Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Action seeing personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); Rescission of an insurance policy on the basis of fraud; Meemic Ins. Co. v. Fortson; Mandatory coverage; MCR 500.3114(1); Attorney fees & costs; MCL 500.3148(2); “Claim”; Case evaluation sanctions; MCR 2.403; The interest-of-justice exception; MCR 2.403(O)(11); Haliw v. Sterling Hts. (On Remand)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-insurer summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claim for PIP benefits, or by granting it attorney fees, costs, and case evaluation sanctions. Plaintiffs sued defendant to recover PIP benefits after a car accident. Defendant argued it was entitled to rescind the policy because plaintiff-Simpson and a friend had misrepresented on the insurance application that they resided together, and because, had they been truthful, it would not have issued the policy. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendant and allowing it to rescind the policy. To the extent defendant “sought to rescind its no-fault policy on the basis of the antifraud provision, the antifraud provision is enforceable because the alleged fraud related to the procurement of the policy and consequently is based on a type of common-law fraud that would allow for rescission.” In addition, the trial court did not err by concluding that the policy could be rescinded as to both plaintiffs because even though Simpson lived at the address on the policy, she misrepresented that both of them lived at that address. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court erred by ruling defendant was entitled to attorney fees against Simpson because, once the policy was rescinded, it was no longer legally entitled to such an award. “During the 21-month period in which this action was pending, [plaintiffs] were able to, and did, file claims for payment of PIP benefits under the policy, and [defendant] defended against those claims. . . . The plain language of MCL 500.3148(2) allows an insurer to seek an award of attorney[] fees for fraudulent or excessive claims in such a situation.” Finally, the court rejected their contention that the trial court erred by awarding defendant case evaluation sanctions against both plaintiffs and by declining to apply the interest-of-justice exception. “Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the law was not unsettled in this area.” Affirmed.
Exclusion of evidence as to defendant’s motivation for CCW; MRE 103(a)(2); People v. King; People v. Benton; People v. Elston; Relevance; MCR 401 & 402; MCL 750.227(2); Principle that the mens rea requirement does not extend to the defendant’s purpose for CCW; People v. Hernandez-Garcia; People v. Triplett; Self-defense; Waived issue; People v. Carter; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Unger
The court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the irrelevant evidence related to defendant’s motivation for CCW. Also, the trial court’s evidentiary ruling did not violate her constitutional right to a defense because she was not entitled to assert it. Finally, reversal was not warranted because the prosecutor’s comment did not deny her “a fair trial or affect the outcome of the proceedings.” Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence as to her motivation for CCW and erroneously prevented her from asserting self-defense. The substance of the excluded evidence as to the sexual assault allegations against C “was made known to the trial court through the parties’ motions and arguments before trial, and it determined that the evidence should be excluded because it was not relevant to” her CCW charge. Defendant was charged with CCW for carrying a concealed pistol. Thus, the only relevant intent was whether she knowingly possessed the pistol. Because her purpose “did not make it any more or less probable that defendant knowingly possessed a pistol during the incident, evidence regarding defendant’s reason for carrying a pistol—namely the allegations that [C] sexually assaulted her son—was not relevant.” Affirmed.
Whether an indictment was duplicitous; United States v. Gandy; United States v. Kakos; Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B); “Jury unanimity"; United States v. Davis; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ramos v. Louisiana; United States v. Hood; Effect of proper jury instructions; United States v. Lloyd; Bank fraud; 18 USC § 1344(1); Shaw v. United States; Sufficiency of the evidence for a bank fraud conviction; United States v. Guzman (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Springer (8th Cir.); Forbearance agreements as “something of value”; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 cmt. d; United States v. LeBeau (7th Cir.); United States v. Colton (4th Cir.); Prosecutorial misconduct; United States v. Carter; United States v. Carroll; Asking jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes; United States v. Al-Maliki; United States v. Roman (7th Cir.); Curative jury instructions; United States v. Acosta; United States v. Warshak; Appeal to the jurors’ duty to the community; Hicks v. Collins; Denial of leave to file a later Rule 33 motion; United States v. Munoz; “Excusable neglect”; Fed.R.Crim.P 45(b); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship; United States v. Elenniss (Unpub. 6th Cir.)
The court held that the district court’s jury instructions cured defendant-Hall’s concerns about a duplicitous indictment, and that her convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Further, although it found some of the prosecutor’s statements on closing argument were improper, they were not flagrant enough to warrant reversal. Finally, it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to move for a new trial. Hall was convicted of 11 counts of bank fraud and a count of identity theft involving fraudulent student loans. She first argued that the indictment was duplicitous because it included both § 1344(1) and (2) in each count related to one loan where it should have separated “1344(1) as one count for a particular loan and § 1344(2) as another count for that same loan.” She did not contest the indictment before trial, but argued on appeal that she was denied her right to jury unanimity. The court concluded that even if § 1344(1) and (2) are separate offenses that require separate counts in the indictment, “the jury instructions cured any potential error.” Before closing arguments, the government elected to rely only on § 1344(1). Thus, the district court only instructed the jury on § 1344(1). Given that “the government elected to rely on § 1344(1), and the district court only instructed on the elements for § 1344(1),” there was no concern here Hall was convicted “for anything besides violating § 1344(1).” She next claimed that there was insufficient evidence to establish bank fraud as to a fraudulent forbearance agreement because granting forbearance on a loan did not deprive the bank of something of value. The court disagreed, noting that forbearance agreements have been held to constitute something of value, and that its sister circuits have held that such an agreement can constitute the foundation for a count of bank fraud under § 1344(1). As to Hall’s prosecutorial misconduct claims, the court held that even if the prosecutor’s statements implying that the jurors were victims of the crime were improper, the remarks were “isolated” to closing argument and did not “permeate” the 18-page closing and 7-page rebuttal. In addition, the overwhelming evidence against Hall supported a finding that the statements were not “flagrant.” Finally, the court found that it could not say “the district court erred in finding no excusable neglect and denying Hall leave to move for a new trial.” Affirmed.
Foreclosure by advertisement; The statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract; MCL 600.5807; The statute of limitations applicable to foreclosure on mortgages; MCL 600.5803; Principle that a mortgage is a lien on real property; Prime Fin. Servs. LLC v. Vinton; Enforcement of a lien; Dane Constr., Inc. v. Royal’s Wine & Deli, Inc.; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1); Home-Owners Ins. Co. v. Perkins
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding defendant-bank’s foreclosure proceeding was not barred by the statute of limitations, or by dismissing plaintiffs-homeowners’ complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(1). In response to defendant’s foreclosure proceeding, plaintiffs filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, and a motion to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered. The trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for injunction and dismissing the case, finding they failed to establish an irreparable injury or that an injunction was in the public interest. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by finding defendant’s foreclosure action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. “Defendant foreclosed on its future advance mortgage in 2019, which was within four years of its claim accruing for the entire unpaid balance . . . .” As such, even assuming its “foreclosure by advertisement proceeding could be considered ‘an action to recover damages or money due for breach of contract or to enforce the specific performance of a contract’ under MCL 600.5807, it was not time-barred under that provision.” The court also rejected their claim that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1). “The trial court correctly determined that defendant’s foreclosure by advertisement proceeding was not time-barred, which precluded any award of injunctive relief. Once the trial court concluded that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court was obliged to dismiss the case under MCR 2.116(I)(1).” Affirmed.
Standing to appeal a zoning board’s decision; MCL 125.3605; Olsen v. Chikaming Twp.; Standing to bring a nuisance per se claim; Towne v. Harr
The court held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to address plaintiff’s administrative appeal of defendant-township’s zoning board’s decision to grant intervening defendant a special use permit for a cell tower. As such, it also held that the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining claims was null and void and must be remanded for consideration. Plaintiff claimed defendant’s decision to approve intervening defendant’s special use permit for the erection of a wireless tower was contrary to law, and that the proposed tower was a nuisance per se because it was in violation of defendant’s ordinances. The circuit court upheld defendant’s grant of the special use permit and dismissed plaintiff’s remaining claims. On appeal, the court found the circuit court was “without jurisdiction to address plaintiff’s appeal of” defendant’s zoning board’s decision. “Because plaintiff failed to plead facts to establish that he is an aggrieved party,” he could not “invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court with respect to the” zoning board’s decision. Consequently, the circuit court’s predicate findings for dismissing plaintiff’s remaining claims—that no zoning violation occurred—were null and void and required remand for consideration. Vacated in part and reversed in part.
Quiet title action; MCL 600.2932(1); MCR 3.411(D)(1); Prima facie case of title; Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Pers. Residence Trust v. Emmet Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Deed interpretation; In re Ruddell Estate; Latent ambiguity; Shay v. Aldrich; Whether there was a mutual mistake supporting reformation of the deed; Johnson Family Ltd. P’ship v. White Pine Wireless, LLC; The merger doctrine
Determining that it could not conclude the trial court erred in its factual findings, and that it did not err in reforming a 2005 deed, the court affirmed the ruling that defendants were fee simple owners of the disputed 50-foot area between the parties’ properties. Plaintiff-Timothy and defendant-Mark are brothers. The real property had been in their family for several years, but “conveyances in a series of deeds created a dispute” over ownership of the area (the Disputed Property). Plaintiffs asserted they had a legal interest in it based on a 2018 deed and an earlier intent by Mark’s parents (Harold and Donna) to convey it to plaintiffs in a 1994 deed. Defendants claimed they had an interest in it “based on Harold and Donna’s intent in 2005 to convey to them the entire house and improvements on Defendants’ Property and Harold and Donna’s representations to Mark that the conveyance included the Disputed Property.” The trial court found that defendants obtained fee-simple title as of 7/27/05, and that all later “deeds to the Disputed Property were null and void. Based on the disputed testimony” offered at the bench trial, the court could not conclude that it “clearly erred in reaching its findings of fact.” The court noted that “a trial court’s decision on a close question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion,” and witness credibility is for the trial court to determine in a bench trial. “After hearing testimony from multiple witnesses and visiting the real property, the trial court” concluded that Mark and Timothy’s maternal grandfather “intentionally excluded the 50-foot area of land from the Plaintiffs’ 1994 deed, and that there was a mutual mistake regarding the conveyance of Defendants’ Property to Mark and his wife when the improvements to the home were located on the Disputed Property.” In addition, it determined “that Harold and Donna intended to convey to defendants the entire house and improvements as a part of the 2005 conveyance. Because the house and improvements were partially located on the Disputed Property,” there was a mistake in the deed to the extent that they “conveyed to defendants the physical structures without conveying the land on which the house and improvements were located. The trial court’s reformation of the 2005 Deed fulfilled Harold and Donna’s intent to convey to defendants the entire house and improvements . . . .”
Adjudication orders; In re BZ; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Principle that how a parent treats one child is probative of how the parent may treat other children; In re LaFrance; The procedural phases of child protective proceedings; In re Ferranti; An “unavailable” witness; MRE 804(a); Admissibility of “former testimony”; MRE 804(b)(1); People v. Farquharson; People v. Duncan; MRE 804(a)(4); “Mental infirmity”; Credibility assessments
In these consolidated appeals of adjudication orders as to his daughters (SN and SS), the court found no error in the trial court’s admission of SN’s preliminary exam testimony in a related criminal case under MRE 804(b)(1), and held that it did not clearly err in finding that jurisdiction existed under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). He argued that the trial court erred in determining that SN was “unavailable” to testify in the child protective proceedings due to mental illness. But the DHHS presented testimony that SN “had cut herself, had developed a viable plan to commit suicide, and had been hospitalized to prevent her from committing suicide.” A mental health therapist (P) who treated her testified that SN “was extremely traumatized whenever she was asked to discuss respondent-father’s actions towards her. Simply learning about the filing of child-protection proceedings caused [her] to suffer a severe mental-health breakdown and the child was hospitalized for a second time due to self-harming and suicidal ideations.” P testified that SN was diagnosed with PTSD and major-depressive disorder, and expressed concern that if SN had to testify about respondent again, she would relapse. The court held that these facts were sufficient to find that SN “was ‘unavailable’ for purposes of MRE 804.” In addition, it rejected his claim that “her testimony was not admissible under MRE 804(b)(1) because [he] did not have ‘an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.’” It noted that he was represented by counsel who cross-examined SN at the preliminary exam, and that respondent’s motive to develop her “testimony in the criminal case was ‘similar’ to his motive to develop that testimony in” this case. As to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the evidence indicated that SN “suffered severe emotional harm as a result of” sexual abuse by respondent. The court was not left with a firm conviction the referee made a mistake in concluding that respondent’s “home environment was one of cruelty, neglect, criminality, or depravity, and that it was an unfit place for” SN to live. It further held that the “trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect to exercise jurisdiction over SS.” It noted that both SN and “his stepdaughter testified that he sexually assaulted them,” testimony the trial court found credible. Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Best interests of the child; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors; Guardianship; In re TK
The court held that § (c)(i) supported termination of respondents-parents’ parental rights, and that termination was in the child’s best interests. Their rights were terminated based on “improper supervision, physical neglect, and drug abuse.” On appeal, the court rejected respondent-mother’s argument that a statutory ground for termination was not met. It noted that 182 days or more had elapsed since the initial disposition order was entered and she “still had not rectified the condition—her substance abuse—that led to adjudication.” In addition, because she made “essentially no effort to stop using illegal substances at the time her parental rights were terminated, the trial court did not err in concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood that this condition would be rectified in a reasonable time considering” the child’s age. It found respondent-father abandoned his statutory grounds argument. The court also rejected respondents’ claim that the trial court erred by finding termination was in the child’s best interests. The trial court found that other than visiting the child, they “were almost completely noncompliant with their parent-agency treatment plan,” and the trial court “noted that their attitudes toward the treatment plan made it highly unlikely that this would ever change.” As such, the trial court determined that it was in the child’s “best interests for respondents’ rights to be terminated and for [the child] to be adopted by his foster family.” In addition, the child “had been placed with his foster family for approximately one year at the time of termination,” the foster mother met all of his needs, he was bonded to the foster family, and “the foster mother indicated that she would likely adopt [him] if respondents’ parental rights were terminated.” Thus, adoption provided the child with “the stability and permanence that he needed as opposed to a guardianship.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(g); In re JK; Principle thar only one statutory ground is required; In re HRC; Reunification efforts; A respondent’s responsibility to participate in & benefit from offered services; In re Frey; Children’s best interests; In re Trejo Minors; In re White; In re CR
Holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under § (g), and that it was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. The record showed that she was “failed to comply with and benefit from the case service plan.” She never produced paperwork to show a legal income, and while she obtained housing, it “was not suitable for the children. Respondent acknowledged at the termination hearing that she did not have enough beds for” them. A visiting caseworker on one occasion saw marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia on the coffee table. Respondent left it in plain sight even though she knew the caseworker was coming to the house. Although she contended “on appeal that she had a valid medical marijuana card, she failed to establish during the proceeding that she did not have an issue with substance abuse. Indeed,” despite the fact she was “diagnosed with alcohol and cannabis dependency during the proceeding, she never participated in treatment and did not submit to any drug screenings.” Further, she only submitted to a required psychological evaluation very late in the case “and never participated in counseling to treat her generalized anxiety disorder.” She also did not consistently attend visitation, which affected the children’s behavior and one child’s (A) mental health. A “required mental health treatment” and had physical health issues as well. His treatment was delayed at times due to “respondent’s failure to provide consent for medical testing and medication.” Evidence also supported that the other two children “viewed respondent as a playmate” rather than a parent. While she could have benefitted from a parenting skills class, she did not complete the required class. Her intensive in-home services, designed to help her build appropriate parenting skills and establish stability, were twice terminated due to her noncompliance. The court noted that there was no evidence she “would have been able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time given” the children’s ages. As to their best interests, she consistently displayed “a lack of commitment, an inability or unwillingness to accept responsibility, and an inability to provide” them with stability and permanency. They “were doing well in their respective placements, where they had the opportunity to obtain permanency.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(g); Failure to comply with the PAA; In re JK; Reasonable reunification efforts; A respondent’s responsibility to engage in & benefit from services; In re Frey; Children’s best interests; In re White
Holding that termination was justified under § (g), that it was in the children’s best interests, and that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights. It concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed he did not “comply with the case service plan. He never provided proof that he had obtained suitable, independent housing.” Caseworkers at times were not sure where he was living. While he “reported to DHHS and to the trial court that he was employed, he never provided proof of his income. Respondent also failed to submit to a psychological evaluation. Although respondent did submit to a substance abuse assessment, he failed to comply with the recommendations and did not complete substance abuse treatment.” Further, of the 80 random substance screenings that were requested, he only submitted to 10. He “tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, and amphetamines during the proceeding, and respondent tested positive for illegal drugs during at least one of his visits with the” children. In addition, he did not “complete a parenting class, failed to participate in the ‘parent partner program,’ and failed to consistently attend parenting time.” While he contended he needed more time to participate in services to conquer drug addiction, the record showed he “was offered a myriad of services, including inpatient treatment, to treat his substance abuse issues. Respondent failed to take advantage of these services, and” showed a lack of commitment during the case. As to the children’s best interests, the record did not indicate he was bonded to them, and at the time of termination, he had not seen them in over a year. Further, they “were doing well in their placement, where their special needs were being addressed and where they had the opportunity to obtain permanency.” A caseworker reported that they “were bonded to their foster parents,” whom one of the children referred to as “mom and dad.”