Other acts evidence involving a minor; MCL 768.27a(1); People v. Pattison; People v. Duenaz; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v. Uribe; People v. Watkins; People v. Pesquera; Effect of a prior acquittal; People v. Oliphant; People v. Gibson; People v. Bolden; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 13; Whether there was a “continuing pattern of criminal behavior”; MCL 777.43; People v. Carll; Whether the “offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against a person”; MCL 777.43(1)(c); Consideration of all crimes within a 5-year period; MCL 777.43(2)(a); Principle that if no pattern of felonious criminal activity existed, the trial court must score OV 13 at zero points; MCL 777.43(1)(g); Discovery; MCR 6.201; People v. Greenfield; People v. Phillips; Authentication; MRE 901(a); People v. Berkey; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; Trial strategy; People v. Heft; People v. Matuszak; Failure to call witnesses; People v. Julian; A substantial defense; People v. Kelly; Impeachment; People v. Roscoe; Expert testimony; People v. Kowalski; People v. Stricklin
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other acts evidence or by scoring OV 13. Defendant was convicted of CSC II for sexually abusing the victim, HT, after she, her adoptive mother, and her brother moved into defendant’s trailer. The trial court sentenced him, as a second-offense habitual offender, to a prison term of 3 to 22-1/2 years. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of TG, who testified that defendant sexually abused her in 1993. It first noted that “the trial court’s comment that the issue was a ‘close call’ and that the evidence would therefore be admitted reveals that it weighed the propensity inference in favor of the evidence’s probative value.” In addition, “[g]iven the similarity of the acts and the settings in which they occurred, the temporal divide between their occurrences, standing alone, would not preclude the evidence’s admission.” Further, his “prior acquittal does not necessarily establish his innocence of the crime charged in that case, only that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lastly, although CSC II “can be proven simply on the basis of the victim’s testimony,” HT’s “delay in reporting the abuse to her mother, as well as the lack of physical evidence, heightened the probative value of the evidence of the similar assaults against TG.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by scoring 25 points for OV 13, holding that “HT’s testimony provided a factual basis to support the trial court’s scoring of OV 13, and defendant was provided with an opportunity to challenge her testimony.” Finally, the court rejected the arguments in defendant’s Standard IV brief as meritless. Affirmed.
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