Divorce; Custody; Child’s reasonable preference; MCL 722.23(i); Dailey v. Kloenhamer; Kubicki v. Sharpe; Sinicropi v. Mazurek; Alleged error as to the trial court’s consideration of additional text messages submitted by the defendant-father in response to the plaintiff-mother’s motion for relief from judgment; Yee v. Shiawassee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs; Parenting time; MCL 722.27a; MCL 722.27a(1) & (3); Fletcher v. Fletcher; MCR 2.613(A); Factual findings; McNamara v. Horner; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c); MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a); Mikedis v. Perfection Heat Treating Co.; Lark v. Detroit Edison Co.; Whether an act of neglect is excusable; Muntean v. City of Detroit; Credibility assessments; Rigoni v. Michigan Power Co.; Spousal support; Richards v. Richards; Olson v. Olson; Moore v. Moore; Contributing to error; Munson Med. Ctr. v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Farm Credit Servs. of MI Heartland, PCA v. Weldon; The ripeness doctrine; Mudel v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.; Whether defendant made misrepresentations to the trial court as to plaintiff’s ability to work & potential wage earning capacity; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); King v. McPherson Hosp.; Child support; Stallworth v. Stallworth; Failure to provide supporting authority; Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley; Property division; Gates v. Gates; Child Protective Services (CPS)

The court held, among other things, that while the trial court should have interviewed the child as to best interest factor § (i), the omission was inconsequential because it clearly would not have reached a different conclusion had it done so. Also, given the overwhelming amount of evidence presented by the defendant-father and the plaintiff-mother’s lack of evidence to the contrary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s request for relief from judgment based on fraudulent misrepresentations to the trial court. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying her request for specific parenting time and for relief from the default judgment of divorce. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in failing to make a specific finding on factor § (i) as to the child’s reasonable preference. The trial court determined that a review of the best interest factors overwhelmingly favored the defendant for an award of custody. It did not interview the child to establish her preference, but indicated, “even if the minor child expressed a preference to reside with her mother, it wouldn’t be enough to persuade this court not to grant him sole legal and physical custody.” It elicited testimony from defendant, but also based its decision on a review of the pleadings in the case, its observation of the parties over an extended time period, as well as documentary evidence submitted by defendant. Specifically, it was in possession of a letter authored by the child’s therapist confirming the level of defendant’s support and participation in the child’s therapy, the “recurrent conflicts” between plaintiff and the child, “and the child’s stated preference to the therapist to reside with defendant.” It had “access to various documents submitted for trial verifying plaintiff’s prior suicide attempt, a multitude of police reports,” and a CPS investigation report about an incident of domestic violence involving plaintiff and the child. While speculative, it was “important to note that the trial court appeared to have a substantive and justifiable reason for not interviewing” the child.