Modification of a spousal support award; MCL 552.28; Luckow v Luckow; Modification of a child support award; MCL 552.517(1); Brendel v Morris; “Changed circumstances”; Laffin v Laffin; Security bond; MCR 2.109; In re Surety Bond for Costs; “Substantial reason”; Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) & (b)(ii); Kern v Kern-Koskela; Caperton v Massey; Reassignment to another judge; Swain v Morse

The court held that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-ex-husband’s motion for leave to proceed without posting bond, and (2) the trial court judge was not biased against him. During the parties’ contentious divorce proceedings, the trial court made several rulings, including ordering defendant to attend anger management and requiring him to post security. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his ex parte request to proceed with his motion to modify child and spousal support without first posting security. It was not left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the trial court erred by “rejecting defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s alleged actions to sabotage his employment in the bankruptcy field amounted to a changed circumstance that would require the [trial] court to revisit child and spousal support.” Because he “did not present the trial court with evidence of changed circumstances or new facts arising after entry of the support orders,” it did not err by “holding that his motion to modify the trial court’s orders of child support and spousal support was without merit.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court displayed bias against him by “(1) referring him to an anger management course, (2) failing to set aside its own ideals when making certain rulings, and (3) shaming and attacking” his mental health. “[R]ather than reflecting a favoritism for plaintiff, or antagonism against defendant, the trial court’s ruling reflected a fair judgment in an effort to help the parties coparent in a more effective manner. Notably, [it] also ordered both parties to enroll in a coparenting course.” In addition, “particularly after defendant informed the trial court that he was not able to sign up for any of the anger management programs recommended by the court, the trial court’s decision to refer him to Step Forward for an anger management course in no way appeared improper.” Further, rather than “reflecting an antagonism against defendant and an intention to humiliate and shame him by having him enroll in a program for which he was ineligible, the record demonstrates that the trial court referred [him] to the Step Forward program in an effort to accommodate both [his] schedule and his financial circumstances.” Moreover, contrary to his “assertions, the record was replete with evidence of defendant’s impulsivity and his inability to control his anger, particularly toward plaintiff.” Finally, remand (and reassignment to a new judge) was not necessary. Affirmed.