment claims because unjust enrichment “does not rely on the existence of a valid contract.” It also reinstated his conversion claim as to personal property other than the security deposit, concluding that his complaint sufficiently identified allegedly converted property. The security-deposit conversion claim failed because without a valid lease, the landlords had no contractual “‘obligation to return the specific money entrusted to [their] care.’” The court affirmed dismissal of the TIRA claim because plaintiff was never legally a party to a rental agreement, the anti-lockout claim because it was filed outside the one-year limitations period, and the HLM claim because an “occupant” must be “a current resident.” It also upheld dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against his former partner and the decision setting aside the landlords’ default, although plaintiff was entitled to costs under MCR 2.625(D)(1). Finally, the court held that imposing $500 in sanctions without allowing plaintiff to respond violated due process because “‘a party must receive some type of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before the imposition of sanctions.’” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Other-acts evidence; MRE 404(b); MRE 403; Accosting a child for immoral purposes; MCL 750.145a; Alternative means of committing an offense; Specific unanimity instruction; People v Darga; People v Chelmicki; Sufficiency of the evidence
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other-acts evidence, a specific unanimity instruction was not required as to the alternative means of violating MCL 750.145a, and sufficient evidence supported defendant-Pinkowski's conviction of accosting a child for immoral purposes. Defendant, a 27-year-old health officer at a children’s camp, was convicted of accosting a child for immoral purposes and CSC II involving 14-year-old ES. The trial court admitted evidence of several other inappropriate comments and acts by defendant toward ES during the same summer. On appeal, the court determined that the evidence was offered for proper purposes under MRE 404(b), including defendant’s intent, motive, and common scheme. Defendant’s general denial placed his sexual intent at issue, and the uncharged conduct provided context for both the touching underlying the CSC II charge and his later question asking ES whether she came to the lodge “to have sex with me.” Further, the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because the conduct involved the same victim during the same general time and at the same location. Thus, “Pinkowski’s conduct and comments were highly probative of his intent to engage in sexual activity with ES.” The court next concluded that the jury did not have to unanimously agree whether defendant violated MCL 750.145a by accosting, enticing, or soliciting ES or by encouraging her. Those theories constitute alternative means of satisfying a single element rather than separate offenses, and there was only one charged act serving as the factual basis for the conviction. Finally, the evidence was sufficient where defendant twice asked ES whether she came to have sex with him shortly after trying to have her mimic sexual movements, and other evidence showed sexually motivated touching. A rational jury could find that defendant intended to accost, solicit, induce, or encourage ES to have sex with him. Affirmed.
Motion to withdraw guilty plea; Voluntariness; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Advice on the consequences of defendant’s felony-firearm sentences; People v Corteway; People v Douglas; People v Clark; People v Sawyer; MCL 750.227b(3)
The court held that defendant-Tomes was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in advising him on the consequences of his felony-firearm sentences rendered it involuntary. He pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver meth. He was initially charged with multiple other crimes, including four counts of felony-firearm. He asserted “that his plea was involuntary because it was based on the inaccurate advice that each of his four felony-firearm charges ‘carries an automatic 2 years in prison consecutive to everything else,’ which would potentially result in ‘a mandatory 8 years’ in addition to sentencing on his other charges.” The court concluded that, given “the clear statutory language and legal precedent establishing that felony-firearm sentences are consecutive only to their underlying offense, trial counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” In addition, there was a reasonable probability that the plea process outcome would have been different if Tomes had received competent advice. While he ultimately pled guilty, the record showed “he repeatedly expressed a desire to go to trial.” And after the plea was entered, he “pursued avenues to withdraw it.” The court noted that “the prosecution conceded that trial counsel’s advice clearly misunderstood the law[.]” Further, there was no suggestion in the record that trial counsel’s erroneous advice “was corrected before he accepted the plea offer. In light of the conceded legal error and reasonable probability that Tomes would have pursued trial if properly advised, the trial court abused its discretion” in rejecting his ineffective assistance claim. The court vacated the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded.
Involuntary mental-health treatment; Mootness; Expired treatment order; Collateral legal consequences; Public-significance exception; In re Tchakarova; Evidentiary claims involving authentication & hearsay; Washtenaw County Community Mental Health (WCCMH)
The court held that respondent’s appeal from an expired involuntary mental-health treatment order was moot because no practical relief remained available and neither recognized exception to mootness applied. Respondent-DC was a 74-year-old WCCMH client with schizophrenia and depression who had a history of prior involuntary hospitalizations. After petitioner-social worker alleged that DC left threatening voice mails, a jury found that he had a mental illness and was a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1). The probate court ordered treatment for up to 180 days, including up to 60 days of hospitalization. On appeal, DC challenged the admission of two voice-mail recordings and related hearsay testimony, as well as petitioner’s argument that he made violent threats. The court did not reach those evidentiary issues because the treatment order had expired. It explained that “‘[a] matter is moot if this Court’s ruling cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy.’” Although civil-commitment cases recognize exceptions for collateral legal consequences and issues of public significance likely to recur yet evade review, neither applied. DC identified no new collateral consequence resulting from this order, and his prior involuntary-treatment history meant the order did not independently create such a consequence. He also failed to argue that his evidentiary claims presented an issue of public significance and therefore abandoned that exception. His request that the court issue guidance concerning proper authentication of recorded evidence confirmed that a decision would provide him no practical relief. Because those general evidentiary questions could be resolved in another case presenting a live controversy, the court dismissed the appeal as moot.
Statutory grounds for termination; §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) & (j); Failure to challenge alternative statutory grounds; Reasonable reunification efforts; Mental-health services; Parent’s responsibility to participate in & benefit from services
The court held that respondent-mother was not entitled to relief from the order terminating her parental rights because she failed to challenge three independently sufficient statutory grounds and did not establish error in the finding that DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. The children were removed after they were found home alone, with one child bleeding and found inside an oven that was on. The petition also alleged prior CPS involvement, substance abuse, untreated mental-health issues, and suicide attempts. After approximately a year of respondent’s noncompliance with services and parenting time, the trial court terminated her parental rights under §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). On appeal, respondent challenged only § (c)(ii). Because “only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence,” her failure to challenge §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) independently precluded appellate relief as to the statutory grounds. The court also rejected her unpreserved reasonable-efforts claim. DHHS recognized her mental-health difficulties and referred her for psychological, mental-health, and substance-abuse assessments. It made repeated referrals after she failed to follow through, offered transportation assistance, used calls, texts, and e-mails to remind her of appointments, provided calendars and priority lists, and referred her to additional mental-health and family-treatment programs. The court concluded that “DHHS modified services several times in an attempt to accommodate respondent-mother and reunify her with the children.” Respondent attended some services but did not continue with them and failed to meaningfully address her mental health. Given the services offered and her “commensurate responsibility” to participate in and benefit from them, she failed to show any error affecting her substantial rights. Affirmed.
Child-protective adjudication; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); 42 USC § 12132; In re Terry; Reasonable reunification efforts; ADA modifications; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii); Ineffective assistance of counsel
The court held that respondent-father was not entitled to relief based on the alleged failure to provide ADA accommodations, that the DHHS was not required to provide reunification services under the circumstances, and that respondent failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel at the adjudication trial. The proceedings arose after respondent was accused of sexually abusing his stepdaughter (AK), resulting in CSC I and CSC II convictions. A jury subsequently found grounds for jurisdiction over his four children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Before the adjudication trial, respondent asserted that a closed-head injury affected his ability to keep up with the proceedings and requested a recording device as a memory aid. The trial concluded that day before one could be obtained. On appeal, the court relied on Terry in rejecting his claim against the trial court because termination proceedings do not constitute “services, programs or activities” under § 12132 and an ADA violation cannot be asserted as a defense to them. As to the DHHS, the trial court found aggravated circumstances based on respondent’s criminal sexual conduct. Because the DHHS sought termination on that basis, no case service plan was required and its “obligation to provide reunification services, along with any reasonable accommodations, did not arise.” Respondent also failed to identify any modified service DHHS should have provided or show resulting prejudice. His ineffective-assistance claims likewise failed. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek an ADA accommodation that respondent could not establish he was entitled to, and his remaining claims concerning counsel’s failure to cross-examine witnesses, present witnesses, and object to the jury’s use of the criminal-case register of actions were insufficiently briefed and lacked a showing of deficient performance or prejudice. Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(j); Children’s best interests; Effect of relative placement; In re Olive/Metts
Holding that § (j) was established by clear and convincing evidence, and that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. The DHHS “became involved with respondent after several allegations of substance abuse, physical abuse, and unsafe home conditions.” He first began using meth “in 2018, at which time he, in his own words, ‘binged until something happened’ four months later. [He] then got clean but relapsed” and later pled guilty to delivering or manufacturing meth. He was sentenced to three years’ felony probation. By 5/24, he “was using ‘daily’ until his children were removed from his care that July. [He] was ordered to comply with a service plan that included random drug screens and substance abuse counseling.” But from July to September, when he was again charged with delivering or manufacturing meth, he “consistently either failed to appear for” the screens or tested positive for meth. The court acknowledged that he made “significant progress in addressing his substance abuse issues” after that arrest, but noted this by itself did “not undermine the reasonable likelihood, based on respondent’s past conduct, that his children will be harmed if they are returned to his custody and care.” Two of them (CN and KN1) “repeatedly expressed that they do not want to have any contact with” him, and he “acknowledged saying things to CN that ‘no parent should say . . . to a child.’” The children have struggled with anger and dental issues, and one has twice attempted suicide. As to their best interests, the “trial court expressly considered each child’s age, their respective relative placement, and the possibility of adoption.” It found that CN and KN1 would be over legal age, or close to it, “by the time respondent completed his criminal sentence. [It] found it significant that KN2 and RN could not be placed together because each child had trauma and behavioral issues that required individualized attention.” It emphasized that they “were improving in their individual relative placements and were finally addressing their issues.” While relative placement “weighs against termination, a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial” court’s finding that termination was in their best interests.
Breach-of-trust claims; One-year limitations period; MCL 700.7905(1)(a) & (2); Adequate disclosure of potential claim; MCL 700.1215; Kilian v TCF Nat’l Bank; Ducharme v Ducharme; Silent fraud/fraudulent concealment; Civil conspiracy
The court held that appellant’s claims arising from appellee-trustee Huntington’s use of Trust funds to purchase a condominium were barred by MCL 700.7905(1)(a)’s one-year limitations period because a 11/22 Trust statement adequately disclosed the potential claims and informed him of the time for commencing a proceeding. Appellant and his brother were remainder beneficiaries of the Trust, while their mother was the income beneficiary. Huntington authorized a $201,185 Trust distribution to purchase from appellant the condominium in which his mother lived. Appellant later alleged that Huntington breached its fiduciary duties by funding the purchase, failing to have the Trust take title, failing to adequately disclose the transaction, and permitting his mother to arrange for the condominium to pass to his brother after her death. He filed his petition on 2/1/24. The court concluded that the 11/22 statement provided sufficient information to trigger MCL 700.7905. It expressly identified a $201,185 distribution to the title agency for the “PURCHASE OF HOUSE,” while appellant, as seller, necessarily knew the purchase price, title agency, and closing date. “At minimum, these circumstances provided appellant with sufficient information to recognize the potential existence of a claim, or at the very least, to prompt further inquiry into whether such a claim existed.” His 12/22 inquiry and his attorney’s subsequent correspondence concerning Trust activity further demonstrated that the statement contained enough information to prompt investigation. The court also rejected appellant’s contention that he did not receive the pages containing the one-year notice. Huntington produced statements containing the disclosure, appellant had received monthly statements since 2021, and his claim that the pertinent pages were missing amounted to “speculation unsupported by the record.” Finally, his silent-fraud/fraudulent-concealment and civil-conspiracy claims were merely restatements of the time-barred fiduciary-duty claims concerning the condominium transaction. Affirmed.