The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Compliance with the verification & notice requirements of MCL 600.6431; Effect of a plaintiff’s compliance with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1406 (the public-building exception to governmental immunity); MCL 691.1404(2); Goodhue v Department of Transp; Fairley v Department of Corrs; Christie v Wayne State Univ; The Court of Claims Act (COCA)

The court held that “under MCL 691.1404(2)’s plain and unambiguous language, a claimant under the public-building exception” to governmental immunity (MCL 691.1406) “who complies with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1404(2) is deemed to have satisfied the notice requirement in the COCA.” Thus, it concluded the trial court erred in summarily dismissing plaintiff-Noyes’s complaint asserting a claim under MCL 691.1406 for failure to comply with MCL 600.6431. Defendant-Oakland University argued that Noyes’s claim was properly dismissed because it was undisputed that he “did not sign or verify his notice as required by MCL 600.6431(2)(d).” Noyes contended “that his compliance with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1406 constituted compliance with MCL 600.6431.” The court noted that resolving this issue turned “on the proper interpretation and application of the relevant statutory provisions.” Apart from the plain language of MCL 691.1404(2), the court found that statutory context also supported its interpretation. Reading the GTLA as a whole, it appeared “that the Legislature deliberately chose to treat claims under MCL 691.1404 and MCL 691.1406 differently from other claims under the GTLA with respect to sworn statements before litigation. That difference expressly includes deeming a notice filed under MCL 691.1404 as constituting compliance with the notice requirements in MCL 600.6431.” In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court primarily relied on Fairley, which concerned the motor-vehicle exception. But “unlike the public-building exception at issue in this case, the statutory language addressing notice under the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, is silent on how to proceed with a claim against the state.” Thus, the court found that Fairley was “not dispositive to the proper interpretation of the interplay between the notice requirements in MCL 600.6431 and MCL 691.1406.” It further determined that defendant’s reliance on Christie was misplaced. While “Christie states that a party suing the state must comply with MCL 600.6431, the Supreme Court also acknowledges that, by operation of law as set forth in MCL 691.1404, following the requirements of MCL 691.1404 itself constitutes such compliance.” Reversed.