Award of attorney fees & costs as civil contempt sanctions; Taylor v. Currie; A trial court’s inherent authority to enforce its orders; In re Moroun; MCL 600.611; MCL 600.1711; MCL 600.1715; The civil contempt proceeding process; In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Principle that a court may issue an order to pay compensation for actual loss or injury caused by a contemnor’s misconduct; In re Contempt of United Stationers Supply Co.; MCL 600.1721; Robin Woods, Inc. v. Woods (3d Cir.); Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund of Local Union #58, IBEW v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co. (6th Cir.); Trial courts’ inherent authority to sanction litigants & their counsel; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; “In connection with”; United States v. Loney (3d Cir.); Inapplicability of the law of the case doctrine; Ashker v. Ford Motor Co.; Prentis Family Found., Inc. v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Inst.; KBD & Assoc., Inc. v. Great Lakes Foam Techs., Inc.; Kasben v. Hoffman; Webb v. Smith; Construing stipulated orders under the rules of contract interpretation; Phillips v. Jordan; Woodington v. Shokoohi; Availability of contract defenses; Limbach v. Oakland Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs; Whether applying the stipulated hourly fee rates would generate a windfall & result in overcompensation; Smith v. Khouri

The court held that the appellants-attorney and law firm’s (collectively Charron) argument that the award of attorney fees and costs as civil contempt sanctions had to be limited to the contempt trial lacked merit, and that its statements in a prior appeal did not create the law of the case because they addressed a separate argument. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order granting the plaintiffs (collectively Morris) $349,416 in attorney fees and $14,090.77 in costs from Charron. The court noted that the trial court indicated “it would hold Charron accountable for the fees and costs Morris incurred as a result of the contempt hearing, but it did not limit remuneration to simply those incurred from the actual trial.” On two occasions in its opinion and order, it “stated that Charron would be responsible for fees and costs Morris ‘incurred in pursuing civil contempt’ and ‘in connection with this contempt proceeding.’” The phrase “in connection with” is expansive. The trial court “expressed the intent to compensate Morris ‘in a manner that reflects economic reality,’ suggesting the recognition that the costs ‘incurred in pursuing civil contempt’ sanctions would exceed those associated solely with the formal trial.” Its statements were “consistent with the understanding that civil contempt sanctions comprise ‘a compensatory remedy’ intended to ‘compensate the complainant.’” The court also rejected the claim that its prior ruling on appeal supported Charron’s position and constituted the law of the case. In the prior appeal, Charron argued that the time delay between the issuance of the show cause order for contempt and the actual transfer of the assets (the basis for the contempt) had served to enhance or increase the underlying damages. This was a separate and distinct issue from “the determination and calculation of the contempt sanction.” The court noted that the trial court was authorized by case law and statute to award Morris attorney fees and costs incurred related to “Charron’s civil contempt[,]” and that in challenging some of the approved billings, Charron did “not specifically identify each billing or time entry alleged to be erroneously included by the trial court in its computation.”