Felonious assault; People v. Chambers; People v. Meissner; Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Gonzalez; Intent; People v. Kanaan; Sentencing; People v. Hardy; People v. Francisco; Scoring of 15 points for OV 1; People v. Brooks; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Unger (On Remand); People v. Taylor; People v. Rodgers; Right to the counsel of choice; People v. Ackerman; Right to effective assistance of counsel; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963 art. 1, § 20; People v. Cline; Venue; People v. Webbs; People v. Houthoofd; Absence of any apparent reason to challenge venue; People v. Jordan; Ignoring a request to object to certain questions posed by the prosecutor; Mentioning three times that defendant had previously been to jail; Conflict of interest; People v. Smith; Right to an impartial jury; People v. Budzyn; People v. Jendrzejewski; Cause under MCR 2.511(D); People v. Walker; MCR 2.511(D)(3); Presumption that jurors are impartial until shown otherwise; People v. Miller; People v. Hughes; Deference to the trial court’s superior ability to assess a venireman’s demeanor; People v. Williams; Jury instructions; People v. McFall; People v. Mills; People v. Clark; Denial of access to legal resources; People v. Mack; Proctor v. White Lake Twp. Police Dep’t

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felonious assault, that OV 1 was correctly scored, and it rejected his claims as to the effective assistance of counsel, the makeup of the jury, and the jury instructions. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to serve 3 to 15 years in prison. The gas station attendant “was ‘concerned’ when defendant instructed him to call 911 before” he told him that he was being robbed and pulled out knives. He recalled that “defendant then opened both knives and pointed the open blades at him from four or five feet away. He said he took defendant ‘seriously’ and thought that defendant wanted to rob him. He described being ‘a little nervous’ when defendant pulled out the knives, and did not run because he did not want to encourage defendant’s retaliation or cause panic for those around. He said that he did not know what would happen, or what defendant would do.” Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he committed an assault. He claimed that “the attendant only felt intimidated, or concerned, rather than fearful, and that defendant did not make a threat.” However, it was “reasonable to infer that the attendant, who had knives drawn on him and then pointed at him, was placed in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” It could reasonably be inferred from his testimony that he “did not know what defendant was going to do and did not want to alarm defendant by trying to flee, and that he complied with the demand to call 911 out of reasonable fear that he could be assaulted with the knives that defendant was pointing at him.” Thus, the evidence supported the jury’s finding that “defendant’s actions placed the attendant in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” As to intent, he noted that “he was several feet away from the attendant at the time he drew and pointed the knives at” him. But from the evidence that he “was pointing knives at and telling the attendant that he was going to rob the store, and that defendant told the police that he wanted to be incarcerated, a reasonable inference arises that he intended to instill fear in the attendant so that he would be compelled to call 911. Despite the distance, the attendant did not know what defendant would do and he could have feared that defendant would lunge at him with the knives or chase him. The situation was sufficiently compelling for the attendant to call the police and activate a silent alarm, as defendant intended.” Affirmed.