Motion to change children’s school enrollment; The Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.); Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Pierron v. Pierron (Pierron I & II); The statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Whether the trial court conducted a full evidentiary hearing; Lombardo v. Lombardo; Whether the trial court dismissed objections on the basis of res judicata; Mootness; Request to modify parenting time; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Shade v. Wright; Kaeb v. Kaeb; Sufficiency of a parent’s remarriage & the children’s relationship with members of their step-family to meet the initial threshold of a change of circumstances under Shade; Determining whether Vodvarka or Shade applies; Lieberman v. Orr; Curless v. Curless

Concluding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, determine whether an ECE existed, and address the MCL 722.23 factors, the court vacated the order denying the defendant-father’s school change request. It also found that remand was required as to his request to modify parenting time because the trial court failed to determine if an ECE existed, let alone whether a modification would change it. The record showed that the trial court did not give “the parties an opportunity to fully present evidence on the issue of whether changing the children’s school was in their best interests.” The attorneys presented their arguments, the parties “were placed under oath, and the trial court asked them questions.” Given that it had to determine the children’s ECE, “whether the requested change would alter it, and whether such a request was in” the children’s best interests, an evidentiary hearing in the form of a Lombardo hearing was required. No evidence was introduced, no witnesses were called, there was no cross-examination by opposing counsel, and the trial court did not expressly consider the statutory best-interest factors. Thus, the court found that it “failed to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the request to change the children’s school enrollment,” requiring remand. Further, the legal error in failing to determine whether an ECE existed and whether the school change would alter it was sufficient to require vacation and remand. In addition, the failure to address any of the MCL 722.23 factors, let alone declare which ones applied and which did not, was “fatal.” On remand, it must first determine the issues as to the ECE “and then conduct a full analysis of the best-interest factors.” Also, “a determination of the effect of the parenting time modification on the custodial environment is necessary to determine” whether the Vodvarka or the Shade standard applies in determining the children’s best interests. If the trial court decides on remand that the Shade standard applies, “it need only make findings on the contested issues. However, if it concludes that the stricter Vodvarka standard applies, then it must address all of the best-interest factors.”