Dispute over the type of hospitalization for a person requiring mental health treatment; Burden of proof for placement of a person found to be in need of treatment; The Mental Health Code (MCL 330.1001 et seq.); MCL 330.1465; “Civil commitment” proceedings; People v. Dobben; People v. Miller; People v. Williams; In re KB; In re Baker; In re Wagstaff; Petition for a continuing order of involuntary mental health treatment; MCL 330.1473; MCL 330.1472a(4); Options & time limitations for involuntary mental health treatment; MCL 330.1472a(3); “Involuntary mental health treatment” defined; MCL 330.1400(f); Forms of treatment; MCL 330.1468(2); MCL 330.1472a(3); “Person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401; Report assessing the current availability & appropriateness of alternatives to hospitalization; MCL 330.1453a; MCL 330.1469a(1); MCL 330.1470; Distinguishing burden of proof & standard of proof; Palenkas v. Beaumont Hosp.; Mayor of Cadillac v. Blackburn; Kar v. Hogan; “Shall” defined; Browder v. International Fid. Ins. Co.; Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Hardy; Harmless error; MCR 2.613(A); In re Sprint Commc’ns Co., LP, Complaint; “Hospital” defined; MCL 330.1100b(7); “Psychiatric unit” defined; MCL 333.20106; MCL 330.1100c(8); “Department” defined; MCL 330.1100a(21); “Hospitalization” defined; MCL 330.1100b(9); Order that respondent remain at the Center for Forensic Psychiatry (CFP) until “further order of the court”; MCL 330.2050(5); MCL 330.1476; “Discharge” defined; MCL 330.1100a(27); “Hospital director” defined; MCL 330.1100b(8)

Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that a probate court’s treatment determination must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the probate court in this case erred by failing to apply this standard and instead determining that no evidentiary standard applied. Thus, it reversed and remanded. In 1974, respondent was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the murder of a child. As a result, he was committed to the CFP. In 2016, the probate court denied his request to be transferred to a treatment center (HPC). On appeal, the court found that the probate court erred by ruling that there was no applicable burden of proof as to determining the appropriate form of treatment to order, and that the absence of an evidentiary standard or burden of proof meant that none need be employed. It agreed with respondent that “the default standard in civil cases—preponderance of the evidence—applies to the probate court’s determination of the form of treatment to order.” The court noted that “there must be a ‘standard of proof’ because without one, a probate court could conceivably justify a factual finding based on ‘some’ or even a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” It then held that “MCL 330.1469a requires that a preponderance of the evidence support the probate court’s findings with respect to its determinations regarding an individual’s treatment and placement.” Further, “the proponent of a particular form of treatment or placement at a specific facility for an individual who has been found to be a person requiring treatment bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to persuade the probate court to enter such an order and for the probate court to be legally justified in entering such an order pursuant to” the Mental Health Code (MHC). Thus, “the probate court erred by ruling that there was no applicable burden of proof to its treatment determination and issuing its treatment order without tying it to any evidentiary standard.” And this error was not harmless. The court also noted that “the probate court was specifically directed to look to MCL 330.1468, which sets forth . . . potential treatment options, and the probate court did not err by referring to this statute.” In addition, “the probate court must determine whether the evidence establishes that [HPC] meets the statutory definition of ‘hospital’ for purposes of” the MHC. Lastly, “if the probate court determines that respondent must remain hospitalized at the CFP, the probate court shall not include language ordering respondent to remain ‘until further order of the court.’”