Attorney fees for representing a criminal defendant in post-conviction proceedings; Capping fees pursuant to a county fee schedule without considering whether additional requested fees were reasonable; In re Foster Attorney Fees; MCL 775.16; In re Ujlaky; In re Attorney Fees of Jamnik

Agreeing with the appellant-attorney that the trial court abused its discretion by capping attorney fees pursuant to the county fee schedule without considering whether his additional requested fees were reasonable, the court reversed the order granting in part his motion for reconsideration and awarding him $1,000 in fees, and remanded. The case arose from fees he charged for his representation of the defendant in her post-conviction proceedings. The court noted that although the “trial court expressed some concern about the 10.1 hours spent on the delayed application for leave,” it did not determine that this or any other amount of time appellant spent on the “case was unreasonable. However, it clearly relied on the Kalamazoo County policy capping compensation for appeals involving guilty pleas.” Appellant asked the trial court at the hearing “to consider whether the hours spent in each category on his itemized billing statement were reasonable.” But it declined to do so on the record, instead agreeing to examine his “itemized hours and issue a written opinion. In the written opinion, the trial court concluded that [he] was entitled to the maximum amounts allotted by” the county for representing defendant “at her plea-withdrawal hearing and her appeal, but it did not determine that any of the additional time” appellant spent on the case, for which he requested additional fees, was unreasonable. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to either award the full amount of his requested fees “or determine its basis for concluding that the amount was not reasonable.” The court remanded for such a determination.